Optimal Central Banker Contracts and Common Agency

This paper considers the contracting approach to centralbanking in a simple common agency model. We suggest thatcentral banker contracts that do not consider the possibilityof more than one principal existing are incomplete contracts.Such incomplete contracts can be a poor form ofmonetary policy delegation under common agency. We develop amodel with two principals – society (government) and ageneric interest group, whose objective conflicts withsociety’s ex ante preferences by incorporating an inflationarybias. We determine when the government-offered orinterest-group-offered contract dominates the central banker’sdecision. The results largely depend on whether theinterest-group-offered contract is written in terms of outputor inflation.     

The Special Case Thesis. An Assessment of R. Alexy's Discursive Theory of Law

Legal Argumentation Theories seek mainly to develop procedures, criteria and principles which can guarantee a proper justification of legal propositions within modern legal systems. In doing this, those theories solicit in general an interconnection between practical reasoning and legal reasoning. This paper refers mainly to what seems currently to be the most elaborate theory of legal argumentation, that is R. Alexy's Theorie der juristischen Argumentation. Although the discussion is mainly concentrated on critical points of R. Alexy's theory, this paper's scope is slightly broader; it attempts to present an overall view of the current discursive theory of law. This is mainly performed through the critical examination of R. Alexy's Special Case Thesis, which seems to raise a handful of counter arguments on behalf of the other proponents of Legal Argumentation. In the first part the special case thesis is presented, as well as the main objections to it. In the second part the validity of the special case thesis is checked against K. Günther's model of practical discourse, which proves to be more elaborate in certain points, when compared with the corresponding model of R. Alexy. In the third part it is shown that the special case thesis can be accepted consistently only if it is combined with a normative theory of law that advocates the interconnection of the concept of law with the idea of right morality. It is further suggested that legal discourse has to be perceived as a special case of a broader moral-political discourse that “explains” or “justifies” (morally) the various restrictions that the positive legal systems impose on the legal discourse.     

‘No banquet can do without liquor’: alcohol counterfeiting in the People’s Republic of China

The illegal trade in alcohol has been an empirical manifestation of organised crime with a very long history; yet, the nature of the illegal trade in alcohol has received relatively limited academic attention in recent years despite the fact that it has been linked with significant tax evasion as well as serious health problems and even deaths. The current article focuses on a specific type associated with the illegal trade in alcohol, the counterfeiting of alcohol in China. The article pays particular attention to the counterfeiting of baijiu - Chinese liquor - in mainland China. The aim of the article is to offer an account of the social organisation of the alcohol counterfeiting business in China by illustrating the counterfeiting process, the actors in the business as well as its possible embeddedness in legal practices, trades and industries. The alcohol counterfeiting business is highly reflective to the market demand and consumer needs. Alcohol counterfeiting in China is characterised primarily by independent actors many of whom are subcontracted to provide commodities and services about the counterfeiting process. The business relies on personal networks – family and extended family members, friends and acquaintances. Relationships between actors in the business are very often based on a customer-supplier relationship or a ‘business-to-business market’. The alcohol counterfeiting business in China highlights the symbiotic relationship between illegal and legal businesses.     

The Walsh contract for central bankers proves optimal after all!

A recent paper argues that the Walsh linear inflation contract does not prove optimal when the government concerns itself about the cost of the central bank contract (Candel-Sánchez & Campoy-Miñarro, 2004). This result relies on assuming that the participation constraint does not represent an effective constraint on the central banker’s decision. We show that the Walsh linear inflation contract does produce the optimal outcome, even when the government cares about the cost of the contract, assuming that the participation constraint holds.