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Kevin J. Elliott 《American journal of political science》2020,64(2):385-397
This article describes how issue specialization through deliberative institutions called “issue publics” can improve the quality of democratic decision making. Issue specialization improves decisions by instantiating a cognitive division of labor among the mass public, which creates efficiencies in decision making and grants large groups of average citizens a scalable advantage over small groups of even the smartest and most capable individuals. Issue specialization further improves decisions by capturing issue-specific information, concentrating it within the specialized deliberative enclaves of issue publics, and refining citizens’ issue preferences. These advantages are brought to bear in wider democratic politics and policy through information shortcuts and through the specialized electoral incentives of representatives. The article responds to concerns about political ignorance, polarization/partisanship, rent seeking, and socioeconomic bias and argues that issue specialization can provide a valuable brake to polarization yet needs institutional supplementation to engage marginalized citizens and combat bias. 相似文献
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Kevin B. Smith 《American journal of political science》2006,50(4):1013-1022
What drives policymakers to put the interests of others above their own? If human nature is inherently selfish, it makes sense to institutionalize incentives that counter decision makers' temptations to use their positions to benefit themselves over others. A growing literature rooted in evolutionary theories of human behavior, however, suggests that humans, under certain circumstances, have inherent predispositions towards “representational altruism,” i.e., to make an authoritative decision to benefit another at one's own expense. Drawing on Hibbing and Alford's conception of the wary cooperator, a theoretical case is made for such behavioral expectations, which are confirmed in a series of original laboratory experiments. 相似文献
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The framers of the U.S. Constitution explicitly designed federalismto enhance representation. Because powers are divided amongmultiple governments, citizens are able to exert pressure onthe elected officials of various governments in an effort toachieve desired outcomes. If one government is not doing whatcitizens prefer, they can seek it from a different government.This assumes that individuals form opinions about the functionsperformed by different governments. Given the complexity offederalism, this may be an unrealistic assumption for many citizens.Original survey data uniquely suited to explore this questionsuggest that citizens do behave in a fashion consistent withthe federalist framework. Moreover, the actual change in theassignment of functional responsibilities across governmentsbehaves as if it responds to public opinion. 相似文献
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