Linking past and future: cross-border development and quality of life in the Badakhshans

The 1895 Pamir Convention divided the mountainous region of Badakhshan into separate entities under Russian and British/Afghan influence, leading to a remarkable divergence in the development fortunes of a people once united by kinship. For those in today's Gorno-Badakhshan in Tajikistan, incorporation into the Soviet Union brought investments in education, health, physical infrastructure, and the economy. People living in Afghanistan's Badakhshan Province retained more political freedom but lived remotely within a feudal state where development investment was limited. In recent decades, both regions have experienced conflict that has affected their development. In this article, we use findings from quality of life assessments carried out by the Aga Khan Development Network to illustrate the stark differences between the Badakhshans. We discuss ongoing efforts to implement cross-border development programmes to improve quality of life in both Badakhshans, while noting that their success depends on a stable security environment in the region.     

Centre–periphery relations in Afghanistan: Badakhshan between patrimonialism and institution-building

The article offers a review of centre–periphery relations and local politics in the Afghan province of Badakhshan from the 1980s to the post-2001 era. It maps the local powerbrokers and charts the transformations that occurred during this period, with particular reference to the impact of the central government's policies on local political alignments and relations of power. The key argument is that President Karzai's and the cabinet's behaviour towards Badakhshani politics was aimed at re-establishing a patrimonial system, rather than at institution-building as claimed. Unable or unwilling to successfully deal with established local players, Kabul resorted to sponsoring new players in local politics and facilitating their rise in order to weaken more independent powerbrokers. However, a local perception of weakness in Kabul, not least due to uncertainty over the durability of the Karzai administration, led local players, old and new, to behave with very short-term horizons, as ‘roving bandits’ rather than as ‘stationary’ ones.