Judicial Greatness and the Duties of a Judge

This paper addresses the phenomenon of judicial greatness by developing a general concept of greatness and applying it to law. Under the view offered in the paper, greatness (in general, and also in law) is connected to theoretical or methodological diversification. When applied to adjudication, this means that great judges are revered because they successfully make a prima facie case for their novel adjudicative methods. This is not a judicial duty but rather a voluntary (and in some circumstances, morally supererogatory) project. However, once a judge succeeds in making such a prima facie case, he is exempt (to a certain degree) from other judicial duties (including the duty to follow the law). This thesis challenges many theories of judicial duty, which do not allow normative room for supererogatory actions in law. The paper demonstrates these claims by discussing two paradigmatic great judges – Chief Justice Marshall and Justice Holmes.     

The Uneasy Case for Comparative Negligence

This article questions, and in some contexts disproves, thevalidity of the efficiency justifications for the comparativenegligence rule. One argument in the literature suggests thatcomparative negligence is the superior rule in the presenceof court errors. The analysis here shows the analytical flawin this claim and conducts numerical simulations — a formof synthetic "empirical" tests — that prove the potentialsuperiority of other rules. The second argument in the literaturein favor of the comparative negligence rule is based on itsalleged superior ability to deal with private information. Thisarticle develops a general approach to liability rules as mechanismsthat induce self-selection among actors. It then shows thatself-selection can occur, not only under comparative negligence,but also under every other negligence rule. These conclusionsweaken the efficiency explanation for the growing appeal ofthe "division-of-liability" principle within tort law and beyond.     

The (Legal) Value of Chance: Distorted Measures of Recovery in Private Law

Parties who make investments that generate externalities maysometimes recover from the beneficiaries, even in the absenceof contract. Previous scholarship has shown that granting recovery,based on either the cost of reasonable investment or the benefitconferred, can provide optimal incentives to invest. This articledemonstrates that the law often awards recovery that is neitherpurely cost-based nor purely benefit-based and instead equalseither the greater or lesser of the two measures. These hybridapproaches to recovery distort compensation and incentives.The article demonstrates the surprising prevalence of thesepractices and explores informational and institutional reasonswhy they emerge.