Liberia's child combatants: paying the price of neglect

Olawale Ismail works at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) on the Arms and Military Expenditure (Africa) Project. He is a fellow of the Social Science Research Council's African Youth and Globalisation programme. His research interests include conflict and security studies, especially in relation to Africa.     

A Note on Optimal Law Enforcement under Asymmetric Information

We show that the probability of apprehension and punishment is usually reduced in a framework with asymmetric information, leading to more offenses being committed. A positive correlation between crime and asymmetry of information in the enforcement process is established. Some suggestions concerning the efficiency of private versus public enforcement are drawn.     

Studies and observations on the use of isoelectric focusing in ultra-thin polyacrylamide gels as a method of typing human red cell phosphoglucomutase

The technique of isoelectric focusing in ultra-thin polyacrylamide gels as a method of typing human red cell phosphoglucomutase (PGM1) has been studied. Typing was possible without the samples attaining true equilibrium focusing conditions. The isozyme patterns so obtained were clearly defined and free from distortion. The importance of assessing relative band intensities when interpreting the isozyme patterns is discussed. Our experience of using the technique to analyse casework material is described.     

Further notes on information,corruption, and optimal law enforcement

We consider two important notes on optimal law enforcement with corruption. First, we analyze the role of asymmetric information on the emergence of collusion between criminals and enforcers. Second, our paper proposes that the optimal criminal sanction for the underlying offense is not necessarily maximal. We achieve this result by coupling the criminal sanction for the underlying offense with a criminal sanction for corruption, both imposed on offenders. A higher criminal sanction for the underlying offense implies that the government must spend more resources to detect and punish corruption (since the likelihood of collusion increases). Thus, the government could reduce this sanction, save on detection, and increase the criminal sanction for corruption (in order to offset the negative effect on deterrence). We are grateful to Mitch Polinsky and two anonymous referees for helpful suggestions. The usual disclaimers apply.     

Kidnap for Ransom in South East Asia

Kidnapping for ransom is not a new phenomenon. According to the Control Risk Group, an international risk consultancy, kidnappings of foreign nationals globally have increased by 275% over the past 10 years. High profile incidents such as the tourist kidnappings in 2000 by the Abu Sayyaf group, operating out of the troubled southern region of the Philippines, show that South East Asia has its own regionalised kidnapping hotspots. It is suspected that a high proportion of kidnappings are perpetrated by economically motivated crime groups but it is not possible to estimate with any degree of accuracy what percentage can be attributed to organised crime. This article will provide an overview of the problem, drawing upon existing literature available in the public domain. A typological discussion will show the critical differences between the various categories of kidnapping. The reliability of existing statistics, categorisation and recording of kidnapping for ransom will also be scrutinised, in particular for their variability across the region, to see whether this presents a barrier to a better understanding of the size and seriousness of the problem. As kidnapping for ransom incidents are becoming increasingly transnational in character, the final section will highlight the desirability of formulating and agreeing upon regional standardised definitions and counting rules for kidnap.