China’s rise as a global power corresponded with a diminution of Taiwanese diplomacy, which has left Central America as the last region to host a continuous bloc of countries that recognize the ROC. In this article, we argue that China’s success in gaining diplomatic recognition from Taiwan’s former allies has largely resulted from China's economic policy, specifically its promises of large-scale infrastructure projects and the integration of Central American economies with Chinese markets. However, there are limits to how far China has advanced in gaining full recognition from the region. The competing political and economic interests of China, Taiwan, the United States, and the Central American countries themselves, continue to influence patterns of diplomatic switching. More specifically, we argue that the threat of punitive measures from the United States combined with a turn in Taiwanese diplomacy toward assistance efforts to combat Covid-19 may deter future switching in the short to medium-term. Our analysis offers case studies of four Central American countries (Costa Rica, Panama, El Salvador and Nicaragua) to illustrate the multi-year processes by which China’s economic strategy leads to diplomatic switching and examine the paths ahead for the remaining holdouts facing the prospect of economic and political penalties by the United States.
AbstractFor nearly a decade, Republicans accused Democrats and the Obama Administration of waging a “war on coal” and Democrats has cited economics as the primary cause of the industry’s troubles. Now that President Trump has declared the war on coal to be over, it is time to examine the regulations promulgated during the Obama Administration and their impact on the industry. This article will discuss the coal industry prior to, during, and after the Obama Administration with particular attention to Obama-era regulations that impacted the industry and President Trump’s efforts to repeal and replace the same. 相似文献
There is widespread concern that higher education is being compromised by being turned into a ‘commodity’ to be ‘consumed’. This article represents an initial attempt to explore the trends in both the UK and US, and considers how the law has responded to them. It argues, however, that there is an important distinction to be drawn between ‘commodification’ and ‘consumerism’. Education has always been a commodity to be bought and sold; the true danger lies in the move to a ‘rights-based’ culture where students (and politicians) see education merely as something to be ‘consumed’ rather than as an activity in which to participate. Whilst the law seems thus far to have been something of a bulwark against this movement, it remains an open question as to whether this will continue to be the case if HEIs do not themselves act more proactively in challenging this damaging view of higher education. 相似文献
In 1970, the Congress enacted the Organized Crime Control Act. Title IX of the 1970 Act is the Racketeer Influence and Corrupt
Organization Act or RICO. This Act had its origins in legislation going back as far as 1934, but coming forward to 1961. The
1970 Act borrowed ideas from this earlier legislation, principally “enterprise,” but also the use predicate statutes to define
“racketeering activity.” The ideas are not new, but their combination affects how prosecutors and law enforcement agents investigate,
try, and sanction violations of the Act. RICO’s drafting also reflects organizational theory and economic analysis. The investigation
and prosecution of a single crime committed by an individual on a single day and in a single place maybe done using one set
of procedural and evidentiary rules. Nevertheless, the investigation and prosecution of patterns of diverse offenses committed
by, through, and against licit and illicit enterprises require sophisticated procedures, evidentiary rules, and criminal sanctions.
In addition, antisocial conduct is more than a challenge to the administration of criminal justice; it also requires the full
panoply of civil sanctions, including public injunctions as well private enforcement of injunctive relief and treble damages.
RICO has had a profound effect on the prosecution of organized crime, white-collar crime, and other forms of similar criminal
behavior.
William J. & Dorothy K. O’Neill Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School; A.B. 1957, University of Notre Dame; J.D. 1960, Notre
Dame Law School. Professor Blakey was the Chief Counsel of the Subcommittee on Criminal Laws and Procedures of the United
States Senate Committee on the Judiciary in 1969-70 when the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-542, 84 Stat.
922 (1970) was processed, Title IX of which is the Racketeer Influence and Corrupt Organization Act or RICO. For a general
treatment of the statute from a variety of perceptive, see the collection of law review literature in G. Robert Blakey & Kevin
Roddy, “Reflections on Reves v. Ernst & Young: Its Meaning an Impact on Substantive, Accessory, Aiding, Abetting and Conspiracy
Liability under RICO,” 33 Amer. Crim. L. Rev. 1345, 1348 n. 3(1996). 相似文献
After the Agreement on the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) came into operation in 1995 developing countries have found themselves in a process of continual negotiation over intellectual property rights and access to medicines. These negotiations have taken place in the World Trade Organization and in the context of free trade agreements. The paper suggests that the only real win for developing countries has been the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health in 2001. What have been the lessons for developing countries in a decade of negotiations over access to medicines? Drawing on themes of rule complexity and regulatory ritualism the paper discusses four key lessons for developing countries. It concludes by arguing that developing countries will do better if they adopt a networked governance approach to negotiation rather than continuing to rely on traditional coalition formation. 相似文献