On Values. Universal or Relative?

Abstract. Any value statement belongs to a certain value code shared, to a certain degree, by a number of people. Is the value code itself relative or not? To solve this problem, one must assume that universal value statements and principles always have a prima-facie character. Prima-facie value propositions not only claim universality but can also be understood as universally valid in the following sense. First, their validity does not depend on an individual's free preferences. Second, although they are culture-bound, there is something all cultures must have in common. But such prima-facie propositions do not logically imply a moral judgement in any particular case. They are merely a starting point of an evaluation procedure, i.e., of weighing and balancing, nothing more. On the other hand, the final (contextual, all things considered) evaluations are necessarily relative to a certain culture and, indeed, to individual preferences. When claiming universality of values, people see the first side of the problem. When endorsing relativism, they see only the second side.     

On Law and Morality. A Dialogue

Abstract. The dialogue focusses on the distinctions and connections between law and morality. Morality is seen as axiological in character, whereas law is deontological. The possibility of a conceptual tie between goodness (axiology) and duty (deontology) is firmly disputed. Habermas's discursive foundation of ethics is criticized because it seems to confer on moral principles the status of a priori synthetic truths. Every moral idea has a cultural relativity which is not taken into account by Habermasian dialogue ethics. The moral and the legal points of view are kept separate: A law which does not satisfy the requirements of a "minimum content" of natural law is not said to be "law," but simply falling short of moral criteria. The possibility of introducing rational guarantees into moral discourse is not denied, but doubt remains as to whether there are "right answers" to moral questions.     

Suum Cuique Tribuere. Some Reflections on Law,Freedom and Justice

Abstract. Moral and theoretical deficiencies of the main foundation strategies in social and political systems (Social Engineering, Foundationalism and Invisible Hand theories) are explained by the necessity of a synthesis of different kinds of rationality, i.e., goal-rationality, norm-rationality and rightness and weighing rationality. The anthropological basis of the theory is a distinction between homo finalis and homo socialis. At the institutional level, this conception leads to a synthesis of the rule of law and the welfare state. At the political level, this implies a retonsideration of the principles of democracy and political planning.     

On the Legitimacy of Law: A Conceptual Point of View*

Abstract. The author outlines a conceptually oriented rational reconstruction of crisis tendencies in modern law. The connection between problems of legitimacy and the notion of rationality is emphasized and topics involving both the theory of communicative rationality and the theory of practical reasoning (especially in law) are discussed. The author concludes that a theory transcending the traditional approaches is needed. Otherwise, we shall not be able to face the questions of jurisprudence in the future, especially as regards an assessment of the relations between law and morality, between law and society and finally between law, legitimacy and democracy.