Optimal law enforcement and the economics of the drug market: Some comments on the Schengen Agreements

In this paper, we extend the optimal law enforcement model to the illegal trade and consumption of narcotics. Three sources of risk in the narcotic business are considered: (1) The consumer can be detected while consuming narcotics; (2) the consumer and the retailer can be detected at the time of sale to the consumer; and (3) the retailer and the producer can be detected at the time of sale to the retailer. We derive the two levels of market equilibrium and a set of comparative static results. The welfare analysis is used to comment on the Schengen Agreements and the implications for the market of narcotics.     

A Note on Optimal Law Enforcement under Asymmetric Information

We show that the probability of apprehension and punishment is usually reduced in a framework with asymmetric information, leading to more offenses being committed. A positive correlation between crime and asymmetry of information in the enforcement process is established. Some suggestions concerning the efficiency of private versus public enforcement are drawn.     

Optimal Law Enforcement with a Rent-Seeking Government

This article analyzes public and private law enforcement whenthe government is motivated by rent seeking. A rent-seekinggovernment seeks primarily to maximize revenue. The articleconcludes as follows: (1) if offenders have sufficient wealth,a rent-seeking government is more aggressive than a social-welfare-maximizinggovernment in enforcing laws against minor crimes (such as parkingviolations) but more lax in enforcing laws against major crimes;(2) competitive private enforcement is usually better and neverworse than monopolistic private enforcement; (3) The choicebetween competitive private enforcement and public enforcementdepends on which is cheaper and on the severity of the offense.     

Analysis of Δ-tetrahydrocannabinol in oral fluid samples using solid-phase extraction and high-performance liquid chromatography–electrospray ionization mass spectrometry

An analytical method using solid-phase extraction (SPE) and high-performance liquid chromatography–mass spectrometry (LC–MS) has been developed and validated for the confirmation of Δ⁹-tetrahydrocannabinol (THC) in oral fluid samples. Oral fluid was extracted using Bond Elut LRC-Certify solid-phase extraction columns (10 cm³, 300 mg) and elution performed with n-hexane/ethyl acetate. Quantitation made use of the selected ion-recording mode (SIR) using the most abundant characteristic ion [THC + H⁺], m/z 315.31 and the fragment ion, m/z 193.13 for confirmation, and m/z 318.00 for the protonated internal standard, [d₃-THC + H⁺]. The method proved to be precise for THC, in terms of both intra-day and inter-day analyses, with coefficients of variation less than 10%, and the calculated extraction efficiencies for THC ranged from 76 to 83%. Calibration standards spiked with THC between 2 and 100 ng/mL showed a linear relationship (r² = 0.999). The method presented was applied to the oral fluid samples taken from the volunteers during the largest music event in Portugal, named Rock in Rio-Lisboa. Oral fluid was collected from 40 persons by expectoration and with Salivette^®. In 55% of the samples obtained by expectorating, THC was detected with concentration ranges from 1033 to 6552 ng/mL and in 45% of cases THC was detected at concentrations between 51 and 937 ng/mL. However, using Salivette^® collection, 26 of the 40 cases had an undetectable THC.     

Hair analysis for delta(9)-THC,delta(9)-THC-COOH,CBN and CBD,by GC/MS-EI. Comparison with GC/MS-NCI for delta(9)-THC-COOH

A sensitive analytical method was developed for quantitative analysis of delta(9)-tetrahydrocannabinol (delta(9)-THC), 11-nor-delta(9)-tetrahydrocannabinol-carboxylic acid (delta(9)-THC-COOH), cannabinol (CBN) and cannabidiol (CBD) in human hair. The identification of delta(9)-THC-COOH in hair would document Cannabis use more effectively than the detection of parent drug (delta(9)-THC) which might have come from environmental exposure. Ketamine was added to hair samples as internal standard for CBN and CBD. Ketoprofen was added to hair samples as internal standard for the other compounds. Samples were hydrolyzed with beta-glucuronidase/arylsulfatase for 2h at 40 degrees C. After cooling, samples were extracted with a liquid-liquid extraction procedure (with chloroform/isopropyl alcohol, after alkalinization, and n-hexane/ethyl acetate, after acidification), which was developed in our laboratory. The extracts were analysed before and after derivatization with pentafluoropropionic anhydride (PFPA) and pentafluoropropanol (PFPOH) using a Hewlett Packard gas chromatographer/mass spectrometer detector, in electron impact mode (GC/MS-EI). Derivatized delta(9)-THC-COOH was also analysed using a Hewlett Packard gas chromatographer/mass spectrometer detector, in negative ion chemical ionization mode (GC/MS-NCI) using methane as the reagent gas. Responses were linear ranging from 0.10 to 5.00 ng/mg hair for delta(9)-THC and CBN, 0.10-10.00 ng/mg hair for CBD, 0.01-5.00 ng/mg for delta(9)-THC-COOH (r(2)>0.99). The intra-assay precisions ranged from <0.01 to 12.40%. Extraction recoveries ranged from 80.9 to 104.0% for delta(9)-THC, 85.9-100.0% for delta(9)-THC-COOH, 76.7-95.8% for CBN and 71.0-94.0% for CBD. The analytical method was applied to 87 human hair samples, obtained from individuals who testified in court of having committed drug related crimes. Quantification of delta(9)-THC-COOH using GC/MS-NCI was found to be more convenient than GC/MS-EI. The latter may give rise to false negatives due to the detection limit.     

Further notes on information,corruption, and optimal law enforcement

We consider two important notes on optimal law enforcement with corruption. First, we analyze the role of asymmetric information on the emergence of collusion between criminals and enforcers. Second, our paper proposes that the optimal criminal sanction for the underlying offense is not necessarily maximal. We achieve this result by coupling the criminal sanction for the underlying offense with a criminal sanction for corruption, both imposed on offenders. A higher criminal sanction for the underlying offense implies that the government must spend more resources to detect and punish corruption (since the likelihood of collusion increases). Thus, the government could reduce this sanction, save on detection, and increase the criminal sanction for corruption (in order to offset the negative effect on deterrence). We are grateful to Mitch Polinsky and two anonymous referees for helpful suggestions. The usual disclaimers apply.     

Household dissolution, child care and divorce law

This paper sets up a model of household dissolution in which one party decides to leave a household that contains children. We study the effects of divorce law on this decision and, in particular, the role of legal provisions governing the post-dissolution care of the household’s children. In particular, we show that there is an inevitable tension between achieving efficiency in marriage and at the same time achieving efficiency in divorce.     

Punish Once or Punish Twice: A Theory of the Use of Criminal Sanctions in Addition to Regulatory Penalties

Though clearly distinct in nature and procedure, both regulatoryagencies and courts frequently rely on similar instruments tosanction the same or very similar kinds of illegal behavior.In this article, we develop a theory of the use of criminalsanctions in addition to regulatory penalties. We show that,even though it is generally more effective to have a penaltyimposed by a regulatory agency rather than by the courts, undersome conditions it is optimal to have both. The article providesthree arguments: agency costs when delegating law enforcement,legal error, and collusion between a regulatory agency and anoffender. The objective of the article, though, is not limitedto the determination of the theoretical conditions that canmake the use of both sanctioning schemes optimal. Our analysisis also relevant to the application of a specific legal doctrine,the Double Jeopardy Clause.     

Regulating electronic identity in the European Union: An analysis of the Lisbon Treaty’s competences and legal basis for eID

This paper discusses the feasibility of EU legal action in the field of electronic identity (eID) within the new distribution of legal competences and the provision of novel legal basis engendered by the Treaty of Lisbon. The article attempts to find a ‘legal anchor’ to the idea of a pan-European electronic identity within EU law, looking at the issues of competences and legal basis. After examining various different areas of competence and the most feasible (and probable) candidates for a legal basis supporting an EU legal framework for eID, the paper argues that the latter should be found in the combination of Article 16 TFEU (concerning the right to the protection of personal data) with Article 3 TUE, and Articles 26 and 114 TFEU (concerning the establishment and functioning of the Internal Market), which also constitute the area of competence where an eID legal initiative can be pursued.     

The scope of punishment: an economic theory

The harm caused by many acts is not certain but probabilistic. Current public enforcement of the law combines harm-based sanctions (usually in criminal law) with act-based sanctions (very common in administrative law and regulation). We propose an economic theory of the choice between harm-based and act-based sanctions in public enforcement. The efficiency of act-based versus harm-based sanctions is analyzed and a typology of the determinants is drawn up. Our model suggests that harm-based sanctions are more efficient when (1) acquiring information about the act is important, (2) engaging in harm avoidance activities is advisable, (3) judgment-proofness is not a very significant problem, (4) punishment is especially costly, (5) changes in law are expensive or difficult to negotiate and (6) on average, potential criminals are better informed than the government about losses for society. Legal policy implications are discussed.