This article suggests that variations in the dominant pattern of innovation policy coordination can be analysed and understood effectively by dividing innovation and other complementary socio-economic policies into low-complexity and high-complexity tasks.
The effective implementation of these two sets of policy tasks that differ in the extent, nature and intractability of collective action problems confronting the coordination process hinges on the strength of two sociopolitical institutions: bureaucratic organizational structures and interactive governing arrangements. While bureaucratic organizational structures are better suited to delivering low-complexity tasks, interactive governing arrangements are more effective in resolving high-complexity policy problems. They interact differently across political economies to structure the management of coordination challenges and thus give rise to divergent patterns of innovation policy-making. The comparative analysis of innovation policy coordination between Hong Kong and Singapore over the past two decades lends strong support to the central theoretical propositions of the article.
East Asian economies differed dramatically in their vulnerability to the financial shocks of 1997–98. In the current literature
on the Asian crisis, one key factor commonly adduced to explain the uneven crises is different national approaches to liberalizing
the financial market. While extant analyses have yielded important insights into the correlation between divergent liberalization
patterns and uneven crises, they have failed to deal with the crucial question of why East Asian economies diverged in their
respective paths to financial market liberalization. To account for differences in liberalization approaches, this article
develops an institutional explanation of financial policy choices. It posits that variations in liberalization patterns stem
from fundamental differences in the organizational structures of the private sector, the bureaucracy, and the party system
that shape the economic interests and political behavior of social groups and state agencies in the policy-making process.
In making this argument, the article focuses on Korea, Singapore, Taiwan, and Thailand, the four major East Asian economies
that pursued different liberalization strategies during the 1980s and 1990s and had contrasting performance in the recent
financial crisis. It argues that cross-national differences in the above-mentioned domestic political structures within the
four economies are the primary sources of their divergent liberalization approaches and outcomes, which, in turn, impacted
financial stability to differing degrees and generated varying abilities to withstand external shocks.
The author thanks Benjamin Cohen, Stephan Haggard, Otto Holman, Geoffrey Underhill, and anonymous SCID reviewers for their
helpul comments on earlier drafts. Generous financial support from the Amsterdam School for Social Science Research and the
Netherlands Fellowship Program is gratefully acknowledged. The usual disclaimers apply.
Xiaoke Zhang is research fellow in the Amsterdam School for Social Science Research and the Department of Political Science
at the University of Amsterdam. He is the author ofThe Changing Politics of Finance in Korea and Thailand (Routledge, 2002) and the co-editor ofInternational Financial Governance under Stress (Cambridge University Press 2003). 相似文献
This article suggests a political party-centred explanation of economic policy reforms that differs significantly from the standard theoretical models that emphasise social coalitions, government systems, regime types or electoral cycles. The explanatory approach advanced here focuses on inter-party and intra-party organisational dimensions within an integrated analytical framework as the major determinants of both the decisiveness of policy reforms and the credibility of such reforms. A comparative analysis of government efforts to transform the securities industry in Singapore and Thailand provides preliminary evidence with which to explore the proposed causal linkage between the patterns of stock market reforms and the changing configurations of political parties. 相似文献