Corruption experiences and attitudes to political,interpersonal, and domestic violence

It is understood that corruption can change the incentives to engage in political violence. However, the scope for corruption to change attitudes toward the permissibility of violence has received less attention. Drawing on Moral Foundations Theory, we argue that experiences of corruption in the social environment are likely to shape individual attitudes toward violent behavior. Using Afrobarometer data, we document a statistically significant and sizable relationship between an individual's experience of paying bribes and their attitudes to political, interpersonal, and domestic violence. These relationships are evident, and not significantly different, for men and women and are robust to the inclusion of variables capturing the local incidence of corruption, local norms regarding violence, and a proxy for the local incidence of violence with the community. Corruption is associated with permissive attitudes to violence even after controlling for the perceived legitimacy of the police and courts.     

Win–Win? Early experience from local area agreements

Local Area Agreements (LAAs) are a mechanism for delivering improved outcomes for local people, through recasting governance relationships between central government and localities and between local agencies. This paper assesses the effectiveness of LAAs in reforming these critical relationships, drawing on research carried out in 2004–06 into the round one and two negotiations. These early negotiations highlighted the complexity of ‘central–local relations’; a coherent approach across Whitehall was hampered by differences in departmental culture and in the nature of relationships with local delivery agencies, while the new role for Government Offices was ambiguous. Nevertheless the early LAAs represented a major step forward in terms of local–central relations. Within localities, the process of developing LAAs proved challenging and highlighted governance weaknesses; however in the main participants report that partnerships have been greatly strengthened as a result. These early experiences provided rich learning, and policy has developed significantly since the pilots. At the time this research ended there was not yet any conclusive evidence on the balance of costs and benefits. However, over time LAAs have the potential to bring about a transformation in governance relationships and, in turn, the delivery of services to address cross-cutting outcomes.     

Gender and Corruption in Business

Are firms with female owners or managers less corrupt than other firms? We test this question using firm-level data on corruption, ownership, and management. We find that women in positions of influence are associated with less corruption: female owners are associated with a lower incidence of bribery and report smaller levels of bribery. Moreover, corruption is seen as less of an obstacle in companies where women are represented in top management. By providing evidence that women are associated with lower levels of corruption in business our research contributes to the literature on development, gender equality, and corruption.     

Political Trust,Corruption, and Ratings of the IMF and the World Bank

There are only a handful of studies that examine public support for the IMF and World Bank. Public opinion data on attitudes to the economy feature prominently in these studies. Utilizing data from the Afrobarometer survey, we find that evaluations of the economy, ideology, and a range of sociodemographic factors including age, gender, employment status, health, education, and living conditions are not significantly related to ratings of effectiveness. Rather, we find that political trust and corruption—two very important concepts in the wider literature on individual-level attitudes toward international relations and foreign policy issues—are strongly associated with ratings of effectiveness.     

Is corruption distasteful or just another cost of doing business?

Public Choice - Using data from a lab experiment carried out in Kenya, we show that while “legitimate” costs and costs imposed by corruption both deter investment, the latter is no more...