BUREAUCRATIC DECENTRALIZATION AND THE REDISTRIBUTION OF URBAN SERVICES: THE CASE OF TEAM POLICING1

Two extreme positions dominate the decentralization debate in urban politics: one school consistently opposes decentralization, while the other maintains that only complete radical community control can solve the problems of politics and administration in the city. Positions and policies between these two extremes tend to get lost in rhetoric and argument, or receive only passing recognition. This paper is an attempt to carve out, theoretically and empirically, some space for an intermediate position. Following a brief exploration of the decentralization debate, we discuss and present some analysis from a team policing experiment, a type of ecentralization that falls in between the two extremes. The data suggest that this type of decentralization can be successful if the program is designed as a non-zero-sum game, and the paper concludes that intermediate programs represent attractive third choices to discredited or unworkable alternatives.     

In search for rules that secure gains from cooperation: the heuristic value of social dilemmas for normative institutional economics

We ask how normative statements are possible within an economic theory framework that recognises the importance of institutional arrangements. Instead of applying established outcome-oriented criteria of social welfare, we examine whether the rules of economic interaction allow the acquisition of gains from cooperation. We suggest to reconstruct any interaction as an existing or repealed social dilemma. This approach helps to identify common rule interests which create room for improvement of all parties involved, and to suggest desirable institutional reforms. Our policy applications include the unemployment problem and rural credit markets.      

High-performance liquid chromatography-ultraviolet-visible spectroscopy-electrospray ionization mass spectrometry method for acrylic and polyester forensic fiber dye analysis

A critical point of comparison between a fiber collected from a crime scene and a fiber from a known source is the color. Fiber dye analysis using thin-layer chromatography or ultraviolet (UV)-visible (Vis) microspectrophotometry provides useful, although limited, data for comparison. High-performance liquid chromatography-electrospray ionization mass spectrometry (LC/MS) overcomes these limitations by integrating chromatography, ultraviolet-visible spectroscopy, and mass spectrometry into a single instrument. In order to evaluate the applicability of the LC/MS to forensic fiber dye analysis, a multi-stage chromatographic method using acidified water and acidified acetonitrile was developed that separated and identified a mixture of 15 basic and 13 disperse dye standards. The LC/MS also detected and analyzed dyes extracted from individual 0.5 cm acrylic and polyester fibers, demonstrating its applicability to this type of analysis. With regard to the analysis of disperse dyes in polyester fibers, the replacement of pyridine with acetonitrile in the extraction system allowed direct injection of the extracts into the LC/MS. The advantage of the LC/MS over other instrumental methods of textile dye analysis is demonstrated by the analysis and differentiation of three black acrylic fibers: two fibers had similar UV-Vis spectra but were differentiated with chromatography and two had similar UV-Vis spectra and chromatograms but were differentiated using the mass spectrometer.     

The return of the regulator: Kazakhstan’s cotton sector reforms since independence

What would a ‘good’ industrial policy in the realm of cotton production look like? This article seeks to address this question through a focus on reforms to the cotton sector in Kazakhstan. In contrast with neighbouring Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, administrators in Kazakhstan had widely freed the cotton sector from government control as early as 1998. Agricultural collectives had been replaced by small private farms, and commercial cotton processors and traders entered the sector. However, in 2007, regulation tightened again and forced ginneries to use a complex warehouse receipt system without making sure that it was accepted by stakeholders and without appropriate institutions for implementing it in place. Moreover, it imposed financing restrictions on ginneries, which were major loan and input providers to farmers. In the following years, private producers and investors turned away from cotton, and cotton area and output fell substantially. We position our analysis in the broader debate about the right approach to industrial policy and argue that the cotton sector performance after 2007 shows how ill-designed regulation and government interference can turn a promising economic sector towards decline.