Compensating Plaintiffs and Punishing Defendants: Is Bifurcation Necessary?

Critics of the civil jury have proposed several procedural reforms to address the concern that damage awards are capricious and unpredictable. One such reform is the bifurcation or separation of various phases of a trial that involves multiple claims for damages. The purpose of this study was to assess the effects of bifurcating the compensatory and punitive damages phases of a civil tort trial. We manipulated the wealth of the defendant and the reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct (both sets of evidence theoretically related to punitive but not to compensatory damages) across three cases in a jury analog study. We wondered whether jurors would misuse the punitive damages evidence in fixing compensatory damages and whether bifurcation would effectively undo this practice. Our findings indicated that mock jurors did not improperly consider punitive damages evidence in their decisions about compensation. Moreover, bifurcation had the unexpected effect of augmenting punitive damage awards. These findings raise questions about the merits of bifurcation in cases that involve multiple claims for damages.     

Comparing the effects of explicit and implicit false-evidence ploys on Mock Jurors' verdicts,sentencing recommendations,and perceptions of police interrogation

In police interrogation, an explicit false claim to have evidence raises important legal and constitutional questions. Therefore, some interrogation manuals recommend implicit false-evidence ploys (FEP) that ask suspects about potential evidence without making a direct claim to possess the evidence. Similar to the hypotheses in a recent study of implicit FEP and confession rates, we hypothesized that individuals would perceive implicit FEP as less coercive and deceptive when compared to explicit FEP that involve direct claims of false evidence. Although mock jurors rated all FEP as highly deceptive and coercive and as more deceptive than controls, we found that participants did not view implicit and explicit FEP differently and that ploy specificity (implicit or explicit) failed to affect verdicts or recommended sentences. These findings suggest that although interrogation trainers and scholars in law and psychology discriminate between the methods, jurors do not.     

Psychological Injury from Licensing Complaints Against Mental Health Practitioners

Today's mental health practitioners are subject to governmental (e.g., licensing boards) and legal (e.g., professional liability or malpractice) monitoring and regulation. Regrettably, the governmental and legal oversight of health care has proven to be tilted in favor of the service user, with frequent unfair processing and unjustifiably harsh penalties imposed on mental health practitioners—which often result in psychological injury. Stress and anxiety caused by a licensing complaint is common; and in this article, the psychological effects are set forth. It is concluded that there is no reason to expect relief from the risks of practice in the future, that is, typical licensing complaints plus added ethical issues are likely as the mental health professions evolve. This means that, whenever there is an indication of a possible complaint from a service user, today's mental health practitioner must, as part of the support services essential for practice, be prepared to rely on legal counsel.     

Psychological Testimony and the <Emphasis Type="Italic">Daubert</Emphasis> Standard

In the legal system, mental health professionals are now a primary source for expert information. Because potentially every psychologist might be drawn into a legal situation, competency requires accommodation of the nexus between the legal system and professional ethics and standards. Three particular Supreme Court cases create a framework for testifying about psychological information. This article reviews those three cases, defines the commitment to evidence-based (scientific) testimony, and explains how psychological ethics and standards should be accommodated. It reviews the major issues that psychologists face in Daubert admissibility challenges. Finally, it makes pertinent recommendations to help avoid the pitfall in dealing with court.     

Stereotypes influence beliefs about transfer and sentencing of juvenile offenders

Despite sharp drops in juvenile crime since the mid-1980s, punitive policies regarding juveniles who commit serious offenses still exist. We assessed beliefs about two such practices: transferring offenders from the juvenile justice to the criminal justice system, and subjecting them to sentences of life without parole (LWOP). We examined whether stereotypes about juvenile offenders – the extent to which people believe they are dispositionally violent superpredators versus economically and socially impoverished wayward youth – influence support for these policies. We measured 321 participants’ beliefs about the causes of juvenile crime and juveniles’ potential for recidivism and rehabilitation. Using vignette methodology and actual case facts, we described a 13-, 17-, or 21-year-old offender who murdered a stranger or abusive parent, and asked whether he should be transferred to criminal court and sentenced to LWOP. As endorsement of the superpredator stereotype increased, so did support for these practices. Offenders who murdered an abusive parent were shown more leniency. Older offenders were generally treated harsher, except by people with strong superpredator stereotypes who, on the issue of LWOP appropriateness, did not distinguish among juveniles of different ages. Findings suggest that stereotypes can influence judgments in cases involving juveniles and indirectly affect policy-making about juvenile offending.