The Relational Principle of Trust and Confidence

This article seeks to explain why, in terms of Iain Macneil'srelational theory of contract, the implied mutual duty of trustand confidence can be described as a quintessentially relationalnorm. The role played by the duty in the development of a relationalapproach to variation of the employment contract is examined.The potential for the trust duty to become a relational principleinforming the content of the employment contract is explored.The impact of litigation based on the trust duty in creatinga relational approach to employees’ contractual remediesat common law, which have traditionally been dominated by thenotice rule, is assessed. Finally, the potential for there todevelop a relational principle of trust and confidence capableof, to some extent, unifying the contractual, statutory andtortious elements of the law of the employment relationshipis examined.     

Introduction

ABSTRACT

This article argues for the analysis of the flow of ideological discourse through society within and across three distinct but interrelated levels: (1) the canonically defined, or macro level, (2) the intermediate or meso level of competitive political appeals, political relevant public discourse and cultural criticism, and (3) the everyday or micro level of conceptual use by non-experts. This differentiation among levels of ideological action and influence helps us to clarify the objects and appropriate methods of ideological analysis. Methods applied in specific cases must facilitate an effective focus on phenomena on one of these levels while still allowing recognition of the complex forms of direct and indirect conceptual influence and connection between the levels. The article also serves as an introduction to the volume, giving a brief account of the analysis and argument of each contribution.     

The congressional foundations of agency performance

When Congress delegates a policy mandate to a regulatory agency, Congress acts as a principal, choosing the institutional arrangements, or the ‘rules of the game’ for agency decision making. Individuals in the agency, acting as agents, take the rules of the game as given and do the best they can within these institutional arrangements. In this paper we develop a simple model that relates the congressional choice of institutional arrangements to two underlying environmental factors — uncertainty and conflict. We suggest that uncertainty and conflict of interest lead Congress, in delegating, to prescribe a greater scope of permissable regulatory activity, a wider array of regulatory instruments, and more confining regulatory procedures. Increased scope and stronger instruments tend to broaden the overall discretionary authority of the agency, while more confining procedures tend to narrow it. We conjecture that with increased uncertainty or conflict the narrowing tendency more than offsets the broadening tendency, for a net decrease in the agency's overall discretionary authority. Lastly, we argue that the performance of a regulatory agency in fulfilling its mandate is determined in large measure by the foundations Congress constructs for the implementation of delegated authority.     

The politics of flatland

A version of the median-voter theorem holds for two-dimensional spatial models in which voters regard the two dimensions as economic goods or goodlike activities and in which the set of feasible outcomes is constrained by budget or technology. Although mathematically trivial, this fact has widespread analytical uses. After arguing that our two-dimensional model, with its stability property, fits a number of important and general policy areas, we use our analysis to address some prominent theoretical issues.     

Detecting Feigned PTSD Using the Personality Assessment Inventory

Research generally supports the use of the Personality Assessment Inventory (PAI; Morey 1991) to detect feigned PTSD, although this support has been somewhat mixed. There is also evidence that coaching individuals on the presence of PAI validity indicators may not affect their ability to avoid detection as feigners (Bagby et al. in Journal of Personality Assessment 78:69–86, 2002), although this question has not been specifically addressed with regard to PTSD. Additionally, a new PAI validity indicator, the Negative Distortion Scale (NDS), was developed that may have utility in detecting feigned PTSD, but this has not been tested. The purpose of this study was to further test the operating characteristics of the PAI validity indicators to detect feigned PTSD among naïve and coached respondents and to examine the newly developed NDS for this purpose. Individuals with genuine PTSD were compared to individuals instructed to feign PTSD on PAI validity indicators. Results suggest that: (a) coaching had minimal influence on the ability of the PAI to detect feigned PTSD, (b) the PAI validity indicators all significantly differentiated genuine from feigned PTSD, and (c) the NIM and NDS indicators were particularly effective for detecting feigned PTSD.     

An unusual case of high-voltage electrocution of a truck driver due to inadvertent contact of the truck with an overhead wire

Electrocution deaths are mostly accidental. However, reconstruction of events in unusual electrocution death is challenging. This article reports an accidental death due to electrocution in a highly unusual circumstance, in which a truck driver reversing his vehicle was electrocuted when his truck inadvertently touched an overhead high-voltage wire. The electric injury marks were present over the sole of the right foot. The scene investigation revealed that the high-voltage wire was loose and was below the level of the prescribed height. The truck was passing over an elevated area made up of dirt and stone. The interior of the cabin of the truck revealed a few non-insulated metallic areas over the floor of the truck, between the accelerator and the brake, which were attributed as the sources of entry of electricity into the body. The electric injury marks were different than those usually seen in high-voltage electrocution as there was an intermediate object (truck) involved, and the contact period between the truck and the electric wire was minimal. This fatality was attributed to the non-proper insulation of the interior of the truck, the negligent driving of the truck driver over the elevated surface, and the loose high-voltage wire without proper maintenance.     

Mandelafying the public service in South Africa: Towards a new theory

A surfeit of service delivery disapprovals in South Africa is a clear reflection of the failure of the Public Service of South from the local, provincial, and national government to effectively and efficiently deliver service to its citizenry. The rise in a dissatisfied citizenry stems from a precise social realization, which envisions the failure of the state to deliver services to the public in an impartial, responsible, translucent, and befitting manner. This has resulted in widespread service delivery protests, which has become the most famous form of response to poor service delivery by frustrated citizens. This article argues for the mandelafication of the South African public service against the background of a cocktail of factors ranging from corruption, lack of transparency and accountability, incompetence, and lack of commitment to work ethics personified by Mandela. The article further argues for the upholding of the dominant constructs in which this mandelafication is grounded in such as proper ethics, humanitarianism, transparency, accountability, empathy, and selflessness, which characterized Nelson Mandela.     

Representation or abdication? How citizens use institutions to help delegation succeed

Abstract. Modern democracy requires delegation. One problem with delegation is that principals and agents often have conflicting interests. A second problem is that principals lack information about their agents. Many scholars conclude that these problems cause delegation to become abdication. We reject this conclusion and introduce a theory of delegation that supports a different conclusion. The theory clarifies when interest conflicts and information problems do (and do not) turn delegation into abdication. We conclude by arguing that remedies for common delegation problems can be embedded in the design of electoral, legislative, and bureaucratic institutions. The culmination of our efforts is a simple, but general, statement about when citizens and legislators can (and cannot) control their agents.