The Legal Community: Judges, Lawyers, Officials and Clerks in the Writing of Europe

This article argues that EU legal studies whould pay more attention to the legal discourse that sustains the conceptions of law and legal politics underlying European law. Drawing loosely on Bourdieu's concept of 'legal fields', it offers a social and intellectual reconstruction of European legal thinking by way of empirical analysis of European legal writing. The article argues that the autonomy, technicality and specificity of European law should be seen at least in part as consequences of the social and professional structure of the community of EU laywers.     

The social policy of the firm

The welfare state concept hides an important aspect of modern industrial societies. In capitalist countries welfare is provided through a mixture of public and private initiatives. The author suggests that the concept welfare economy more fully captures the economic interpenetration of public and private sectors. The growth of fringe benefits illustrates the extent to which private enterprise performs the welfare function.Government increasingly intervenes through processes of mandating, stimulating, regulating, and supporting, using private enterprise as the vehicle for delivery of welfare services. Government's traditionally conceived role as welfare service provider is also changed through recognition that it is both an employer and purchaser, significantly impacting society's original income distribution.An earlier version of this essay was presented as a lecture at the University of Melbourne and published in Ronald F. Henderson, The Welfare Stakes: Strategies for Australian Social Policy, Melbourne: Institute of Applied Economics and Social Research, 1981.     

Institutional determinants of the largest seat share

The degree of predominance of the largest party in a representative assembly affects government formation and survival. The seat share of the largest party, in turn, is constrained by the interaction of assembly size and electoral district magnitude in the following way. When all S seats in an assembly are allocated in districts of magnitude M, a logical quantitative model proposes that the largest fractional share is s₁ = (MS)^−1/8. As a curve, the model is found to fit with R² = 0.509, considering data from the averages of 46 periods in 37 countries, during which the electoral rules were essentially steady. As a worldwide average, the expression s₁(MS)^1/8 = 1 holds within 1%. Deviations from this average express the impact of various country-specific political and socio-cultural factors that can be investigated once the basic institutional constraints are controlled-for. This means that the degree of largest party predominance may be engineered to hover around a desired average by adjusting assembly size, and district magnitude, while keeping country-specific factors in mind.