Soviet propaganda and the neutron bomb decision

Abstract

In July 1977, newly elected President Jimmy Carter suddenly found himself confronted with a difficult neutron bomb decision. With a narrow victory in Congress, pro neutron‐bomb forces had successfully presented the President with the authority to proceed with production. Unfortunately, as the months passed, Carter failed to move swiftly with production of the neutron warheads which many NATO alliance members saw as a much needed deterrent to the Warsaw PACT'S massive armor superiority.

Confronted with mounting international and domestic opposition to the neutron weapon, Jimmy Carter, in the fall of 1977, insisted that the NATO allies officially support American production of the warheads before the United States would produce it. Spurred on by Carter's indecision and by certain NATO members’ reluctance to officially support the weapon, the Soviet Union shifted its propaganda machine into high gear in a massive effort to sway international opinion against the weapon.

During the first few months of 1978, Western Europe saw a flood of protests against this so‐called “inhumane” weapon. Domestic communist and left‐wing socialist opposition to the neutron bomb precipitated a precarious right‐left split within many Western European socialist parties. Nowhere was this split more graphically illustrated than within the ruling West German Social Democratic Party (SPD). Chancellor Helmut Schmidt and his moderate technocrats basically favored the neutron bomb, but feared crippling left‐wing SPD opposition and possible defections if West Germany complied with American demands to break with over 30 years of U.S.‐West German nuclear precedent and agree officially to American production of a nuclear weapon, the neutron bomb.

Only after much American cajoling did the allies move toward official NATO support for production. Carter had failed to understand the disastrous political implications which left‐wing opposition had created within the NATO countries and refused to let Schmidt and other leaders off the hook. And then in an amazing move, after Schmidt and the NATO allies had risked political ruin to reach an agreement to support the neutron bomb, President Carter pulled the rug from under them on April 7,1978, when he indefinitely delayed a decision on the weapon.

With this decision, Carter had set a dangerous precedent by yielding to Soviet pressure and had missed an opportunity to win the favor of skeptical NATO allies and critics who asserted he was too weak and indecisive. But above all, Carter had unnecessarily alienated and angered NATO leaders like Schmidt who risked possible political ruin by supporting the neutron bomb.     

Book Reviews

John F. Manley and Kenneth M. Dolbeare, The Case Against the Constitution: From the Antifederalists to the Present (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharp, Inc., 1987), 199 pp.

Mark Tushnet, Red, White, and Blue: A Critical Analysis of Constitutional Law (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1988), 328 pp.

Sheldon S. Wolin, The Presence of the Past: Essays on the State and the Constitution (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989), 228 pp.

Peter Brown, Minority Party: Why Democrats Face Defeat in 1992 and Beyond (Washington, DC: Regnery Gateway, 1991).     

Editorials in national development: Perceptions of Nigerian journalists

This study examines the self‐reported perceptions of the role of editorials in national development for a purposive sample of 348 full‐time, salaried Nigerian journalists on nine national newspapers in two newspaper ownership groups: private and government. Three major findings are indicated.

The first finding is that, on seven‐statement comparisons of the role of editorials in national development, government journalists perceived their editorials as more supportive of the government than did private journalists, a result largely reflective of government newspapers’ persuasive role in behalf of government agencies.

The second finding is that ownership of newspapers is not a particularly strong factor in journalists’ perceptions of the role of editorials in development. Such a finding calls into question the rationale for the continuing case for private ownership of Africa's media institutions as a solution to the limitations of the region's media in exercising independent, effective, and persuasive influence on development.

Finally, because this study indicates that newspaper ownership is occasionally not a factor in the perception of the role of editorials in development, it questions the implications of the simple, traditional distinction between government and private newspapers for national development in sub‐Saharan Africa.