Long-term effects of two childhood psychosocial interventions on adolescent delinquency,substance use,and antisocial behavior: a cluster randomized controlled trial

Objectives

Examine the long-term effects of two childhood universal prevention programs on adolescent delinquency, substance use, and antisocial behavior.

Methods

The cluster randomized controlled trial involved 56 schools and 1,675 children in Zurich, Switzerland. Two evidence-based interventions, namely the social-emotional skills program Promoting Alternative Thinking Strategies (PATHS) and the cognitive-behavioral parenting program Triple P, were implemented during the first two years of primary school, at ages 7 and 8 years. Outcomes were measured at ages 13 and 15 years, and included youth self-reports and teacher assessments. Multilevel models were used to account for the clustered nature of the interventions. Effects were estimated with the inclusion of baseline covariates.

Results

Across 13 outcomes related to delinquency, substance use, and antisocial behavior at ages 13 and 15 years, only two non-negligible effects were found. The first was a reduced prevalence of police contacts in the PATHS condition [effect size (ES)?=??0.225). The second was a difference in competent conflict resolution skills in the combined PATHS?+?Triple P condition compared to the context (ES?=?0.259), but in the unexpected direction: participants in the combined treatment appeared to be less competent than their control group peers. All other effects were either statistically non-significant or negligible in size (i.e., ES?<?|0.200|).

Conclusions

Even “evidence-based” interventions may have few long-term effects on delinquency, substance use, and antisocial behavior. Our findings add to the small literature on the long-term effectiveness of early universal prevention in field settings.

     

The Argument of Rightness as an Element of the Discretionary Power of the Administrative Judge

The article concerns the situation of the judicial application of the law where the entity applying the law refers in a decision-making process to moral principles. The decision should be based on the directives of interpretation, which indicate the need for such a determination of the meaning of the applicable norms so that it remains in harmony with commonly accepted moral rules of the society. The equity (understood as rightness) has one more purpose; namely, it allows for the process of decision-making—and not just for the process of unifying the decisions—since the mere rule does not specify the algorithm of undertaking them. This rule thus assumes that it will be further specified by phronesis judge who in a given situation will determine—for the purposes of a particular decision—a hierarchy between the criteria of substantive justice “embedded” in this rule. The reference to equity (rightness) stands for the concretization of an unspecified general rule. We deal here with an indefinite general rule, the application of which is facilitated by a reference to rightness.

     

Interpretation of Law and Judges Communities

The principle of omnia sunt interpretanda refers to the derivational conception and derivational theory of interpretation. The principle appears in disputes concerning the role of a judge in the process of interpretation, and this has produced an effect that Polish theory of law is currently getting closer to the conceptions presented in the American debate on activism and textualism. In the practice of jurisdiction, the principle of omnia sunt interpretanda is mostly invoked outside theoretical context. It becomes a manifestation of a new dimension of judicial independence, namely an independent authority over the meaning of legal text. In the following paper the legal cultures and legal theories involved in the dispute are being disclosed in order to put in question the possibility of achieving a clear result of interpretation against a background of a crisis of the relations between law and law-making state, which manifests itself in the peculiar process of legal institutions becoming autonomous in relation to state institutions. In this context, the aforementioned principle constitutes the manifestation of the way in which courts come up with a new definition of the role of the third (sui generic) power. The certain organizational requirements placed upon the courts (especially the SAC and provincial administrative courts) are being scrutinized in order to find out in which mode it is possible to at least reduce the degree of inconsistency of the results of interpretation. Here, the attempt to organize a community of judges for the activities of legal interpretation undertaken by them plays a crucial role.