Disaggregating public-private governance interactions: European Union interventions in transnational private sustainability governance

Transnational private sustainability governance, such as eco-certification, does not operate in a regulatory or jurisdictional vacuum. A public authority may intervene in private governance for various reasons, including to improve private governance's efficient functioning or to assert public regulatory primacy. This article argues that to properly understand the nature of public-private governance interactions—whether more competitive or complementary—we need to disaggregate a public authority's intervention. The article distinguishes between four features of private governance in which a public authority can intervene: standard setting, procedural aspects, supply chain signaling, and compliance incentives. Using the cases of the European Union's policies on organic agriculture and biofuels production, the article shows that public-private governance interaction dynamics vary across these private governance features as well as over time. Furthermore, the analysis highlights the importance of active lobbying by private governance actors in influencing these dynamics and the resulting policy outputs.     

The instrumental power of transnational private governance: Interest representation and lobbying by private rule‐makers

While scholars have researched transnational private governance for over two decades, we still know little about some of the specific political activities in which private rulemaking schemes engage. This article addresses this topic by bringing together hitherto separate literatures on private governance and interest groups. I argue that examining private governance's instrumental power, and interest representation and lobbying specifically, complements the literature's dominant focus on the structural and discursive power of private governance. The article makes three contributions. First, it conceptualizes private governance schemes as interest organizations by analyzing similarities and differences with traditional interest groups. Second, the article examines instrumental power empirically by assessing the participation of 48 transnational private governance schemes in the European Union's lobby register and variation among private governance schemes in this respect. Finally, the article contributes to developing a new research agenda to continue bridging the gap between the private governance and interest group literatures.     

WELFARE STANDARDS, SUBSTANTIVE TESTS, AND EFFICIENCY CONSIDERATIONS IN MERGER POLICY: DEFINING THE EFFICIENCY DEFENSE

For several years already, the efficiency defense (and its incorporationin the law) has been a much debated issue in merger policy.When discussing the introduction of an efficiency defense inmerger control, it is important to define clearly its contentand interpretation. However, different approaches to the conceptof efficiency defense exist in the literature, and it is notalways clear which jurisdictions apply an efficiency defense.Therefore, to improve communication and comparison between jurisdictions,it would be useful to reach agreement on the exact content ofan efficiency defense. This paper proposes to define the efficiencydefense along two dimensions: a conceptual one—relatedto the welfare standard—and a procedural one—relatedto the application of the substantive test. The main conclusionof this paper is that the concept of efficiency defense canonly be appropriately applied under a total welfare standardand if efficiencies can be directly balanced against the anticompetitiveeffects of mergers on a case-by-case basis. Using this definition,only in Canada and Australia (formal review process) would anefficiency defense exist.     

Transnational private governance between the logics of empowerment and control

Transnational private governance initiatives that address problems of social and environmental concern now pervade many sectors. In tackling distinct substantive problems, these programs have, however, prioritized different problem‐oriented logics in their institutionalized rules and procedures. One is a “logic of control” that focuses on ameliorating environmental and social externalities by establishing strict and enforceable rules; another is a “logic of empowerment” that concentrates on remedying the exclusion of marginalized actors in the global economy. Examining certification programs in the areas of fair trade, organic agriculture, fisheries, and forest management, we assess the evolutionary effects of programs prioritizing one logic and then having to accommodate the other. The challenges programs face when balancing between the two logics, we argue, elucidate specific distributional consequences for wealth, power, and regulatory capabilities that private governance programs seek to overcome.