Molecular Identification of Necrophagous Dermestes Species in South Korea Using Cytochrome c Oxidase Subunit I Nucleotide Sequences (Genus Dermestes)

Species identification of necrophagous insects found on a dead body is an essential key in applying medicolegal entomology to the estimation of postmortem interval (PMI). Due to limited morphological identification of insect evidence, several studies have identified species using molecular information such as DNA markers. While considerable cytochrome c oxidase subunit I (COI) gene sequence data of necrophagous fly species have been collected and annotated, those of necrophagous beetle species have not. Since necrophagous beetles such as Dermestes species have a larval period longer than that of flies, beetles are useful in even the late decomposition phase in estimating minimum PMI. To obtain the full-length COI gene sequences of six Dermestes species collected from South Korea, we designed primers for polymerase chain reaction amplification and sequencing. The obtained full COI nucleotide sequences were used for performing phylogenic analysis and comparison with previously reported sequences. The results demonstrated that the COI gene sequences could be used to identify forensically important Dermestes species in South Korea.     

Promoting customer engagement: A new trend in utility regulation

This paper traces a new development in regulation that encourages utilities to engage more directly with their customers. We make four contributions: First, we perform a comprehensive analysis of how regulators are using customer engagement, and offer a simple model for understanding different customer engagement initiatives. Second, we review assessments of customer engagement. We find that there are no quantitative, empirically robust assessments of the effectiveness of customer engagement as a regulatory tool. Third, we develop two detailed case studies of an energy regulator and a water regulator that are in the forefront of customer engagement efforts. We find that there is no direct link between the engagement strategy used and the economic incentives received by a firm. Finally, we propose a framework for improving the customer engagement process. The new framework relies on microeconomics, modern tools of program evaluation, and supplying the regulated firm with direct incentives to engage with the customer.     

An assessment of the determination of energy needs: The case of nuclear power

The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) forced the Atomic Energy Commission, and subsequently the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, to weigh costs and benefits of proposed nuclear power plants. This paper examines how the Commission has developed a framework for decision making in response to the NEPA mandate. Its principal conclusions are that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission is not interested in being in the business of assessing power needs, and that regulating need by electricity source is counterproductive. If the question of power needs should be addressed at all, the paper argues that a more general framework should be used which would apply to all new facilities. Such a framework would allow a utility to build the plant of its choice, subject to satisfaction of existing regulations, after it is determined that sufficient demand exists.This research was supported in part by the National Science Foundation and the Environmental Quality Laboratory at Caltech. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Conference on the Economics of Nuclear Power Regulation at the Brookings Institution. I wish to thank Roger Noll, James Krier and Gary Miller for their helpful comments. Any remaining errors are solely my responsibility.     

The political economy of environmental regulation: Towards a unifying framework

There are several theories that attempt to explain various aspects of environmental policy. Building on insights from this theoretical work, and recent advances in our understanding of instrument performance, this paper constructs a more complete theory of environmental regulation. There are two primary contributions of this research. The first is to provide more satisfactory explanations for a number of observed patterns of environmental policy. For example, there is, as yet, no satisfactory theory about the emergence of incentive-based mechanisms, such as marketable permits and effluent fees. The second contribution of this paper is to develop a parsimonious framework for understanding many important aspects of environmental policy. This framework suggests the outputs of environmental policy emerge from a struggle between key interest groups.This research was supported by the National Science Foundation. I would like to thank Gordon Hester for helpful comments. Responsibility for the final product rests solely with the author.     

Genipin--a novel fingerprint reagent with colorimetric and fluorogenic activity

Genipin, the hydrolytic product of geniposide, which is extracted from gardenia fruit, shows good potential as a fingerprint reagent. It develops latent fingerprints on paper as blue impressions with good contrast and resolution. Even very faint impressions that are barely visible in ambient light will fluoresce brightly upon illumination at ca. 590 nm and are best viewed with a barrier filter above 630 nm. Potential advantages of genipin are the combination of colorimetric and fluorogenic activity in one reagent as well as its being a safe and environmentally friendly natural product.     

The economic significance of “insignificant” rules

We know relatively little about the economic effects of “insignificant” rules because they are not typically analyzed. Yet, these rules could be cumulatively important. We provide an economic analysis of one proposed rule to control hazardous air pollutants, which is not considered to be economically significant. This rule is of particular interest because it is one of the first in a long series of rules that Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) will consider for limiting hazardous air pollutant emissions. Our analysis suggests that the proposed controls that EPA has considered are not likely to pass a benefit–cost test. We recommend that an agency base its decision to allocate additional resources to benefit–cost analysis on the expected value of the improved information. In addition, agencies should consider applying a rule of thumb that would specify a threshold level of risk reduction that needs to be achieved before some kinds of regulation are considered.