Bremse oder Gaspedal? Eine empirische Untersuchung zur Wirkung der direkten Demokratie auf den Steuerstaat

This article analyzes the relationship between the different forms of direct democratic participation and the size of the tax state in the Swiss cantons for the period from 1983 to 2000. The analysis distinguishes between the different effects of the financial referendum and the initiative. Theoretical arguments suppose that the financial referendum curb the tax state, whereas the initiative is expected to contribute to its growth. Pooled time series analyses show that legal conditions of direct democratic participation in general and especially the legislation on financial referenda are much more important than the frequency of plebiscites for the explanation of the different sizes of the tax states in the cantons. As an additional result of the analyses, the impact of direct democracy on the tax state turns out to be much larger in the 1990s compared to the decade before.     

Bicameralism and policy performance: The effects of cameral structure in Comparative Perspective

This article addresses the relationship between cameral structure and policy performance in the member states of the OECD for the time period from 1971 to 1996. The empirical analysis shows that bicameral structures act as a significant brake on government intervention and on the expansion of the welfare state. Furthermore, bicameralism is a powerful veto player to block reforms in economic and financial policy. With the exception of the over-representation of small and sparsely populated areas, none of the advantages that classical political theory ascribes to second chambers has actually been confirmed. Bicameral structures pose no barrier to executive dominance, nor do they promote stability within political systems or improve the quality of democracy or economic performance. On the contrary, with regard to social representation, they have a strong negative effect: in comparison to systems with a single chamber, bicameralism significantly reduces women's electoral success.     

Does Satisfaction with Democracy Really Increase Happiness? Direct Democracy and Individual Satisfaction in Switzerland

This paper takes the influential ??direct democracy makes people happy??-research as a starting point and asks whether direct democracy impacts individual satisfaction. Unlike former studies we distinguish two aspects of individual satisfaction, namely satisfaction with life (??happiness??) and with how democracy works. Based on multilevel analysis of the 26 Swiss cantons we show that the theoretical assumption on which the happiness hypothesis is based has to be questioned, as there is very little evidence for a robust relationship between satisfaction with democracy and life satisfaction. Furthermore, we do not find a substantive positive effect of direct democracy on happiness. However, with respect to satisfaction with democracy, our analysis shows some evidence for a procedural effect of direct democracy, i.e. positive effects related to using direct democratic rights, rather than these rights per se.     

The Janus‐Face of Negociation Democracy. The Effects of Consensus Democracy,Direct Democracy and Decentralization on State Intervention in Swiss Cantons

Dieser Beitrag analysiert die Varianzen der quantifizierbaren Staatstätigkeit in den 26 Schweizer Kantonen der 1980er und 1990er Jahre. Im Mittelpunkt der erklärenden Grssen stehen dabei Formen der Verhandlungsdemokratie, insbesondere der Konkordanz, dezentraler Entscheidungsstrukturen und direktdemokratischer Beteiligungsrechte. Wir zeigen, dass die Erweiterung des Konzeptes der Verhandlungsdemokratie auf weitere Staatsorgane neben der Regierung zur analytischen Unschärfe fhrt, da die verschiedenen Ausprägungen der politischen Machtteilung mit unterschiedlichen Wirkungen auf den Umfang des ffentlichen Sektors verbunden sind. Während die Konkordanz im Sinne der parteifrmigen Organisation politischer und sozialer Konflikte tendenziell die staatliche Intervention begnstigt, zgeln konstitutionelle Vetospieler die Staatstätigkeit, indem direktdemokratische Mitwirkung und dezentrale Machtteilung dem Staat Fesseln auf der Einnahmen‐und Ausgabenseite anlegen.     

Konstanz und Konkordanz. Die Stabilität kantonaler Regierungen im Vergleich

Die Instabilität kantonaler Regierungszusammensetzungen im Sinne wechselnder Parteienkoalitionen hat seit der Einführung der Volkswahl einen neuen Höhepunkt erreicht. Gleichzeitig finden sich in der Nachkriegszeit frappante Unterschiede zwischen den einzelnen Ständen, die sich gegen Ende des 20. Jahrhunderts noch akzentuiert haben. Der vorliegende Artikel versucht, die verschiedenen Determinanten zur Erklärung der unterschiedlichen parteipolitischen Regierungsstabilität in den "präsidentiellen" Konkordanzsystemen der Kantone theoretisch herzuleiten und empirisch zu überprüfen. Die empirischen Ergebnisse weisen darauf hin, dass die Ursachen für die unterschiedliche Stabilität der parteipolitischen Zusammensetzungen kantonaler Exekutiven nicht etwa mit dem Typ des Wahlsystems oder spezifischen Regierungsmerkmalen zusammenhängen, sondern vielmehr mit dem Grad elektoraler Kompetition und damit mit den Kooperationsstrategien der Regierungsparteien sowie – in weit schwächerer Form – mit dem Fragmentierungsgrad des Parteiensystems.     

Swiss Federalism from a Comparative Perspective –Dealing with Reform Obstacles

Swiss Federalism from a Comparative Perspective ‐ Dealing with Reform Obstacles In the first part of this introductory contribution, the authors present the content of this special edition as well as the individual articles and their main findings. The contributions are organized along three main comparative themes: the international and inter‐temporal comparison of Swiss federalism, the comparison of the constituent units from an institutional point of view, and the comparative analysis of their functioning in specific policy areas. In the second part of this article, the authors develop three theses concerning reform obstacles and opportunities of Swiss federalism related to polity, politics, and policy. They argue that federalism reforms are difficult to undertake given the conjunction of both centrifugal and centripetal dynamics. However, reforms are facilitated in Switzerland because institutions of federalism hardly ever turn into a politically contended issue and because federal conflicts and reform obstacles can be avoided by means of informal coordination.     

Switzerland on the Road from a Consociational to a Centrifugal Democracy?

Can Switzerland still be classified as an example of consociational democracy, characterized by power sharing and elite cooperation, by the second decade of the 21^st century? Drawing on Lijphart's typology of consociational and centrifugal regimes, an analysis of the transformation of Swiss democracy reveals that while Switzerland continues to display institutional elements of power sharing, a polarizing and competitive trend can be observed in the governing style of the elite. Increasingly adversarial elite behaviour and a growing polarization within parliament and government as well as with regards to referendums indicate a growing shift toward centrifugal democracy.     

Consensus and direct democracy:Conceptual and empirical linkages

Abstract The first part of this paper draws a number of theoretical connections between various forms of direct democracy and the two types of democracy outlined by Lijphart. Plebiscites and mandatory referendums without quorums of consent are shown to correspond to majoritarian forms of democracy, whilst optional referendums and initiatives with quorums of consent are shown to share similarities with power–sharing forms. The second part of the paper offers an empirical analysis of the different use of citizen–initiated referendums (optional referendums and initiatives) in Switzerland's consensual systems (i.e., cantons) by examining to what extent the various elements of power–sharing are developed. It is argued that referendums and initiatives are used less frequently when government coalitions have greater strength and local autonomy is more developed.