Whistleblowing as a new regulatory instrument in global governance: the case of tax evasion

Abstract

The cross-border impacts of whistleblowing recently have become far more visible and consequential, as evident with the ‘Paradise’ and ‘Panama Papers’ leaks, which exposed tax and other financial wrongdoings of prominent personalities around the world, leading to scandals, resignations and prosecutions. Despite its new prominence, whistleblowing often continues to be seen as a series of ad hoc chance acts. We argue instead that whistleblowing is an increasingly institutionalized regulatory tool that is enabled by an emergent ‘whistleblowing system’, with similarities to other new forms of informal global governance. Whistleblowing can be controversial, and we develop a framework for assessing whether any particular whistleblowing event and the system that enables it are in the public interest. We then apply this analysis to the case of global tax evasion. We conclude that a whistleblowing system can make important contributions to difficult cross-border regulatory challenges such as tax evasion, especially where other governance systems fail.     

Democracy in Britain: Retrospect and Prospect

The EU referendum has raised questions about the nature of democracy, which is not just majority rule. It is wrong to claim that direct democracy has now replaced representative democracy, as Parliament is required to answer all the questions that the referendum did not. The conduct of the referendum reflected the worst aspects of Britain's political culture of sterile adversarialism. Both left and right have shared assumptions about governing that have made it difficult to develop a culture of democratic citizenship. The political system still reflects its pre‐democratic origins (as in the survival of a House of Lords and the obsession with titles) and the role of money in politics represents a form of corruption. Institutional reforms depend for their success on the nurturing of a democratic culture, which is a task for many hands.     

Citizens’ Perceptions of Governance in Rural and Urban China

This article presents three main findings from a purposive stratified survey of urban and rural residents. First, Chinese citizens “disaggregate” the state with high levels of satisfaction for Central government that fall dramatically as government gets closer to the people. Satisfaction levels are noticeably lower for those in rural China. Second, attitudes about the way policy is implemented by local governments raise concerns. Irrespective of place of residence, respondents feel that when implementing policy local officials and governments are mainly concerned with their own interests, are more receptive to the views of their superiors rather than those of ordinary people, favor those with money, and are formalistic in implementing policy rather than dealing with actual problems. Third, the areas of work that citizens would really like government to concentrate on are job creation and providing basic guarantees to protect against the shocks of the transition to a market economy. Tony Saich is the Daewoo Professor of International Affairs, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University and Director of the Harvard University Asia Center. His recent research focuses on the development of social policy in China, particularly on the provision of public goods by local governments. His publications include Governance and Politics of China by Palgrave and edited volumes on Financial Sector Reform in China (with Yasheng Huang and Edward Steinfeld) and AIDS and Social Policy in China (with Joan Kaufman and Arthur Kleinman both by Harvard University Asia Center. He would like to thank Edward Cunningham for his great help in preparing this article. He also wants to thank Victor Yuan (Horizon Market Research Company) for his tremendous help in designing the survey and implementing it. In addition, I would like to thank Anita Chan, Martin King Whyte and two anonymous reviewers for their extremely helpful comments on an earlier draft.