Accounting for coalition‐building in the European Union: Budget negotiations and the south

Which parameters affect coalition building in budgetary negotiations? In this article, three distinct levels of analysis are identified to account for coalition building patterns, associated with domestic politics, domestic socioeconomic structures and EU politics. At the level of domestic politics, ideology points to cross‐governmental affinity of a partisan nature; at the level of socioeconomic structures, similarity of policy interests, generated by cross‐national socioeconomic convergence with EU policy standards, informs coalition formation patterns; at the EU politics level, the intergovernmental power balance influences the political aspirations of each Member State in the integration process and coalition‐building decisions. Two sets of parameters affect the evolution of EU coalition patterns, corresponding to the integration impact on the EU (new cleavages) and on the Member States (the impact of Europeanisation). This analytical framework is used to examine the southern coalition (Spain, Greece, Portugal) in the four multi‐annual financial frameworks (1988, 1992, 1999 and 2005).     

Negotiating in stages: National positions and the reform of the Stability and Growth Pact

Abstract.  This article examines the politics of the 2005 reform of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). It distinguishes between two stages in the reform process. The first stage delimited the negotiation space – confining reform into an interpretation of the formal clauses that prescribe SGP functioning – and set the reform agenda. In the second, decision-making stage, Member States engaged in high politics bargaining, more sensitive to their short-term (fiscal deficit) and long-term (fiscal sustainability) macroeconomic conditions, attempting to upload country-specific 'expenditure exceptionalism'. The authors of this article find a crucial disjunction in some Member States between positions held across the two stages. Strategic considerations, comprising the broader constitutional/political game and the need to demonstrate national macroeconomic credibility, account for such discrepancy in the two negotiation stages.     

Can electors combat corruption? Institutional arrangements and citizen behaviour

Studies interested in the cross‐national levels of corruption have concluded that specific institutional characteristics drive the aggregate variation. In countries with high institutional clarity and plurality electoral systems, corruption tends to be lower since increased voter monitoring and clarity of responsibility incentivise politicians to deliver virtuous policies. However, the underlying accountability mechanism has never been tested at the individual level. It is still unclear whether (1) voters do place voting weights on corruption, and (2) whether these weights vary in response to aggregate institutional characteristics. In this article, survey data from 23 democracies is used to put the accountability micro‐mechanism to this test. While there is some evidence that voters do vote on the basis of corruption, the moderating effect of institutional characteristics is not as strong as previously thought.