Can a contractarian be a paternalist? The logic of James M. Buchanan’s system

We consider the simplest version of a jungle economy à la Piccione-Rubinstein, wherein as many agents as goods are assumed, agents consume at most one indivisible good, and a transitive strong power relation exists. We first study the wilderness of jungle equilibria, i.e., whether they are Pareto-minimal (an allocation is Pareto-minimal if it is impossible to reduce the welfare of one agent without increasing the welfare of another). We show that jungle equilibria are not necessarily Pareto-minimal. We then study and characterize the set of Pareto-minimal jungle equilibria. Second, we tackle the case of equally powerful people, in contrast to the assumption that the power relation is asymetric. Assuming specifically a transitive weak power relation, we show that jungle equilibria exist, but that they are not always unique, nor Pareto-optimal. We also provide conditions under which those equilibria are Pareto-minimal.

     

Towards the End and Beyond: The "Almost" Referral of Bagaragaza in Light of the Completion Strategy of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda

The Bagaragaza case was the first at the International CriminalTribunal for Rwanda in which the referral of an accused to anational jurisdiction was discussed. Such a referral may bemade at the discretion of a Trial Chamber designated by thePresident, if the Chamber satisfied itself that the Accusedwill have a fair trial and that the death penalty will not beimposed or carried out. The referral can be made to three differentStates: the one where the accused was arrested, the one werethe crimes were committed and the one which has jurisdictionand is willing and adequately prepared to hear the case. Inthe Bagaragaza case, the request for referral was dismissed,because the Referral State in question, the Kingdom of Norway,has no provision for genocide in its penal law. This paper discussesthe referral mechanism and the role it plays in the Tribunal'sambitious completion strategy. An analysis of the Bagaragazacase will show how this mechanism has actually been applied,concluding that the Tribunal rightly resisted the pressure toabide by the completion strategy and chose substance over form.After the Tribunal's closure, two important questions will facethe international community: (a) Where will convicted and acquittedpersons be relocated? (b) Has international criminal justicebeen promoted at the expense of long-term peace and stability?