Liberal Equality, Exploitation, and the Case for an Unconditional Basic Income

This paper considers whether arguments presented in Philippe Van Parijs' Real Freedom for All: What (if Anything) Can Justify Capitalism? succeed in rebutting the objection that the introduction of a substantial unconditional basic income (UBI) would allow non-working citizens to free-ride on the efforts of, and so exploit, working citizens. It considers Van Parjis' 'external assets argument' for UBI, and finds that this argument does not succeed in reconciling payment of a substantial UBI with the reciprocity principle which underpins this 'exploitation objection'. It considers and rejects Van Parijs' implicit claim that the exploitation objection must be grounded in a distributive principle which contradicts the egalitarian commitment to prevent brute luck inequality. It concludes that Van Parjis has failed, thus far, to articulate a convincing response to the exploitation objection.     

Attempts to Define ‘Terrorism’ in International Law

Netherlands International Law Review -     

Social capital

In parallel with, and as a complement to, globalisation, ‘social capital’ has enjoyed a meteoric rise across the social sciences over the last two decades. Not surprisingly, it has been particularly prominent across development studies, not least through heavy promotion by the World Bank. As a concept, though, as has been argued persistently by a minority critical literature, social capital is fundamentally flawed. Although capable of addressing almost anything designated as social, it has tended to neglect the state, class, power, and conflict. As a buzzword, it has heavily constrained the currently progressive departure from the extremes of neo-liberalism and post-modernism at a time of extremely aggressive assault by economics imperialism. Social capital should not be ignored but contested – and rejected.     

Tailoring Representative Democracy to the European Union: Does the European Constitution Reduce the Democratic Deficit?

Abstract Even if the institutions of representative democracy that have developed in the nation‐state context cannot be simply transposed to the European Union, for practical and normative reasons they do provide the main starting point for any reflection on the EU's ‘democratic deficit’. This article draws upon the Constitution prepared by the European Convention to reconstruct the concept of representative democracy in the EU. Drawing on the proposals put forward, it identifies two distinctive challenges that need to be overcome if the concept of representative democracy is to be successfully applied to the EU: the multilevel character of the polity and the shift of the centre of political gravity from legislative to executive politics. The article then examines the extent to which the institutional proposals contained in the Constitution go to meet these two challenges and also highlights some aspects in which these proposals fall short.