Dagher redux: searching for the missing pieces

The most relevant question for any joint venture is, when does the relationship become a jointventure and not simply a price-fixing cartel? With respect to this question, this Article juxtaposes Texaco, Inc. v. Dagher, 126 S. Ct. 1276 (2006), against years of contrary precedent. In Dagher, the Court altered the seemingly settled foundation of antitrust law by changing its view on past holdings and abandoning the ancillary effects doctrine. The Article provides an outline of key holdings prior to Dagher, as well as a discussion of the issues that can arise as joint ventures are formed. Additionally, the authors examine how the decision altered the foundation of joint venture law in the United States. In particular, the Article exposes several important antitrust concerns relating to joint ventures that the Supreme Court did not address in Dagher. Perhaps the most perplexing issue of Dagher is whether the venture at issue would have survived analysis under the Federal Trade Commission's "continuum" approach.     

Toward a definitive antitrust standard for nonprofit hospital mergers

Despite decades of federal and state regulatory efforts to encourage more efficient utilization of hospital resources, recent federal antitrust enforcement actions assert that nonprofit hospital mergers are detrimental to consumers. This policy, however, is derived from misguided attempts to apply the economic assumptions of for-profit industries to the nonprofit hospital sector and to extend statutes enacted to restrain national economic concentration to local nonprofit enterprises. This paper concludes that a rational antitrust enforcement policy that recognizes the unique characteristics of hospital markets can be described within the confines of existing antitrust statutes.     

Price competition in hospital markets: the significance of managed care

Anticompetitive conduct in the healthcare industry is often hard to detect, and has been ignored by some courts that appear to lack an understanding of managed care and its significance in maintaining price competition. These courts have adopted an approach that is far too historical and mechanistic, and is characterized by outdated factors analyzed in isolation from each other. In order to preserve effective price competition, the courts should embrace a realistic analysis that accurately reflects the workings of health services markets. This article describes the many facets of market power and anticompetitive conduct, and how they affect healthcare prices. The author then tums to an analysis of two recent hospital antitrust decisions, and critiques them for their failure to properly analyze the dynamics of local hospital markets.