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OTA WEINBERGER 《Ratio juris》1992,5(3):252-268
Abstract
The author distinguishes two concepts of practical reason: (a) practical reason as a source of practical principles, and (b) practical reason as the theory of thought operations connected with action. He proves that there is no practical recognition in the sense (a). We can deal with actions only on the basis of dichotomic semantics. Critical analyses of some theories of practical reason are presented (Kant, Lorenzen, Apel, Alexy). The critical part of the paper mainly concerns the discourse theory and its implications for practical philosophy and jurisprudence. 相似文献
The author distinguishes two concepts of practical reason: (a) practical reason as a source of practical principles, and (b) practical reason as the theory of thought operations connected with action. He proves that there is no practical recognition in the sense (a). We can deal with actions only on the basis of dichotomic semantics. Critical analyses of some theories of practical reason are presented (Kant, Lorenzen, Apel, Alexy). The critical part of the paper mainly concerns the discourse theory and its implications for practical philosophy and jurisprudence. 相似文献
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OTA WEINBERGER 《Ratio juris》1991,4(1):18-35
Abstract. The author criticizes Kelsen's distinction between static and dynamic systems of norms and his theory of legal dynamics. The author moreover presents the institutionalist conception of legal dynamics. Kelsen's concept of static systems is incompatible with normological scepticism: The deduction of rules from a basic principle depends on additional premises; even in static systems there is a kind of dynamics produced by actual facts. Kelsen's conception of legal dynamics is also incompatible with normological scepticism and with Kelsen's demand of purity of jurisprudence. In the institutionalist conception Iegal dynamics is rather conceived as an interplay of legal norms and facts. Empowering relations, the principle of co-validity, temporal limits of norms, derogation, legal validity and the basic norm are analysed accordingly. Appendices deal with Paulson's empowering theory of legal norm and Lippold's double-faced reconstruction of the legal order. 相似文献
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OTA WEINBERGER 《Ratio juris》1994,7(2):239-253
Abstract . The author outlines limitations of the explanation capacity of Habermas's Discourse Philosophy, because of its problematic presuppositions. The main topics discussed are: (i) the legitimacy of legal systems; (ii) Habermas's concept of democracy; (iii) his theory of justice. Legitimacy cannot be based only on discourse processes, but it has to be defined by international law. Discourses in society are essential for democratic systems, but the discourses by themselves do not guarantee the optimal result as discourses may be disturbed by deceptive propaganda, by prejudices or by wrong political slogans. It is not convincing that discourse procedures guarantee impartiality and justice nor that in discourses better arguments always prevail. 相似文献
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OTA WEINBERGER 《Ratio juris》1995,8(3):261-270
Abstract. This paper is an answer to Mazzarese (1993) in which the author argues that Kelsen's normological scepticism is a consequence of his theory of legal dynamics and of his views on the relation between higher and lower norms. The author rejects this tenet and reasserts his opinion that there is an essential break between the classical Pure Theory of Law and Kelsen's late doctrine. Therefore an inquiry is justified whether the theses and concepts of the classical Pure Theory are compatible with normological scepticism in Kelsen (1979). Mazzarese's comments on neo-institutionalist views on legal validity are based on a misinterpretation of this conception. 相似文献
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OTA WEINBERGER 《Ratio juris》1996,9(3):248-257
Abstract. Political and juristic enquiry must be conceived of as an action theoretical approach. On the basis of his formal and finalistic action theory as well as his neo-institutionalist view, the author sketches the role of information in modern democracy. He holds the view that democratic institutions are always in danger of being misused. The complex role of mass media, party propaganda and the detrimental effects of state propaganda are analyzed. The author deals with some general features of information processes in the realm of political practice: Information has to be considered in relation to action; the message by itself does not show whether the information is true; there are two forms of reception of information, active and passive reception. Information processes have a deep influence on personal as well as on political liberty. The intrusion of marketing-methods of propaganda in political practice is a great danger for democratic life, particularly if realized by the state or central institutions. It can destroy intellectual freedom, which is a prerequisite of discursive democracy. Democracy and human liberty can flourish only in an open society. 相似文献
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