The regulation of lobbyists

The authors gratefully acknowledge helpful comments from Charles Rowley, Robert Tollison, and a referee of this journal.     

" 'These Boots Are Made for Walking' ": A Reply

Erik Craft's comment on our 2000 article takes up a minor point,the impact of no-fault divorce on the gender of the spouse filingfor divorce. In the original article, we related the genderof the filing to rent exploitation during marriage, rent appropriationthrough divorce, and particularly child custody. We tested thehypotheses we generated using a sample of more than 46,000 divorcedecrees from the only four states collecting all the informationwe needed. The type of divorce ground was only a control variable,and not a strong one. We argue that Craft's comment misses ouressential point.     

Fraud in courtship: Annulment and divorce

The possibility of fraud exists in any contract. Courts and custom allow some amount of fraud before voiding the contract. The same principles hold for marriage. This paper provides a comparative analysis of annulment and divorce, shows that there exists a socially optimal amount of fraud in marriage, and demonstrates how changes in the locale's divorce regime result in changing demand for annulments. While substitutability between annulment and divorce is limited, annulment is shown to become more valuable for introducing fault when the divorce regime shifts to no fault. As European nations harmonize their family laws, they should be conscious of this substitutibility.     

'These boots are made for walking': why most divorce filers are women

Because of the financial and social hardship faced after divorce,most people assume that generally husbands have instigated divorcesince the introduction of no-fault divorce. Yet women file fordivorce and are often the instigators of separation, despitea deep attachment to their children and the evidence that manydivorces harm children. Furthermore, divorced women in largenumbers reveal that they are happier than they were while married.They report relief and certainty that they were right in leavingtheir marriages. This fundamental puzzle suggests that the incentivesto divorce require a reexamination, and that the forces affectingthe net benefits from marriage may be quite complicated, andperhaps asymmetric between men and women. This paper considerswomen's filing as rational behavior, based on spouses' relativepower in the marriage, their opportunities following divorce,and their anticipation of custody.     

Sex, Property Rights, and Divorce

This paper examines how differences in sex drives between husbands and wives affect bargaining strengths during marriage and particularly at times when divorce might occur. The basic argument follows from the fact that sex drives vary over an individual's life cycle, and are systematically different for men and women. The spouse having the lowest sex drive at any time in the marriage has a property right over whether or not sexual intercourse will occur, with a consequent increase in bargaining power at the margin. The paper derives a number of testable implications from its model, and, using several data sources, shows empirically how this difference affects marriage, adultery and divorce.     

The price of virtue

This article offers new evidence on the determinants of U.S. unwed birth rates from 1981 to 1990. We show that illegitimacy rates are positively and significantly correlated with payments under the Aid to Families with Dependent Children program over a period in which real AFDC payments declined. We attribute this result to a decline in the social sanctions for illegitimacy. Because social sanctions declined, so did the cost of deviance, as well as the price for which unwed women sold their virtue.     

Child support guidelines and divorce incentives

A child support guideline is a formula used to calculate support payments based on a few family characteristics. Guidelines began replacing court awarded support payments in the late 1970s and early 1980s, and were eventually mandated by the federal government in 1988. Two fundamentally different types of guidelines are used: percentage of obligor income, and income shares models. This paper explores the incentives to divorce under the two schemes, and uses the NLSY data set to test the key predictions. We find that percentage of obligor income models are destabilizing for some families with high incomes. This may explain why several states have converted from obligor to income share models, and it provides a subtle lesson for the no-fault divorce debate.