Opaque transparency: an analysis of the Israeli lobbying regulatory regime of 2008

After some failed attempts to regulate the lobbying, the Israeli Parliament—the Knesset—passed the Lobbyist Law on April 2nd 2008. Although lobbying is a common and legitimate part of the democratic process, it raises issues of trust, equality of access, and transparency. What motivated the MKs to regulate lobbying—public interest, private interest, or symbolic politics? The MKs claimed that the law was needed for improving transparency whereas MK Yechimovich declared that it balances the strength of the rich, represented by lobbyists and the wide public. Assessing the achieved transparency in the comparative framework of other lobbying regulatory regimes, we see that the law confers tangible benefits on powerful interest groups, while providing only symbolic gestures to the public. Lack of information available for MKs creates a need for lobbyists for political intelligence and MKs need to identify the interests in play to guarantee for themselves the necessary legislative subsidy. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Lobbygruppen im politischen Wettbewerb: Die Auswirkungen des Konkurrenzkampfes unter Interessengruppen auf deren Lobbyverhalten

Lobby groups face direct competition from each other, yet the level of competition they face varies and depends on the political issue area they compete in. This article investigates the question, how these differing intensities of competition affect the lobbying behavior of interest organizations. Based on data stemming from a survey among Swiss and German interest groups, this article establishes that the intensity of competition among lobby groups positively influences both directly lobbying politicians (inside lobbying) but also exercising influence indirectly via the media and the public (outside lobbying). Yet it is also demonstrated that the inside lobbying benefits more strongly from higher competition levels, hence interest organizations look for ways to directly influence politicians first when they are faced with stiffer competition.     

Rational lobbying and EU climate policy

Using a simple rational choice model as a heuristic device, this paper explores the lobbying behaviour of environmental and business organisations in the field of climate policy and discusses why their lobbying behaviour differs. I find that environmental organisations lobby less than what would be considered rational according to the simple rational choice model, and argue that this might largely be explained by tight budget constraints. I also find that business organisations lobby more than what would be considered rational according to the model, and argue that this might be explained if one applies a long-term perspective on rational lobbying in the policy field rather than a short-term perspective on single policy decisions. Moreover, I find that the type of lobbying differs. While environmental organisations focus on single policy decisions, business organisations also invest in general lobbying. The analysis is based on interviews with interest organisations lobbying in the field of climate policy at the European Union (EU) level.

Comparative lobbying research: advances,shortcomings and recommendations

This review article suggests that there is a new school of comparative lobbying emerging. However, this development is taking place only gradually. Unlike the earlier studies, which studied corporatism/pluralism, outside lobbying and lobbying regulations, the new comparativists are mainly focusing on inside lobbying strategies and success as a function of country‐level factors. Yet, the literature still suffers from underdeveloped theories. I stress that our knowledge can be improved with better theorizing. Better theories, in turn, can be formulated by improving the use of quantitative data gathering, qualitative research, formal models and better communication between researchers working with different methodologies in different disciplines. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Pluralism,corporatism and perception of corruption

When people know who is influencing the elected politicians and they may ‘put the rascals out’ in case they feel that the incumbents are corrupt, ceteris paribus, their perception of the level of corruption should not be affected by lobbying. If on the other hand people are not sure which or how many actors are influencing public policy and they are not able to hold the government truly accountable as interest group influence is constant with different governments, people will be more likely to perceive the government as corrupted. The former system is a characteristic of corporatism and the latter of pluralism. This problem is exacerbated by the fact that interest groups with resources such as business groups or firms in pluralist systems are more influential than groups with few resources. Thus, people may perceive pluralist policy‐making system as more corrupt than corporatist policy‐making system where fewer visible actors have more or less equal weight in the policy‐making process. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Neglecting results? A critical view of the literature on organised interests in the European Union

Much research has been undertaken to cast light on to the role of interest groups in the European Union and elsewhere. However, only a few researchers have focused their energy on the practical effects of involvement—effects on the legal output of the political process. Thus, we have a good knowledge of interest groups as input factors, and we have a language to asses their weight in terms of input legitimacy. However, we do not understand their actual impact on the substance of legislation: does involvement make laws more efficient? This question seems especially relevant in the European Union as this organisation is often said to be much dependent on the effective and efficient functioning of its rules—its output legitimacy. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Public Affairs: A field's maturation from 2000+ to 2030

This paper explores the development of the field of public affairs (PA) through the observations, research and experiences of two of its most cited scholars, deputy editors, and longtime contributors to the Journal of Public Affairs. We examine how PA and its practitioners have moved non‐linearly from 2000+ PA, to Public Affairs 2.0, toward a still evolving model of practice. Three areas of practice are explored in depth, including (a) how the function is managed, (b) its communication activity, and (c) how it supports organizations in interacting and engaging with stakeholders and issues. Finally, four alternative futures are laid out as possible paths along which the function may evolve as it moves forward to its next decade's end in 2030.