Second Thoughts on Europe's "Third Level": The European Union's Committee of the Regions

The Maastricht Treaty provided for a consultative Committeeof the Regions to bring the European Union's "third level" intothe deliberation of legislation. It began to operate in early1994. This article assesses its creation and recent activityagainst the expectations and demands that were expressed atthe outset, looking in turn at the representative, advisory,and symbolic functions the new body can perform. What emergesis a largely symbolic body that suffers from entrenched internaldivisions and functional overreach in the absence of any realinfluence on the Union's policymaking process. The danger isa downward spiral of progressive obscurity and the frustrationof its members' aspirations.     

The rise of China—challenges and opportunities for the European Union

Asia Europe Journal - China’s growing power and influence raise important and inescapable questions for countries and societies around the world, not least for Europe. A rising China offers...     

Chinese Women in Rural–Urban Transition: surrogate brothers or agents of their own fate?

How has the joint family structure—one of the basic institutions of rural organisation in China—been used by families in the transition from rural to urban reality since the early 1980s? During the 1960s and 1970s, the rural people's communes consolidated the role of patrilocal marriage patterns and the shared inheritance and responsibilities of brothers (both hallmarks of the joint family), while in the 1980s and 1990s, the joint family was used to maximise the economic interests of the new entrepreneurial groups in rural China. However, the transition to urban status and life gradually changed the role of sisters among siblings, as existing social patterns gradually eroded and changed meaning. This contribution explores how these macro-level institutional transitions manifest themselves in the social practice and institutional arrangements of a family case study.     

From Corporatism to Lobbyism? — Parliaments,Executives, and Organized Interests in Denmark and Norway

The integration of organized interests into the formation and implementation of public policies is a core institutional trait of the Scandinavian countries. However, significant changes have taken place in the relations between organized interests and public authorities in Denmark and Norway during the last two decades. The use of traditional corporatist structures of interest intermediation has been reduced in favor of a corresponding increase in lobbyism. At the same time a marked increase in the frequency and intensity of contacts between organized interests and parliamentary actors has taken place. The shift in focus mirrors the increasing role played by the two parliaments in public policy formation and a less positive assessment of the outcomes of strongly institutionalized corporatist policy making by administrative decision makers.     

The Role of Flexibility Mechanisms in EU Climate Strategy: Lessons Learned and Future Challenges?

The main objective of this paper is to examine the evolution of European Union (EU) climate strategy, scrutinising in particular developments in EU's views on the so-called flexibility or Kyoto mechanisms. In brief, the paper argues that there has been a gradual change in EU's views, from the role of a sceptic in the run-up to Kyoto towards becoming more of a frontrunner on emissions trading in recent years. The need to 'save Kyoto' and the protracted development of EU climate policy are highlighted as two of the most important drivers behind this process of change. This paper also discusses some of the lessons learned from international negotiations and the development of EU climate policy. Finally, and drawing upon the lessons learned, the paper explores key future challenges for the further development of EU climate strategy.     

Need-efficiency trade-offs in the allocation of resources: Ideological and attributional differences in public aid decision making

We examined whether ideological differences influenced perceptions of the underlying causes of public aid applicants’ predicaments, and whether in turn ideology-patterned attributions accounted for how resource allocators prioritized need- and efficiency-related goals in allocating aid. To examine the need-efficiency trade-off, participants (N=112) divided a hypothetical pool of aid applicants for subsidized health insurance into two “incorrect” allocation outcomes: false alarms (allocate aid to unneedy applicants) and misses (deny aid to needy applicants). Moreover, to examine beliefs about the absolute percentage of aid applicants who are truly in need of societal assistance, participants divided the remaining aid applicants into two “correct” allocation outcomes: hits (allocate aid to needy applicants) and correct rejections (deny aid to unneedy applicants). Results of a series of structural equation models indicated that conservatism was linked to the causal belief that aid applicants’ predicaments arise from dispositional rather than situational factors, which in turn predicted a preference for making efficiency-related over need-related resource allocation judgments (e.g., preferring misses to false alarms) and the belief that a relatively small number of aid applicants are truly in need of societal assistance (e.g., preferring correct rejections to hits). Results are discussed in terms of how ideologically driven attributions influence the manner in which people resolve need-efficiency trade-offs inherent in the context of public aid decision making.     

COMPETITION POLICY WITH OPTIMALLY DIFFERENTIATED RULES INSTEAD OF "PER SE RULES VS RULE OF REASON"

Both in U.S. antitrust and EU competition policy, a developmentto a broader application of rule of reason instead of per serules can be observed. In the European discussion the attemptto base competition policy on a "more economic approach" ismainly viewed as improving the economic analysis in the assessmentof specific cases. In this paper it is shown from a generallaw and economics perspective that the application of rulesinstead of focussing on case-by-case analyses can have manyadvantages (lower regulation costs, rent-seeking, and knowledgeproblems), although an additional differentiation of rules througha deeper assessment can also have advantages in regard to thereduction of decision errors of type I and II. After introducingthe notion of a continuum of more or less differentiated rules,we show—based upon law and economics literature upon theoptimal complexity of rules—in a simple model that a competitionrule is optimally differentiated if the marginal reduction ofthe sum of error costs (as the marginal benefit of differentiation)equals the marginal costs of differentiation. This model alsoallows for a more detailed analysis of the most important determinantsof the optimal degree of rule-differentiation. From this lawand economics perspective, competition policy should consistmainly of (more or less differentiated) rules and should onlyrarely rely on case-by-case analysis. Therefore the main taskof a "more economic approach" is to use economics for the formulationof appropriate competition rules.     

Friendship,Courting, and Engagement: Pre-electoral Coalition Dynamics in Action

The literature on pre-electoral coalitions (PECs) still relies heavily on comparative statics to gauge whether a PEC is likely to form and/or its effects on government formation. However, less is known about the behavioural dynamics of PECs. The dynamics of the recent 2009 PEC between the Socialist People's Party and the Social Democrats in Denmark are assessed. Elaborating on the signalling hypothesis, it is argued that coalition members over time must show their ability to vote together in parliament in order to establish a credible commitment. Empirical support is found for this take on the signalling thesis. It was also found that the distance between the parties narrows before the formulation of the PEC, and distinct phases in the process are pointed to, which the authors coin ‘friendship’, ‘courting’, and ‘engagement’. Finally, alternative explanations are assessed and the question of which party of the PEC would have to change voting patterns in the inter-party coordination process in order to become 'office-fit' is addressed. It is concluded that PECs have a systematic effect on the members' parliamentary voting behaviour and that they serve as a preparatory signalling device for opposition parties with office ambitions.