Assisting an Accused to Represent Himself: Appointment of Amici Curiae as the Most Appropriate Option

Given the proportion and complexity of international criminalproceedings, allowing an accused to represent himself beforean international criminal court might render his defence ineffective,even if the accused is a lawyer himself. If international criminalcourts are not willing to have the accused bear the consequencesof his choice of self-representation, the measure of appointingexperienced Defence Counsel as amici curiae to make legal contributionsto add to the Judges’ informed decisions seems to entailfewer undesirable ethical consequences for counsel than beingadded as ‘standby counsel’ or ‘court assignedcounsel’. Through occupying a neutral position and notbeing required to represent the accused, the amici's input maybalance the flow of defence and prosecution arguments and thuscontribute to the fairness of international criminal trials.The measure of appointing standby counsel or court assignedcounsel to an accused who wishes to represent himself appearsless appropriate, especially from a legal professional perspective.     

Interest group size dynamics and policymaking

We present a dynamic model of endogenous interest group sizes and policymaking. The model integrates ‘top-down' (policy) and `bottom-up' (individual and social-structural) influences on the development of interest groups. Comparative statics results show that the standard assumption of fixed-sized interest groups can be misleading. Furthermore, dynamic analysis of the model demonstrates that reliance on equilibrium results can also be misleading since equilibria may be unstable. Complicated dynamics may then emerge naturally, leading to erratic time patterns for policy and interest group sizes. Our model can endogenously generate the types of spurts and declines in organizational density reported in empirical studies.     

European air pollution assessments: co-production of science and policy

This paper examines the question whether the scientific knowledge framework produced in the context of the Convention on Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution (LRTAP) can keep its credibility, legitimacy and relevance when used in a different policy arena, e.g. the European Commission (EC) of the European Union. The paper combines a conceptual framework for considering effective assessments with the notion of boundary work and co-production of science and policy to examine differences between the roles and division of tasks between scientists and policy makers in the two different policy contexts. The paper concludes that, despite the differences between the two policy settings, user characteristics and the historical context are to a certain extent similar in LRTAP and the EU Clean Air for Europe Programme (CAFE), and that participants in the two processes partially overlap and tackle the same policy problem. The scientific knowledge framework as developed within LRTAP can maintain credibility, legitimacy and relevance when it is used in CAFE if certain conditions are fulfilled. One condition is the effective functioning of LRTAP, because the CAFE assessment process remains also dependent on the LRTAP process. Data collection and mapping efforts in the context of LRTAP form also the basis for the analyses within CAFE. Furthermore, a broadly embedded scientific basis is needed in the countries to enable each country to follow or relate to the analyses commissioned by the EU. The conceptual framework and concept of boundary work used in this paper turned out to be helpful in focusing on the dynamic relationship between science and policy.

A computational electoral competition model with social clustering and endogenous interest groups as information brokers

We extend the basic model of spatial competition in two directions. First, political parties and voters do not have complete information but behave adaptively. Political parties use polls to search for policy platforms that maximize the probability of winning an election and the voting decision of voters is influenced by social interaction. Second, we allow for the emergence of interest groups. These interest groups transmit information about voter preferences to the political parties, and they coordinate voting behavior. We use simulation methods to investigate the convergence properties of this model. We find that the introduction of social dynamics and interest groups increases the separation between parties platforms, prohibits convergence to the center of the distribution of voter preferences, and increases the size of the winning set.