RACIAL AND ETHNIC DIFFERENCES IN PRETRIAL RELEASE DECISIONS AND OUTCOMES: A COMPARISON OF HISPANIC,BLACK, AND WHITE FELONY ARRESTEES*

The present study uses data on the processing of felony defendants in large urban courts to examine Hispanic, black, and white differences at the pretrial release stage. The major finding is that Hispanic defendants are more likely to be detained than white and black defendants. And, racial/ethnic differences are most pronounced in drug cases. In fact, Hispanic defendants suffer a triple burden at the pretrial release stage as they are the group most likely to be required to pay bail to gain release, the group that receives the highest bail amounts, and the group least able to pay bail. These findings are consistent with a focal concerns perspective of criminal case processing that suggests Hispanics as a newly immigrated group are especially prone to harsher treatment in the criminal case process.     

Agency Escape: Decentralization or Dominance of the European Commission in the Modernization of Competition Policy?

The "modernization" reforms of European antitrust are summarized and interpreted. The article uses principal–agent analysis enhanced by socio-institutional insights. The reforms in policy implementation are of historic importance. While they appear to promise decentralization to national competition authorities, more sophisticated analysis points to an increase in the centralized power of the Commission. The novel instrument of a supranational European Competition Network creates a redesigned relationship between the Commission and the member states that carries high risks of incoherence. Modernization driven by a legal epistemic community carries a less obvious risk that increased power of competition policy will unduly reinforce liberal market disciplines through a juridification of the European competition regime.     

Government 'strength' and budget deficits in advanced democracies

Abstract. Roubini and Sachs provided the first systematic test of the idea that political structure the size, composition, diversity, and/or stability of a governing cabinet - is related to budget deficits. In this paper, we take issue with several of Roubini and Sachs' choices concerning data and operationalization, and argue that their approach cannot offer clear conclusions about the relationship between national political structure and budget deficits. We test the 'strength of government' hypothesis using central government finance data on 16 countries, 1959–1990. We measure deficits in a way that maximizes comparability across countries but avoids the potential problems of standardizing by GDP. We examine carefully the definition and measurement of 'strength of government', in light of recent theoretical and empirical work in comparative politics. We perform pooled time-series regression analysis of deficit change in 16 OECD countries for the period 1959–1990. We argue that while structural differences between governments may have little impact on deficits during good economic times, they may become especially noticeable and influential during periods when governments struggle to cope with severe economic problems.