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Clientelist systems vary, and this variation influences the adoption and evolution of conditional cash transfer (CCT) programmes. We find that vertically integrated, corporatist clientelism in Mexico and more locally oriented, bossist clientelism in Brazil differentially shape the choices of governments to turn piecemeal, discretionary CCTs into more expansive and secure benefits.  相似文献   
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Osborne and Gaebler's Reinventing Government offers a powerful image of a revolution in government. This article explores some of the assumptions of that seminal work as they relate to the nature of the change process. Parallels are drawn with the debate on the nineteenth-century revolution in government, and Osborne and Gaebler's work is judged unlikely to survive the critical perspective of history. Their work may nonetheless be taken as providing a research agenda for the study of the recent extensive changes in British local government. To this end, the findings of the two major surveys of organizational change conducted by the Local Government Management Board are examined to see if such a revolution is indeed occurring. The conclusion is drawn that some, but by no means all, of Osborne and Gaebler's propositions are supported by this evidence, although their account of how change has come about is rejected.  相似文献   
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We use the National Crime Victimization Survey to examine whether domestic violence is less likely to be repeated if it is reported to the police and if the offender is arrested. Our longitudinal analyses suggest that reporting has a fairly strong deterrent effect, whereas the effect of arrest is small and statistically insignificant. We find no support for the hypothesis that offenders retaliate when victims (rather than third parties) call the police or when victims sign complaints. We also find no evidence that the effects of reporting or arrest depend on the seriousness of the offense, a history of violence by the offender or sociodemographic characteristics. Our results suggest that the best policies for deterrence will be those that encourage victims and third parties to report violence by intimate partners to the police.  相似文献   
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