The impact of campaign expenditures on political competition in the French legislative elections of 1993

We use regression analysis to estimate the effect that campaign money had on the votes of challengers and incumbents in the 1993 elections to the French legislative assembly. Incumbent candidates can at best expect to win 1.01% of the popular vote for each extra franc they spend per registered voter in their district. Challengers can expect to win at least twice as much as this. Simulations show that if campaign spending ceilings were halved, incumbents would have gained an extra ten percent of the popular vote over their closest challenging rivals. The regression analysis also suggests that voters react negatively to candidates who rely heavily on their own money for their outlays and reward candidates who rely on contributions from private individuals. These results suggest that campaign spending ceilings may inhibit political competition, and that voters may resist a candidate who relies on narrow sources of funding.     

Can repressive regimes be moderated through foreign aid?

In what circumstances should foreign aid be given to less developed countries with repressive rulers? Repressive rulers are assumed to control the national income and to trade it against the probability of staying in office which is assumed in turn to depend positively on popular wealth and repression. A foreign donor aware of this process of optimization will pursue his international objectives by attaching conditions to his aid that alter the relative price of repression and popular wealth in the calculations of the tyrant. The effectiveness of direct and in-kind aid and the desirability of a “carrot an stick” aid policy depend on the direct and the interactive effects that popular wealth, repression, and the parameters of economic growth exert on the regime's stability and its level of income.     

The Downsian voter meets the ecological fallacy

This paper presents evidence that voter participation does not depend on the probability that one vote is decisive. An extensive summary of the empirical participation literature is provided which shows that most but not all studies have found that turnout in an electoral district is higher when the race is closer. Individual-level vote regressions for the 1979 and 1980 Canadian national elections are estimated using objective measures of closeness (as opposed to self-reported measures). The main finding is that a citizen is no more likely to vote in a close election than in a lands-lide election. District-level turnout regressions for the same elections are also estimated, and a significant relation between closeness and turnout is observed. This suggests that aggregation bias may generate a spurious closeness-turnout relation in district-level regressions.     

Voter turnout: How much can we explain?

This paper evaluates the ability of common explanatory variables to predict who votes. Logit voting regressions are estimated with more than three dozen explanatory variables using survey and aggregate data for the 1979, 1980, 1984, and 1988 Canadian national elections. We find that the usual demographic variables such as age and education, and contextual variables such as campaign spending have significant effects on the probability of voting, but the models have low R2's and cannot predict who votes more accurately than random guessing. We also estimate regressions using past voting behavior as a predictor of current behavior, and find that although the explanatory power rises it remains low. This suggests that the difficulty in explaining turnout arises primarily from omitted time- varying variables. In some sense, then, it appears that whether or not a person votes is to a large degree random. The evidence provides support for the rational voter theory, and is problematic for psycho/sociological approaches.     

Are Campaign Contributions a Form of Speech? Evidence from Recent US House Elections

This paper investigates the effects of the sources ofcandidates' campaign funding on their electoral outcomes, withparticular emphasis on whether candidates who rely on a narrowbase of funding suffer adverse electoral consequences. Anextensive dataset consisting of over 650,000 contributions toHouse candidates in elections from 1980 to 1992 is used. Theresults reveal a negative relationship between theconcentration of contributions and voteshare for open seatcandidates and challengers. This finding appears to havesignificant implications for some of the empirical premisesunderlying the U.S. Supreme Court's landmark Buckley v.Valeo decision. At the very least, it represents an importantstylized fact about US elections that is robust over 1980–1992 period.     

Desirability and effects of campaign spending limits

This paper measures the influence of campaign spending on incumbent and challenger votes in Canadian federal elections. The goal is to assess the influence of spending ceilings on political competition and on voter welfare. It is found that in the 1984 and 1988 Canadian federal elections challengers could increase their voteshare by spending but that incumbents could not. These results are used in a simulation to show that if ceilings were lowered, incumbent voteshare would rise. On this evidence it is argued that spending ceilings may tilt the playing field in favour of incumbents and reduce political competition.     

The price of transparency: do campaign finance disclosure laws discourage political participation by?citizens�� groups?

We surveyed independent citizens?? groups who advertised in either of the Canadian federal elections of 2004 and 2006 to see whether financial reporting laws act as barriers to entry in politics. The most conservative estimates suggest that conforming imposes administrative costs of no more than 9% of group budgets. These small reporting costs and our finding that 61% of respondents believed reporting requirements discouraged independent groups from participating in elections suggest that there may be intangible but substantial costs to disclosure. Our survey indicates these costs arise from the fear of prosecution by authorities for alleged violations of reporting requirements.     

Is there a displacement deadweight loss from tax evasion? Estimates using firm surveys from the Czech Republic

In the presence of the underground economy, taxes may give rise to a deadweight loss from displacement of efficient producers by inefficient producers. We consider an economy in which a producer faces two types of costs: the cost of production and of taxes. If efficiency in production is positively correlated with tax-honesty, then high tax rates may cause inefficient producers to crowd out efficient producers. We find the correlation of production efficiency and tax-honesty to be positive (between 0.1368 and 0.1673) by using surveys of 426 Czech firms taken in 2004 and 2005. We also find that firms feel threatened by rivals who evade taxes. Both findings support the notion that displacement deadweight loss exists. In a more speculative part of our paper, we use highly restrictive assumptions to arrive at estimates of displacement deadweight loss ranging from 2.7 to 13.1% of firm costs.

Improper Selection of High-Cost Producers in the Rent-Seeking Contest

The resources two rival businesses spend to raise their own chanceof getting a unique monopoly license are a cost of rent-seeking.When those businesses differ in the costs of producing themonopoly good there is an additional cost of rent-seeking that hasnot been sufficiently studied in the literature. If the high cost producer winsthe license, the difference between his cost and the costs of hismore efficient rival is a social loss from improper selection ofproducers by the political process. The loss becomes more severewhen the ability to lobby of the inefficient producer outstripsthat of the efficient producer. This may help to explain whyspecialized lobbying evolved. Specialized lobbying reduces thesocial cost from improper selection of firms by allowing efficientproducers to hire expert rent-seekers and so to raise theirchances of gaining monopoly concessions.