RACE,DRUGS, AND POLICING: UNDERSTANDING DISPARITIES IN DRUG DELIVERY ARRESTS*

This article draws on several unique data sources to assess and explain racial disparity in Seattle's drug delivery arrests. Evidence regarding the racial and ethnic composition of those who deliver any of five serious drugs in that city is compared with the racial and ethnic composition of those arrested for this offense. Our findings indicate that blacks are significantly overrepresented among Seattle's drug delivery arrestees. Several organizational practices explain racial disparity in these arrests: law enforcement's focus on crack offenders, the priority placed on outdoor drug venues, and the geographic concentration of police resources in racially heterogeneous areas. The available evidence further indicates that these practices are not determined by race‐neutral factors such as crime rates or community complaints. Our findings thus indicate that race shapes perceptions of who and what constitutes Seattle's drug problem, as well as the organizational response to that problem.     

Financial Management Grades for the States: A Prospective Use

This research examines whether financial management grades awarded to the states by the Government Performance Project (GPP) can provide some prospective gauge of fiscal performance in proximate years, particularly on the downside of the business cycle. Our findings confirm the weaker fiscal condition in both 2002 and 2003 of states that received lower financial management grades from the GPP in 2001, suggesting that these grades have the potential to be prospective as well as retrospective. These results, however, are tempered by several concerns that inform our suggestions for additional research to further assess the prospective potential of financial management performance grades.     

POLICE REPORTS AND VICTIMIZATION SURVEY RESULTS An Empirical Study

To test the assumption that police reports cannot be used as a representative sample of all criminal events, a research study was undertaken comparing the characteristics of robberies and robbery victims derived from police offense reports in San Jose, California, to those derived from a victimization survey in the same area The result of the comparison of these two data sources disclosed that: (1) for commercial robberies there were no differences between police offense reports and victimization survey data for the characteristics which were compared; (2) for personal robberies, there were no differences for the characteristics of victim's sex and age, number of victims, victim/offender relationship, and number of offenders. The differences observed for victim's race and time of occurrence can be attributed to classification problems and methodological differences It is highly probable that the police robbery offense reports and the Victimization survey data are representative of the same population of robberies Results suggest that further evaluation of the assumption that police offense reports do not reflect the “true” nature of all (i.e., reported and unreported) crime is warranted.     

Did they ‘Read Before Burning’? The Coalition and Quangos

Attitudes to quangos are paradoxical. On the one hand they are perceived to be undemocratic, unaccountable organisations, while on the other they are seen to improve effectiveness, limit political interference and increase public confidence in government. This paradox is reflected in the behaviour of political parties, which generally adopt a harsh line towards quangos in opposition, but come to rely on these bodies in office. Ahead of the 2010 general election it was, however, noticeable that the Conservative party rejected this dynamic by promising to pursue ‘a more sophisticated approach’. This article explores the Coalition government's subsequent ‘public bodies reform programme’, assessing its progress against recommendations contained within the Institute for Government's Read before Burning report of July 2010. It concludes that while the Coalition has addressed long‐standing concerns about the day‐to‐day governance of public bodies, it has failed to resolve a set of broader and strategic (metagovernance) issues.     

Juvenile Delinquency in Post-Mao China

The post-Mao de-politicization put an end to the continuous class struggle in China. After the post-Mao government had removed the radical elements from the party and united the society by its appealing modernization program, it directed its attention to street crime and juvenile and young offenders. Crime committed by juvenile and young offenders has become a serious social problem. It is estimated that among the total offenders apprehended by the police, 70% are under the age of 25, and 30% under the age of 18. Despite the party's tough policy, juvenile crime is increasing and becoming more organized and violent. The paralysis of the Maoist social control system is stressed in explaining the increase in crime. The disruption in the family structure, in school and work patterns, and in neighbourhood organizations, in conjunction with a sweeping crisis of belief among the populace in general, has created a vacuum of social control in post-Mao Chinese society. The seriousness of juvenile delinquency and the lack of community undertakings have forced the government to institutionalize and legalize its control over juvenile and young offenders.