The Darfur Report and Genocidal Intent

The author argues that the Commission of Inquiry on Darfur,in excluding any genocidal intent in the Government authoritiesof the Sudan, while leaving open the possibility for individualstate officials or members of militias to entertain such intent,did not duly take into account the various views on genocidalintent put forward in legal literature. In the author's opinion,genocide — typically, that is, for all practical purposes— requires a collective activity of a group, state orentity — activity in which individual perpetrators participate.As for the genocidal intent of individual perpetrators —in this typical scenario, according to the author — oneshould distinguish between (i) the view, upheld by the InternationalCriminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the InternationalCriminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), as well as the Commissionof Inquiry, that such intent is the aim physically to destroya protected group, and (ii) the more correct view that suchintent consists of the individual's (a) knowledge of a genocidalcampaign and (b) at least dolus eventualis as regards the atleast partial destruction of a protected group. This legal constructionof genocidal intent does not, however, lead to conclusions substantiallydifferent from those reached by the Commission of Inquiry withregard to the mental attitude of the Sudanese Government andmilitias: as they did not act pursuant to a collective goalto destroy a protected group, no genocidal intent could materialize.However, contrary to the Commission's conclusions, it followsfrom this proposition that no genocidal intent could be foundeither if, in some instances, single individuals were held tohave acted with the desire to see the protected group destroyed.For, in this event, the two requirements for individual genocidalintent would be lacking, namely knowledge of a genocidal campaign(on the premise that no such campaign was carried out), anda fortiori dolus eventualis.     

Niskanen effects in the California Community Colleges

The regression results of this paper show that bureaucrats act to maximize both their outputs and their discretionary budgets as predicted by Niskanen for demand constrained conditions. But the evidence does not confirm the Niskanen hypothesis concerning chronic oversupply by bureaus. Further, the evidence here shows that the discretionary budgets of bureaus may not fall to zero as suggested by Niskanen. Instead, it would appear that, given severe budget constraint bureaus may not produce an excess supply of output and may cut costs in an effort to maintain a positive discretionary budget balance.