The Relational Principle of Trust and Confidence

This article seeks to explain why, in terms of Iain Macneil'srelational theory of contract, the implied mutual duty of trustand confidence can be described as a quintessentially relationalnorm. The role played by the duty in the development of a relationalapproach to variation of the employment contract is examined.The potential for the trust duty to become a relational principleinforming the content of the employment contract is explored.The impact of litigation based on the trust duty in creatinga relational approach to employees’ contractual remediesat common law, which have traditionally been dominated by thenotice rule, is assessed. Finally, the potential for there todevelop a relational principle of trust and confidence capableof, to some extent, unifying the contractual, statutory andtortious elements of the law of the employment relationshipis examined.     

Motivations for Social Media Use: Associations with Social Media Engagement and Body Satisfaction and Well-Being among Adolescents

Journal of Youth and Adolescence - Adolescents are spending considerable time on social media, yet it is unclear whether motivations for social media use drive different forms of social media...     

Introduction

ABSTRACT

This article argues for the analysis of the flow of ideological discourse through society within and across three distinct but interrelated levels: (1) the canonically defined, or macro level, (2) the intermediate or meso level of competitive political appeals, political relevant public discourse and cultural criticism, and (3) the everyday or micro level of conceptual use by non-experts. This differentiation among levels of ideological action and influence helps us to clarify the objects and appropriate methods of ideological analysis. Methods applied in specific cases must facilitate an effective focus on phenomena on one of these levels while still allowing recognition of the complex forms of direct and indirect conceptual influence and connection between the levels. The article also serves as an introduction to the volume, giving a brief account of the analysis and argument of each contribution.     

Reviews

Arabic Edition of the British Council Map of Europe and the Middle East. Scale 1: 11,000,000. Royal Geographical Society

Iraq Irrigation Handbook: Part I. Euphrates. Compiled by Ahmed Sousa, under the direction of J. D. Atkinson. Published at Baghdad by the Government of Iraq, 1944. 10” × 7”. Pp. in, with 35 tables, 18 figures and 1 plate, also, in a portfolio 15” × 14”, 16 other plates. Price not stated.

Jenghis Khan. By W. Yan. Hutchinson International Authors, Ltd. 9s. 6d.

From Tunisia to Normandy. By Major‐General H. Rowan‐Robinson, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O. Hutchinsoh.

Defence is Our Business. By Brigadier J. G. Smyth, V.C., M.C. Hutchinson and Co. 10s. 6d.

Anna and the King of Siam. By Margaret Landon. Illustrated by Margaret Ayer. John Day Co., New York. Pp. 391.

The Modern Prison System of India. By Lieut.‐Colonel F. A. Barker, C.I.E., O.B.E., M.A., M.D., B.C., I.M.S. (Retd.).

Fabian Colonial Essays. With an Introduction by A. Creech Jones, M.P., and edited by Dr. Rita Hinden. Geo. Allen and Unwin. Pp. 261. 8s. 6d. 1945.

Modern Exploration. F. Kingdon Ward. 124 pp. Published by Jonathan Cape at 6s.     

The congressional foundations of agency performance

When Congress delegates a policy mandate to a regulatory agency, Congress acts as a principal, choosing the institutional arrangements, or the ‘rules of the game’ for agency decision making. Individuals in the agency, acting as agents, take the rules of the game as given and do the best they can within these institutional arrangements. In this paper we develop a simple model that relates the congressional choice of institutional arrangements to two underlying environmental factors — uncertainty and conflict. We suggest that uncertainty and conflict of interest lead Congress, in delegating, to prescribe a greater scope of permissable regulatory activity, a wider array of regulatory instruments, and more confining regulatory procedures. Increased scope and stronger instruments tend to broaden the overall discretionary authority of the agency, while more confining procedures tend to narrow it. We conjecture that with increased uncertainty or conflict the narrowing tendency more than offsets the broadening tendency, for a net decrease in the agency's overall discretionary authority. Lastly, we argue that the performance of a regulatory agency in fulfilling its mandate is determined in large measure by the foundations Congress constructs for the implementation of delegated authority.     

The Invisible Hand: Financial Pressures and Organisational Convergence in Multilateral Development Banks

This paper investigates how the unique financial model of multilateral development banks – dependent largely on issuing bonds in private capital markets to raise lending resources – came about in the early history of three different MDBs, and how this in turn shaped their operational characteristics. Historical research demonstrates that the World Bank, Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) and Andean Development Corporation (CAF) converged on organisational and operational arrangements very different to what their founders had intended, and much closer to one another, as a direct result of the need to secure sufficient resources to function as viable development lenders. The findings indicate that in the absence of governments willing or able to provide significant financing out of their budgets, MDBs tend to converge towards a single organisational model in order to maintain access to international capital markets. All three MDBs examined here modified their lending and financial policies in unexpected ways and, in the case of the IADB and CAF, even restructured their original membership, specifically for the purpose of securing adequate financial resources.     

The politics of flatland

A version of the median-voter theorem holds for two-dimensional spatial models in which voters regard the two dimensions as economic goods or goodlike activities and in which the set of feasible outcomes is constrained by budget or technology. Although mathematically trivial, this fact has widespread analytical uses. After arguing that our two-dimensional model, with its stability property, fits a number of important and general policy areas, we use our analysis to address some prominent theoretical issues.