Schumpeter's critique of Marx: A reappraisal

Abstract. The paper provides an account of Marx's position of Schumpeter's three categories: capitalism, socialism and democracy. Marx's conception of capitalism is established as more wide-ranging than sometimes thought, covering any form of society where commodities predominate, and implying a polarized class structure independent of considerations of manual or lowly labour. It is not therefore essentially a political conception, nor does its application turn on the question of private ownership. Socialism, for Marx, involves the abolition of commodities and therefore of money and the wages system. Accordingly, his conception of socialism is not one of state ownership or nationalization, as Schumpeter claims. His commitment to democracy arises from the nature of socialist society and sets him apart from vanguardist political theory. It is therefore more deeply-rooted than Schumpeter suggests.     

On prediction in political science

This article discusses recent moves in political science that emphasise predicting future events rather than theoretically explaining past ones or understanding empirical generalisations. Two types of prediction are defined: pragmatic, and scientific. The main aim of political science is explanation, which requires scientific prediction. Scientific prediction does not necessarily entail pragmatic prediction nor does it necessarily refer to the future, though both are desiderata for political science. Pragmatic prediction is not necessarily explanatory, and emphasising pragmatic prediction will lead to disappointment, as it will not always help in understanding how to intervene to change future outcomes, and policy makers are likely to be disappointed by its time-scale.     

ORGANIZATIONAL STATUS AND PERFORMANCE: A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR TESTING PUBLIC CHOICE THEORIES

Popular belief is that ownership change (from public to private) brings about improved performance. But (i) ownership displays a spectrum, not an either/or; (ii) degree of competition is conceptually and often actually independent of ownership; and (iii) so is change-of-ownership's assumed instruments for improving performance, change in managerial incentive structures and reporting structures. The article surveys the relevant theories, popular and scholarly, and develops models for testing the relationships between status change (ownership) and performance (indices of productivity, profitability etc.), and between status change and internal organizational change (indices of reorganization and of linkage), in a small number of British organizations which underwent change in recent decades. Preliminary results of one or two analyses illustrate the methods and the possibilities.     

Efficient,Fair, and Incomprehensible: How the State “Sells” Its Judiciary

Socio‐legal scholars often approach dispute resolution from the perspective of the disputants, emphasizing how the resources on each side shape the course of conflict. We suggest a different, “supply‐side,” perspective. Focusing on the state's efforts to establish centralized courts in place of local justice systems, we consider the strategies that a supplier of dispute resolving services uses to attract disputes for resolution. We argue that state actors often attempt to “sell” centralized courts to potential litigants by insisting that the state's services are more efficient and fair than local courts operating outside direct state control. Moreover, we argue that state actors also invest significant energy in claiming that the local courts are incomprehensible. Thus, in its efforts to introduce and advance centralized courts, the state argues not only that it offers the best version of what the citizenry wants, but also that it is impossible to conceive that people would want something other than what the state offers. We illustrate our argument and explain its significance by examining judicial reform in New York, where there has been a decades‐long effort to displace local justice systems.