The accountability function of the courts in Tanzania and Zambia

This comparative analysis of the judiciaries in Tanzania and Zambia finds that neither one has developed a strong accountability function vis-à-vis the government. It goes on to address why judges in the two countries rarely have restrained the government in politically significant cases, identifying three sets of factors that may explain why the judges perform as they do: the legal culture; the institutional structure; and the social legitimacy of the courts. The study concludes that there are signs in the Tanzanian judiciary of a certain willingness to hold the government accountable in politically salient cases, but that their opportunity to do so is limited, due to institutional, social and political factors restricting the flow of constitutional cases. The Zambian courts have more political cases and opportunities for fulfilling an accountability function vis-à-vis the executive, but are reluctant to assert such authority. This is attributed to the legal culture and to political pressure.     

Introduction: the accountability function of the courts in new democracies

Much of the literature on ‘democratic consolidation’ has adopted a forward‐looking, future‐oriented perspective. Rather than studying past regimes, it tries to assess the life expectancies of contemporary ’third wave’ democracies. The article contends that authors have usually been unaware of the methodological complexities this choice of time perspective involves. If we want to reach reasonable judgements about the chances of democratic survival in a given country we have to be conscious of the probabilistic nature of such a prospective exercise. And we have to make (and justify) some basic analytical decisions. We have to explain the time horizons we are adopting as well as the future conditions we are assuming. We have to make clear how we construct the binary opposition between ‘consolidated’ and ‘non‐consolidated’ democracies. We have to decide whose expectations of democratic stability we take into account. And we have to cope with conflicting and unstable perceptions. Unless we ‘consolidologists’ heed these methodological ground rules, it is unlikely that we will ever reach shared judgements, or else, intelligible disagreements, about empirical states of democratic consolidation.