中小企业外部股权融资难的原因分析

目前,我国中小企业外部股权融资还面临着诸多困难。构建制度环境是缓解中小企业外部股权融资困境的主要途径。     

《物权法》所有权概念的分析

所有权不仅是物权法,而且是整个民法中最为重要的概念之一。《物权法》第39条对所有权进行了描述性地定义,既继承了民法通则对所有权定义的传统,又揭示了所有权概念的部分内涵,具有一定的积极意义。但是,它没有囊括所有权的消极权能,更没有揭示出所有权作为“排他性支配权”的本质内涵。     

集体土地所有权立法的妥当性分析

物权法草案维持了农村土地集体所有权,这是立法者斟酌历史和现实的妥当选择。第一次规定了该权利行使的意思机关,完善了集体土地所有权制度。但草案仍然沿用现行法规定集体土地的三种所有权类型、规定集体经济组织为集体土地所有权行使的代表、不规定权利行使的监督组织,是不妥当的。应该取消乡(镇)、村民小组集体土地所有权,统一为村集体所有。集体经济组织在现实中和立法上都非常混乱,不适宜作为集体土地所有权行使代表。     

Family-owned,limited close corporations and protection of ownership

Protected ownership and freedom of contracts are two basic parts of the institutional framework of successful countries according to Douglass North, winner of the Nobel Prize in 1993. The incentives to make long-term investments are strengthened if ownership rights are protected and freedom of contracts is a basic element in the process of efficient allocation of scarce resources. An important engine in prosperous societies is the family firm. Most companies in these societies can be classified as family firms and a major part of GDP is produced by family businesses. Consequently, how ownership is protected in family firms is an important issue.Three important factors of private ownership of property are the rights to determine use of owned assets, the return generated from them and to transfer the assets at mutually agreeable terms to a new owner(s).The incentives of a founder entrepreneur to put efforts into the establishment of a firm are determined by all the three factors. We will here pay special attention to the third factor, transfer of the ownership of the firm. The founder often places contractual restrictions on such transfers to ensure that the structure of ownership is stable and that the firm stays in the family. The possibility to do so is part of the freedom of contracts and is associated with the extent of ownership held as well as the incentives to invest in new businesses.This paper is primarily about how protection of family ownership can be achieved from a legal point of view and discusses the reasons to enforce these legal relationships in the future for second, third, fourth etc. generations of family owners.     

所有权概念之思考

本文在反思传统所有权概念立法例及其理论缺陷的基础上 ,深入考察了所有权的内在方面和弹力性 ,认为 ,为全面理解所有权概念及其终极支配性 ,应放弃弹力性的说法 ,并将目光聚焦在“人”身上     

Justice,Fairness, and World Ownership

It is a central tenet of most contemporarytheories of justice that the badly-off have aright to some of the resources of the well-off.In this paper, I take as my starting point twoprinciples of justice, to wit, the principle ofsufficiency, whereby individuals have a rightto the material resources they need in order tolead a decent life, and the principle ofautonomy, whereby once everybody has such alife, individuals should be allowed to pursuetheir conception of the good, and to enjoy thefruits of their labour in pursuit of suchconception. I also endorse the value offairness, whereby the right person orinstitution makes the decision as to whether tobring about justice.I show that justice and fairness can besatisfied only if we all enjoy a combination ofprivate and collective rights over the world.In making that case, I shall argue that the setof ownership rights I advocate differs fromreadily available conceptions of restrictedprivate ownership in two important respects.First, it is such that in some circumstances,two individuals or more can have control rightsover the same property at the same time, not,as is standardly the case in legal systems, bycontracting with one another (through gifts andjoint purchase), but simply on grounds ofjustice. Second, it allows that, if necessary,property-owners be expropriated from theirproperty without compensation.     

论所有权的限制

所有权是一种最为完备、最为充分的物权,所有权制度是物权制度的核心。但任何一项权利都不 是绝对的,所有权也应受到一定的限制。从所有权限制的背景考察和法理基础出发,阐释所有权 应受限制之理由,并对我国所有权限制之状况进行了总结,并指出对所有权的限制与法律规定所 有权制度的目的是一致的,设定所有权的目的是为了解决资源的有限性和人的欲望的无限性引 起的人与人之间对物关系的紧张性,那么对所有权进行限制同样离不开这一目的。     

企业集团的多重利益冲突及其治理

企业集团作为一种企业合作组织形式，一方面因其制度优势而在世界经济中的地位日益重要，另一方面因其复杂结构所带来的诸多治理问题又制约了其良性发展。与单个企业相比，企业集团的组织结构复杂多变，治理问题也具有多重性。交叉持股型企业集团中应注意大股东之间的协调问题；纯粹控股型企业集团中注意要加强母公司对子公司的有效监控；而母子关系型企业集团中的治理问题最为复杂，应在母子公司之间建立一个良好的集权和分权机制，防止母公司对中小股东和债权人的利益侵害。     

买卖性造船合同下的所有权安排

顺应国际潮流,主张将造船合同归类为买卖合同,而非归类于承揽合同,并在此基础上,结合国际私法理论和英国法院的典型案例,对买卖性造船合同下的三种所有权安排进行了比较和分析。     

Corporate Governance in Spain (with an Application of the Power Indices Approach)

This paper describes the governance system of Spanish listed firms in the early 1990's. Although the institutional setting of the Spanish Stock Exchanges differs little from other European national markets, we found important differences in several aspects of corporate governance. In particular, some of the standard mechanisms of control (e.g. boards and institutional shareholders) do not play an active role, whereas ownership is relatively concentrated. Moreover, power indices suggest that controlling blocs of large shareholders are very likely to form. We thus conclude that the ownership of shares is a pivotal mechanism in the governance of Spanish corporations.