Tasmania and the Secret Ballot

Encyclopaedias and handbooks, etc, all present Tasmania's starting date for implementing the secret ballot as 1858. But this research note argues the correct date was two years earlier in 1856. Moreover, before this, Tasmania's early 1830s participation in the Australia–wide proballot campaign, and its Constitutional inclinations towards the ballot have also been overlooked. To correct this omission relevant background is presented which highlights the riotous behaviour of pre–ballot elections. This is followed by a summary concerning the ballot's starting dates for Victoria and South Australia. Having confirmed these basic facts, further evidence is presented regarding Tasmania's true application of the secret ballot, including citations from a rare copy of the state's 1856 Electoral Act. In short, this "rediscovery" means that Tasmania definitely deserves a new place in the history of Australia's famous democratic innovation.     

Reducing lockup crowding with expedited initial processing of minor offenders

This article assesses the effects of one jurisdiction's attempt to control its lockup population through creation of a separate processing center designed to expedite initial processing of individuals charged with misdemeanors and minor felonies. In the new center, cases were screened and initial hearings held around-the-clock, seven days per week. “Before” and “after” samples of arrestees are compared on prosecutorial screening time, time to court, and time in custody. The results show significant reductions in case screening and length of time to initial court hearing. Individuals released on recognizance and those with no charges filed spent significantly less time in custody and saved considerable bed space for the jurisdiction. Individuals with bond set experienced no reductions in length of custody. Collateral consequences of the new facility included improved procedural justice, expanded detention capacity in the county, and an end to part of the federal litigation.     

Project USA: American competitiveness and what must be done to restore it

The United States today faces a loss of influence as a world power, a reduction in American independence as a policymaker, and a decline in the standard of living on which Americans have come to depend. History teaches that nations weaker and less productive than the United States can rise to become economic powerhouses and rapidly increase their standards of living. History also teaches that nations failing to recognize their fundamental problems will inevitably decline. American politicians must face what is abundantly clear: the United States is losing ground and must act quickly to reverse its course. This White Paper outlines what must be done. Information about the nation's current status must be analyzed and communicated. Incentives to improve the level of competence in government must be provided and maintained. The emphasis of government policy must be changed to reflect broad economic and technological interests as opposed to special interests. Savings must be encouraged and increased. Infrastructure must be improved Tax laws must be modified to help bring these changes about. Economic and technological issues must be elevated to the importance they require. American thinking must reflect the new realities: that the age of leadership through military power is over, that the requirements for success in the world of the 1990s and beyond require a sound and growing economy that is internationally competitive. The US can accomplish these goals only through foundation-shaking, comprehensive, fundamental changealong the lines we propose herein.This paper is the executive summary (with minor editing modifications) of a white paper that is available from Cornell University's Johnson Graduate School of Management.     

Decision theory,reasonable doubt,and the utility of erroneous acquittals

A criminal-trial juror votes to convict or acquit a defendant in the knowledge that the vote may be in error: False convictions and false acquittals are unavoidable in human fact-finding systems. We show here that rigorous consistency relationships exist between the juror's assessments of the relative desirability of the four possible trial outcomes and his or her threshold level of reasonable doubt. However, numerical values for reasonable doubt commonly obtained by direct questioning are significantly at variance with those obtained indirectly by computation from evaluations of the four possible outcomes. The disparity is, we argue, no mere methodological detail, but a potentially fundamental substantive issue which has historically been masked by the vagueness of verbal expressions of probability and utility.Helpful comments on earlier drafts from Gary Wagner, Michael Gottfredson, Brian Thorn, Rick Greenstein, Vernon Greene, John Bartholdi, and two anonymous reviewers are gratefully acknowledged.