对法律事实建构论的初步阐释——以主体间性为分析进路的思考

诉讼法学界关于客观真实与法律真实的争论是针对法律事实的认定标准所产生的分歧,但是,争论并没有跳出主观与客观、事实与价值、形式与实质这种二元对立的思维模式。而要探究法律事实的形成,必须重新考察诉讼活动的性质,进而实现分析进路由主体性向主体间性的转换。法律事实建构论的提出就是这种分析进路转换之后的结果,但值得注意的是,我们必须对法律事实建构论的限度保持必要的警醒。     

科学理解与主体间性

科学理解问题现已成为科学哲学研究中的热点问题,其探讨目的是要从理解的角度求取科学知识之普适性来源,以从科学的角度来弥合人与自然、人与人之间的裂痕。科学知识之普遍性来源于科学共同体的共通性,而后者又基于科学家之间的主体间性。主体间性的引入既为科学理解同样亦为科学理论本身的发展提供了新的方法论。     

Why Subjectivity Matters: Critical Theory and the Philosophy of the Subject

Abstract

In this paper it is argued that Habermas' critique of German Idealism is misguided and that his rejection of the philosophy of the subject is unjustified. Critical Theory needs to recognise the importance of subjectivity for all social philosophy if its theoretical aims are to be achieved. In order to demonstrate the relevance of subjectivity to Critical Theory the essay draws on analytic philosophy of mind and on the work of Manfred Frank and Dieter Henrich.     

Imaginary Turns in Critical Theory: Imagining Subjects in Tension

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to examine two turns towards the idea of the creative imagination in contemporary critical theory in the works of Axel Honneth and Cornelius Castoriadis. Honneth's work subsumes the idea of the creative imagination under the paradigm of mutual recognition. Castoriadis constructs the idea of the creative imagination from an ontological perspective. However, Castoriadis' idea of the primary autism of the creative imagination can be thrown into relief by Hegel's Jena Lectures. Hegel's and Castoriadis' work opens onto a subjectivity in tension, that is, a subjectivity that is forged out of a combination of subjective interiority, as well as the patterns of interaction that are multidimensional in their scope and create social spaces that force the subject beyond an initial closure.     

犯罪主体的认知差异及其实证研究

实证研究发现,人们对犯罪严重性及其惩罚的排序较为一致,支持了犯罪学领域中的共识模式。但受调查者的个体特征(年龄、性别、民族、宗教)显著影响他们对犯罪严重性及其惩罚的认知,具体表现在评分均值的差异。从个体的主体性角度看,后现代法学批判了意志自由和理性主体,强调人的实践性和有限理性。舒茨的主体间性理论和哈耶克的知识分散论表明,自我的意义确立过程和对他人经验的理解是两种完全不同的经验图式和解释图式,诠释了不同主体之间的认知差异。     

马克思写《黑格尔法哲学批判》的思想动机

文艺复兴后，西方思想界出现笛卡尔主体哲学，“我思故我在”，强调自我为中心，康德继承了笛卡尔的思路提出了主体性原则，黑格尔认为不赞同这些观点，提出了主体间性。马克思认为黑格尔解决的是天国问题，对于现实问题解决不了。于是他对黑格尔的法哲学进行了批判。     

The intersubjective space–time of a Zulu choir/HIV support group in global perspective

This article draws from anthropology, conversation analysis, ethnomusicology, semiotics, and phenomenology, using the concept of intersubjectivity to model how the micro-organization of musical communication can be integral in social processes of support, identity maintenance, and activism amid structural inequality. This is based on ethnographic fieldwork in Durban, South Africa, with a Zulu gospel choir that functioned as a support group, activist organization, and performance troupe. Three distinct aspects (or levels) of intersubjectivity are discussed. The organization of these levels in music making is outlined through fine-grained discussion of how people with HIV coordinate bodies and voices in space as they make music together for each other and for international audiences. This article contributes to the further development of a musical semiotics, discussing how overlapping conceptualizations of intersubjectivity in multiple disciplines may be synthesized to analyze the performance of coordinated sonic action.     

Discussion paper: between sharing and discourse

This discussion paper aims at critically discussing some of the issues covered in the papers collected in the present special issue. It deals with four major points: the main differences between everyday interaction and interaction in musical settings, and the implications for music, seen as a locus for social semiosis; the “sharing” function of music, particularly with regards to its intersubjective nature; the relevance of multimodality in musical interaction; and the way music may achieve authority construction and negotiation. Finally, the paper highlights the most promising pathways for future research traced by the special issue.     

The Impersonal Strategy: Re-visiting Virginia Woolf's Position in The Common Reader Essays

The concept of impersonality as a writer's strategy has been exposed to misinterpretations that either fail to exhaust its full meaning and deposit an unequal amount of attention on all components of the term or, in the worst case, tend to distort its true elements. In relation to Virginia Woolf's criticism, in particular, it is a critical commonplace that the author employed an impersonal position in order not to fully materialise her feminist vision, but to shy away from explicitly expressing her feminist convictions and openly supporting women's rights. Indicative of this is the criticism that suggests disapproval of Woolf's reluctance to side with her own gender and declare the power of female personality.

The aim here is to challenge such critical views, separate the discussion of impersonality from its association with that of androgyny, and re-visit the issue of Woolf's employment of the impersonal strategy. I examine two of Woolf's essays on nineteenth-century women writers included in her first volume of The Common Reader and offer an analysis from both a gender-oriented and a genderless angle. Woolf's strong affinity with female conditions of oppression, her modernist convictions, her need to compromise with the male-dominated context of the time and her concurrent urge to co-operate with the common reader of an unspecified sex for the sake of artistic creation reveal more complex reasons behind her intentions than those examined by critics so far.     

Recognitive Freedom: Hegel and the Problem of Recognition

Abstract

This paper examines the theme of recognition in Hegel's account of self-consciousness, suggesting that there are unresolved difficulties with the relationship between the normative sense of mutual recognition and phenomenological cases of unequal recognition. Recent readings of Hegel deal with this problem by positing an implicit distinction between an ‘ontological’ sense of recognition as a precondition for autonomous subjectivity, and a ‘normative’ sense of recognition as embodied in rational social and political institutions. Drawing on recent work by Robert Pippin and Axel Honneth, I argue that Hegel's conception of rational freedom provides the key to grasping the relationship between the ontological and normative senses of recognition. Recognitive freedom provides a way of appropriating Hegel's theory of recognition for contemporary social philosophy.