Do school accountability systems make it more difficult for low‐performing schools to attract and retain high‐quality teachers?

Administrative data from North Carolina are used to explore the extent to which that state's relatively sophisticated school‐based accountability system has exacerbated the challenges that schools serving low‐performing students face in retaining and attracting high‐quality teachers. Most clear are the adverse effects on retention rates, and hence on teacher turnover, in such schools. Less clear is the extent to which that higher turnover has translated into a decline in the average qualifications of the teachers in the low‐performing schools. Other states with more primitive accountability systems can expect even greater adverse effects on teacher turnover in low‐performing schools. © 2004 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management.     

Issue Redefinition, Venue Change and Radical Agricultural Policy Reforms in Sweden and New Zealand

This paper compares radical agricultural policy reforms in Sweden and New Zealand in the 1980s and 1990s to establish which factors bring about such types of policy reforms. Ruling out a number of alternative explanations for reform found in the public policy and political economy literature, we focus on the role of reform strategies. We show that the redefinition of agricultural policy – from a matter of finding the balance between budgetary costs and farmers' income to considering agricultural policy as part of macroeconomic policies – was important, particularly in Sweden. Change of policy venue is the other reform strategy identified, which was crucial to the successful introduction of the reform. In both countries, ministers of finance deliberately shifted agricultural policymaking to arenas in which they were able to control the reform process.     

Party Politicisation Reversed? Non‐partisan Alternatives in Norwegian Local Politics

Based on time series data from Norwegian local elections, this article addresses the question of whether the party politicisation process in the local electoral arena is showing signs of reversal. We explore this question by looking at the extent to which non-partisan lists have existed over time in Norwegian municipalities and by an analysis of the degree to which the voters have supported them. Furthermore we examine the nature of the non-partisan lists, and finally we revisit earlier studies that showed that the party politicisation of local government increased participation.
The results show that national parties still dominate local politics. Nevertheless, non-partisan lists continue to mobilise. During the 1990s we witnessed a slight rise in the supply of non-partisan lists. However, supply decreased in the 2003 elections, probably owing to changes in the electoral law. In terms of representation, non-partisan lists appear successful. On average, during the time span we investigate, non-partisan lists obtained mandates in more than 93 percent of the municipalities where they stood for election. Our study gives little support to the assertion that there is a new generation of non-partisan lists consisting mainly of single-issue lists. However, there are signs of a shift away from the traditional local lists. Finally we have analysed the relationship between turnout and the presence of non-partisan lists. In contrast to the 1960s and to some extent the 1970s, turnout is currently highest in municipalities with non-partisan alternatives, irrespective of municipal size. Although it is clearly an overstatement to talk of a non-partisan renaissance, it seems as if the non-partisan lists have a stronger mobilising potential nowadays than they did in the past.     

Aleksandr Dugin and the ideology of national revival: Geopolitics,Eurasianism and the conservative revolution

This article examines the emergence of Aleksandr Dugin as the leader of the Eurasian Movement and later Party in Russia. For much of the 1990s Dugin was a prominent intellectual among the Russian nationalist‐communist opposition, moving from the position of ideologue of a fringe political party ‐ Edvard Limonov's National Bolsheviks — to advisor to the communist speaker of the State Duma, Gennadiy Seleznev. Dugin's ideology combined an anti‐Western interpretation of geopolitics with mysticism, Aryanism, conspirology, authoritarian statism and Eurasianism. Dugin's expanding set of Internet sites became an ideological empire of a virtual society. In 1999, in the aftermath of the NATO intervention in Yugoslavia, Dugin saw an opportunity to move from the marginal opposition to the ideologue of the post‐Yeltsin president. In this capacity, Dugin and his Eurasian Movement emerged as prominent supporters of Vladimir Putin, whom Dugin identified as the embodiment of the ‘Eurasian capitalist’ model of statist development. Dugin developed a close working relationship with Gleb Pavlovsky, a spin doctor for Putin's Kremlin. In the aftermath of 11 September and Putin's move towards supporting the United States in the war on terrorism, Dugin has continued his nominal support for the president, even as he has criticized his pro‐Western policies as anti‐Eurasian and a threat to Russian interests.     

Rationality and the political business cycle: The case of local government

The empirical results which have been reported support the hypotheses' implied by the model of rational political behavior set out in Section 2. In pre-election periods, local government development expenditures deviate significantly from their normal levels. The extent of deviation is approximately 20%.Consistent with the predictions of this model, it is found that incumbents not seeking re-election deviated far more in their pre-election discretionary budget expenditure than incumbents seeking re-election. The expenditure gap between the two types of incumbents is large and statistically significant. Incumbents not seeking re-election exhibit a deviation equivalent to 47% of the development budget, while those seeking re-election exhibit a 12% deviation.