On the political economy of the informal sector and income redistribution

In this paper we analyze a general equilibrium model in which agents choose to be employed in formal or in the informal sector. The formal sector is taxed to provide income subsidies and the level of redistribution is determined endogenously through majority voting. The model is simulated to produce qualitative results and to illustrate the differences between economies with different distributional features. We show that a distortion in the democratic rule in favor of the rich reduces transfers while the size of the informal sector may remain at high levels. Despite a greater demand for redistribution in societies where the majority has few resources (skills), we find that political systems which work in favor of a rich minority will produce little redistribution. Our results call for pro-poor measures such as free training and education programs that should be offered to those who cannot afford it.     

Rare and Severe Maxillofacial Injury Due to Tear Gas Capsules: Report of Three Cases

Tear gases are used by police or armed forces for control of riots or social events or by the general population for private self‐defense. These agents are used widely throughout the world, but some harmful effects have reported. In addition, despite well‐defined chemical side effects documented in the literature, data are insufficient regarding mechanical injury due to tear gas capsules. We report three cases of severe maxillofacial injury in patients who had these capsules fired from tear gas guns directly to their faces. The capsules penetrated the patients' faces, causing potentially fatal injuries. To our knowledge, reports of this kind of injury related to tear gas capsules are very rare in the literature. In conclusion, tear gas guns may be very dangerous in terms of human health and they may cause severe injuries, especially when they are not used according to strict guidelines.     

Taking Sides: Determinants of Support for a Presidential System in Turkey*

A key issue on the Turkish political agenda concerns a transition to presidentialism, with a constitutional amendment proposal submitted in December 2016. While the positions of political elites are well known, we lack a detailed analysis of the electorate’s views on such a transition. To fill this gap, we present cross-sectional and panel data collected over the period from spring 2015 to winter 2015–16. Partisanship emerges as the key factor shaping views on presidentialism, and reflections of the centre–periphery cleavage in Turkish politics are also visible. The shift of the Turkish nationalist constituency’s views in favour of presidentialism has been a significant trend in the aftermath of the June 2015 general election.     

Political Consequences of Welfare Regimes: Social Assistance and Support for Presidentialism in Turkey

ABSTRACT

Tackling redistributive expansion in developing countries, this paper explores broader political consequences of social assistance programmes. Drawing from the Turkish case, where social welfare expanded since the 2000s, it examines attitudes of social assistance beneficiaries towards transition to presidentialism, which was approved in a referendum in 2017, and took effect in 2018. Using the results of an original survey, it indicates that social assistance benefits played a significant role in increasing support for presidentialism, by garnering votes from opposition voters, especially those with high-risk perceptions, in return for benefits. Given the character of Turkish presidentialism, devoid of vital checks and balances, the findings reveal that incumbents can mobilise support by using redistributive instruments in the context of democratic backsliding.     

Behind the Curve: Clarifying the Best Approach to Calculating Predicted Probabilities and Marginal Effects from Limited Dependent Variable Models

Models designed for limited dependent variables are increasingly common in political science. Researchers estimating such models often give little attention to the coefficient estimates and instead focus on marginal effects, predicted probabilities, predicted counts, etc. Since the models are nonlinear, the estimated effects are sensitive to how one generates the predictions. The most common approach involves estimating the effect for the “average case.” But this approach creates a weaker connection between the results and the larger goals of the research enterprise and is thus less preferable than the observed‐value approach. That is, rather than seeking to understand the effect for the average case, the goal is to obtain an estimate of the average effect in the population. In addition to the theoretical argument in favor of the observed‐value approach, we illustrate via an empirical example and Monte Carlo simulations that the two approaches can produce substantively different results.