Metropolitan Institutions and Policy Coordination: The Integration of Land Use and Transport Policies in Swiss Urban Areas

The article addresses the question of how different metropolitan institutional settings affect the quality of political negotiation processes and their subsequent policy decisions. Starting from the theoretical controversy of the two metropolitan reform traditions, two opposing ideal types of metropolitan government institutions are conceptualized: on the one hand the public choice model that stands for a decentralized, nonprofessional, and politically dependent administration in fragmented urban areas, and on the other hand the neoprogressive model that stands for direct public service production by centralized and professionalized bureaucracies within consolidated municipalities. A qualitative comparative analysis of nine decision cases in four Swiss urban areas uncovers three main results: voluntary, positive, and policy-driven coordination as well as well coordinated policy solutions are found in centralized rather than decentralized institutional settings, in fragmented rather than consolidated metropolitan areas, and in project structures with a strict separation of the political sphere of negotiating from the technical sphere rather than in negotiations without such clear distinction. However, it is only under very specific institutional conditions that these well-coordinated solutions are also being implemented. The findings must be put into perspective in two respects. On the one hand, the positive effect of fragmentation on the quality of deliberation is supposedly unique to Switzerland due to its very strong federalism. On the other hand, the importance of bureaucratic autonomy is probably due to Switzerland's marked tradition of a weak state. The results from the nine test cases in general, however, substantiate the hypotheses derived from the neoprogressive model of metropolitan government institutions rather than the public choice model.     

THE JOINT-DECISION TRAP: LESSONS FROM GERMAN FEDERALISM AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

Compared to early expectations, the process of European integration has resulted in a paradox: frustration without disintegration and resilience without progress. The article attempts to develop an institutional explanation for this paradox by exploring the similarities between joint decision making ('Politikverflechtung') in German federalism and decision making in the European Community. In both cases, it is argued, the fact that member governments are directly participating in central decisions, and that there is a de facto requirement of unanimous decisions, will systematically generate sub-optimal policy outcomes unless a 'problem-solving' (as opposed to a 'bargaining') style of decision making can be maintained. In fact, the 'bargaining' style has prevailed in both cases. The resulting pathologies of public policy have, however, not resulted either in successful strategies for the further Europeanization of policy responsibilities or in the disintegration of unsatisfactory joint-decision systems. This 'joint-decision trap' is explained by reference to the utility functions of member governments for whom present institutional arrangements, in spite of their sub-optimal policy output, seem to represent 'local optima' when compared to either greater centralization or disintegration.     

HOW TRADITIONAL ARE THE AMERICAN,FRENCH AND GERMAN TRADITIONS OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION? A RESEARCH AGENDA

Consistent with the notion of tradition, public administration scholars usually interpret and compare administrative developments in the US, France, and Germany as inheritance, assuming continuity. However, administrative traditions have thus far not been an object of systematic research. The present research agenda aims to address this research gap by introducing the transfer‐of‐ideas approach as a means to examine the empirical substance of national traditions. We claim that for current research, the benefits of this approach are twofold. First, the transfer‐of‐ideas approach contributes to comparative public administration since it reveals in how far intellectual traditions are hybrid instead of distinctively American, French or German developments. Second, the approach may help to address the polysemous meanings of and terminological difficulties within administrative concepts that prevail in Public Administration on both sides of the Atlantic.     

Die Evaluation öffentlicher Politiken mit föderalistischen Vollzugsarrangements. Eine konzeptionelle Erweiterung des Stufenmodells und eine praktische Anwendung

Der vorliegende Artikel leistet einen Beitrag zur Konzipierung von Wirkungsmodellen für die Evaluation von öffentlichen Politiken mit föderalistischen Vollzugsarrangements. Das Phasenmodell des Policy‐Zyklus erfasst die Prinzipal‐Agent‐Probleme des Vollzugsföderalismus nur unzureichend. Es ist aus diesem Grund sinnvoll, in der Genesephase eine Zusatzschlaufe vorzusehen, die dem Umstand Rechnung trägt, dass in der Schweiz die Kantone beim Vollzug von Bundesgesetzen nicht nur Umsetzungs‐, sondern auch Programmierungskompetenzen haben. Diese Zusatzschlaufe impliziert allerdings beim häufig verwendeten Stufenmodell von Knoepfel und Bussmann (1997) für die Evaluierung öffentlicher Politik das Problem, dass es zu einer Vermischung der Evaluationsgegenstände auf Bundes‐ und Kantonsebene kommt. Diesem Umstand begegnen wir mit der Erweiterung des Stufenmodells, indem wir die beiden föderalen Ebenen getrennt betrachten und die Evaluationsgegenstände nicht generell, sondern entsprechend der Staatsebene definieren. Das Modell wird mit einer Anwendung aus der Evaluation des Krankenversicherungsgesetzes illustriert.     

HABERMAS’ MODELS OF DECISIONISM,TECHNOCRACY AND PRAGMATISM IN TIMES OF GOVERNANCE: THE RELATIONSHIP OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION,POLITICS AND SCIENCE IN THE ALCOHOL PREVENTION POLICIES OF THE SWISS MEMBER STATES

This article assesses the effects different constellations of science, administration and the political sphere display on the policy process in the field of alcohol prevention policy in the Swiss member states. First, it is argued that Habermas’ models of Decisionism, Technocracy, and Pragmatism can be interpreted as distinct modes of governance that take place in today’s policy‐making and implementation. Second, as for the effects of these different constellations of science, administration and politics, the findings from a written survey of the Swiss cantons reported here imply that a broad and adequate policy design is found in cantons with an alcohol prevention policy that is dominated by administrative actors. Output performance proves to be comparatively higher in cantons with a high influence either of scientific actors or of political actors. In an overall comparison, a combined model of administrative dominance with strong affiliation to the scientific community is shown to prevail against the other models considered.     

The politics of external approval: Explaining the IMF's evaluation of austerity programmes

During the European debt crisis, numerous states launched austerity programmes. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) evaluates and forecasts the likelihood of member states’ success in implementing these programmes. Although IMF evaluations influence country risk perceptions on capital markets, little is known about their reasoning. This article uses fuzzy‐set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA) to explore on what grounds the IMF evaluated the success prospects of austerity programmes during the European debt crisis. Results reveal that IMF evaluations are heavily influenced by the programme's implementation credibility. They require a tractable policy problem, a country's institutional capacity to structure implementation, and favour expenditure reduction over revenue measures. By acting as a strict guide on the road to fiscal adjustment, the IMF indirectly influences member states’ scope of policy making through its surveillance activities. Extensive austerity programmes that need to be implemented swiftly are evaluated negatively if the country is not involved in an IMF programme.     

OUTCOME-BASED PUBLIC MANAGEMENT AND THE BALANCE OF POWERS IN THE CONTEXT OF DIRECT DEMOCRACY

We argue that direct democracy forms a specific context for NPM reform, with the voting population as a third agent beside legislature and executive constituting a considerable limit to the legislature's political steering capacity. In this context we expect that NPM will lead to a shift in political power between sovereign, legislature and administration. This article investigates the possibilities of outcome-based public management to ameliorate public action under these circumstances. The findings of the analysis of the NPM reform in the Swiss city of Bern indicate that problems of outcome-based public management are accentuated in a direct democratic system. The puzzling finding is that while the political players themselves see a shift in power between the electorate, legislature and executive, they are doing nothing to compensate this shift.