Is it none of their business? Business and democratization,the case of Turkey

This article explains how the Turkish business' regime preferences have evolved from pro-authoritarian to pro-democratic in the context of dual transitions, in response to changes in incentive structures shaped by domestic, regional and international parameters. It particularly focuses on big business and highlights the central role that greater exposure to international competition during the course of opening up and liberalization played in the evolution of its regime preferences. The article suggests that the central mechanism which has led to the regime preference change is socialization by strategic calculation facilitated by business' increasing incorporation into transnational networks. It asserts that the Turkish big business' experience is particularly interesting because international exposure not only created new opportunities for big business, but also new divisions and rivalries within the business community. These new rivals formed flourishing alliances with the government, with their accompanying claims to power that challenged the big business' previous hegemony in accessing state resources. In the process, big business' fear of losing its privileged status to rival business groups and the resulting uncertainties led big business to associate democratization with higher benefits, as they became increasingly aware of the link between democratization and diminished uncertainties, through their interaction with transnational business networks. Consequently, big business consolidated its pro-democratic stance as shifting domestic alliances enhanced the need for diminishing uncertainties, while internationalization along with the prospect of EU membership increased the cost of status quo.     

Regulating webcasting: An analysis of the Audiovisual Media Services Directive and the current broadcasting law in the UK

Webcasting is an emerging industry, which steadily gains significance as technology enables efficient delivery of video content via Internet. The regulation of webcasting is a topic worthy of debate: Regulating webcasting heavy-handedly may result in stifled innovation whereas not imposing any regulation carries the danger of an un-level playing field between webcasters and stringently regulated broadcasters. In the wake of the Audiovisual Media Services (AVMS) Directive's adoption, the debate has inevitably come to the attention of national regulators of EU Member States, and will remain on OFCOM's agenda until the Directive's implementation into UK law is completed. This article provides an analysis of both the AVMS Directive and the current UK broadcasting law as regards to its applicability to Internet-based services in order to identify UK's current standing prior to implementation; discusses the role of alternatives to state regulation (self- and co-regulation) in the implementation process and finally addresses the DCMS Public Consultation on the Implementation of AVMS Directive revealing the government's plan for the implementation.     

Constructing the homeland: Kazakhstan's discourse and policies surrounding its ethnic return-migration policy

A new political development that emerged after the disintegration of the Soviet Union was the adoption of ‘homeland stances’ by the newly independent states. Through the construction of the homeland image, the states of the region claimed responsibility not only for their own citizens, but also for a diaspora community of co-ethnics. Kazakhstan became one of these states and its leadership portrayed Kazakhstan as the homeland of the Kazakh diaspora. Furthermore, Kazakhstan's leadership developed far more active homeland rhetoric and initiated an ethnic return-migration policy as early as 1992. This paper will explore the discourse of Kazakhstan's leadership on the repatriation of its co-ethnics as well as the legal and political context that it created to achieve their smooth absorption into domestic society.     

The politics of de‐delegation: Regulatory (in)dependence in Turkey

This essay explores the rise and decline of regulatory independence in Turkey. Framing the ongoing process of limiting independence of these agencies as the politics of de‐delegation, it raises the question of why Turkish regulatory agencies have become subject to increasing political intervention. Contending that institutional legacies and mounting illiberal predispositions of the Turkish state facilitate the politics of de‐delegation, the essay focuses on centralization, executive discretion, and politicization of bureaucracy as the major institutional legacies. Then it briefly discusses formal and informal mechanisms of political intervention, which have impaired the independence of the regulatory agencies.