治理网络游戏成瘾是青少年成长发展辅导的系统工程

互联网的迅速兴起是科学技术发展创新的重要标志,也因此给青少年带来了思维、交往等模式的变化而形成了社会性的冲击,很多青少年陷入网络瘾癖不能自拔。治理青少年网络游戏成瘾的问题应是一个青少年成长发展辅导的系统工程,绝不能片面地指责网络,更不能简单地割断青少年与网络间的联系。我们需要做的:一是研究青少年发展需求,检讨青少年的生活状态,为青少年创造一个快乐成长的客观环境;二是加强青少年成长团体的建设,为孩子搭建平等交流的人际环境平台,尽可能在青少年个体的生存环境中建设起畅通的倾诉、沟通管道;三是进入孩子们的网络世界,更直接地了解虚拟世界里的孩子,更多学会掌握现代社会信息交流的工具,在现代技术的平台上与孩子共同成长。     

Bringing the battlefield into the classroom: using video games to teach and assess international humanitarian law

The graphic and widespread atrocities committed during conflicts around the world and broadcast across 24/7 news and social media have made war never feel so close and the powerlessness of law seem so real. This raises difficulties in engaging students in real-life decision-making quandaries where military necessity meets legalism, as well as fundamental ethical questions about the use of realistic, yet explicit, imagery in the classroom. The School of Law at Queen’s University Belfast has developed a series of innovative computer scenarios based on the Arma 3 open world tactical war simulator. A variety of formative scenarios (addressing issues such as cluster munitions and landmines) were developed to familiarise the students with the factual scenario and the computer technology. Subsequently, students engaged in a summative assessment to test their legal understanding in the face of increasingly challenging conflict situations, in particular grey zones where legal argument can justify seemingly morally wrongful acts during war. This paper examines both the learning objectives of this project, and the project development cycle – from the initial proposal to its implementation in class, as well as positing the benefits and drawbacks in integrating technology and games into the legal teaching environment, reflecting on the emerging and traditional pedagogy in this area.     

Power Dynamics in an Experimental Game

We introduce a new experimental method for studying power. Drawing from multiple theoretical perspectives, we conceptualize power as relational and structural, as well as comprised of different forms through which basic human needs can be met. Thus, the method we introduce examines how, when faced with a particular need, people use multiple forms of power concurrently and within a “field of influence,” namely, the other players in a game. This enabled us to examine how one form of power is transformed into another and how power is transferred from one player to another through interaction, as well as to measure power as behavior, as the exercise of choice, as potential, and as outcomes. Two experiments using egalitarian start conditions and a survivable ecology demonstrated that participants used power to gain more power, creating inequality. Being the target of force made some players unable to “survive” in the local ecology. Theoretical and methodological issues in the study of power are discussed and the application of our game method to the study of power in other fields is considered.     

Strategic rebels: a spatial econometric approach to rebel fighting durations in civil wars

ABSTRACT

Recent research on multi-actor civil wars highlights that rebel organizations condition their conflict behavior on that of other rebel organizations, with competition and free-riding constituting the core theoretical mechanisms. We provide a new actor-centric approach to explicitly model strategic interdependence in multi-actor civil wars. We argue that rebel organizations have incentives to remain mobilized until the end of a conflict to maintain their power to negotiate, power to spoil, power to enforce, and power to protect. This induces strategic complements that dominate duration dynamics in multi-actor conflicts. Based on a network game-theoretic model, we derive a spatial econometric framework that allows for a direct test of strategic interdependence. We find that the estimated duration interdependence is positive but partially offset in secessionist conflicts where the public goods nature of the incompatibility also induces strategic substitution effects.     

治理河流污染的制度激励悖论分析

为了治理日益加剧的河流污染,从中央到地方都相应出台了各种激励措施,但是这些措施并未起到显著效果,却形成了制度激励悖论。排污企业与地方政府在经历了新政策出台初的短暂扰动后,恢复原有均衡。要打破这一均衡,必须改变博弈各方的收益结构、可选策略集以及信息结构等,才有望建立符合科学发展观的最优均衡。     

A Tale of Two Leaders: Leadership and Cultural Change at the New Zealand Treasury

Differences in the transformational leadership exercised at the New Zealand Treasury (NZT) by two Secretaries – Henry Lang (1969-1973) and Graham Scott (1986-1996) – are related to differences in their paradigmatic situation rather than a shift away from a serial loyalist public service bargain that caused both to direct their leadership initiatives toward developing and maintaining the trust successive finance ministers placed in NZT advisors. Thus while Lang's leadership was directed toward expanding the reporting role of the NZT to the limits of what could be expected under a relatively stable market failure policy paradigm, the subsequent erosion of the authority of this paradigm meant that, under Scott's leadership, the NZT reinvented itself to avoid implication in a failure to contribute to the policy leadership required to advance a coherent reform strategy.     

Beyond griefing: Virtual crime

Because there is so much money involved in virtual worlds these days, there has been an increase in criminal activity in these worlds as well. The gaming community calls people who promote conflict “griefers”. Griefers are people who like nothing better than to kill team-mates or obstruct the game’s objectives. Griefers scam, cheat and abuse. Recently, they have begun to set up Ponzi schemes. In games that attempt to encourage complex and enduring interactions among thousands of players, “griefing” has evolved from being an isolated nuisance to a social disease. Much in the same way crime has become the real world’s social disease. Grief is turning into crime.     

虚拟财产应纳入夫妻共同财产——兼论网络游戏中虚拟财产的归属

随着网络游戏的普及,网络游戏逐渐成为某些人的一种职业,在夫妻生活中夫（妻）一方或双方玩网游的也不在少数,关于网络游戏中的虚拟财产之争已频繁出现。无形财产在婚姻家庭领域顺应时代潮流被纳入夫妻共同财产已是大势所趋,在离婚时应当由专门的评估机构对网络游戏虚拟财产价值进行评估,将其作为夫妻共同财产进行分割。     

Buying treaties with cigarettes: Internal side‐payments in two level games

Two‐level games models predict that domestic division within a state can alter the extent to which that state is able to reach agreements with other states, and also alter the content of any agreement that is reached. I extend the model by introducing internal side‐payments composed of unrelated domestic issues. Domestic opposition to an international agreement will inhibit cooperation most when the executive and median legislators are in relative agreement about other salient domestic political issues. Domestic opposition to an international agreement will inhibit cooperation least when the executive and median legislators are in relative disagreement about other salient domestic political issues. U.S. ratifications of the NAFTA and the Chemical Weapons Convention illustrate that not all types of domestic division inhibit international cooperation—some can facilitate it