State terror in the Philippines: the Alston Report,human rights and counter-insurgency under the Arroyo administration

The human rights agenda of the United Nations has faltered over recent years. An examination of conditions in a country such as the Philippines highlights some of the reasons. The appallingly high number of political killings in that country was investigated by Philip Alston, UN Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, early in 2007. Following a well-defined process of review, he spent a short but difficult time examining the situation. His report condemned repressive elements of the Philippine state and directed specific criticisms at the armed forces, noting the omnipresent role of counter-insurgency. He found that a culture of impunity prevailed within the military and that the Arroyo administration had not done enough to address the problem or to protect the rights of its citizens. Alston's visit provided an insight into both the Philippine government's inadequate human rights record and the failure of UN mechanisms established to redress such poor performance.     

Republican liberty and border controls

This article examines the normative status of border controls from a neo-republican perspective, grounded in the value of freedom as non-domination. It makes use of Philip Pettit’s account of this kind of freedom and discusses Pettit’s own remarks on the status of border controls. Against Pettit, it argues that the domination generated by border controls is ineliminable given existing political institutions, because such controls cannot avoid subjecting non-citizens to coercion in ways that are not forced to track their interests. The article also argues for an alternative neo-republican account of border controls that does not deny their coerciveness but allows for certain border control policies in non-ideal circumstances.     

Control,consent and political legitimacy

In this essay, I evaluate Philip Pettit’s theory of republican political legitimacy and maintain that it fails to provide a more satisfactory account of legitimacy than consent-based theories. I advance two interrelated theses. First, I argue that in so far as Pettit successfully narrows the scope that his theory of political legitimacy has to address, his arguments could be adapted to support consent-based theories. Second, I argue that Pettit’s theory fails to satisfy the high standards it sets for itself and is thus unsuccessful. My critique focuses on Pettit’s notions of historical, political and normative necessity, before evaluating whether his requirement of equally individualised popular control of government should be endorsed.     

Solidarity,equality, and freedom in Pettit’s republicanism

This article discusses Pettit’s views of social justice and political legitimacy in On the People’s Terms. Although Pettit’s book presents a powerful account of the ideal of nondomination, this article probes some deficiencies regarding important questions about solidarity, equality, and feasibility.     

Legal obligation as a duty of deference

An enduring question in political and legal philosophy concerns whether we have a general moral obligation to follow the law. In this paper, I argue that Philip Soper’s intuitively appealing effort to give new life to the idea of legal obligation by characterising it as a duty of deference is ultimately unpersuasive. Soper claims that people who understand what a legal system is and admit that it is valuable must recognise that they would be morally inconsistent to deny that they owe deference to state norms. However, if the duty of deference stemmed from people’s decision to regard the law as valuable as Soper argues, then people who do not admit the value of the state would have no duty as such to defer to its norms. And, more importantly, people who admit the value of the state would have a duty not to defer to particular norms, namely those norms which violate the values that ground their preference for a state. This critique of Soper operates within his parameters by accepting his claim that moral consistency generates reasons to act. Even on those terms, Soper’s defence of legal obligation as a duty of deference is unpersuasive. I wish to thank John Tasioulas, Joseph Raz, Bill Edmundson, Adam Cureton, the editors and referees of Law and Philosophy, and the participants of the Society for Applied Philosophy 25th anniversary conference, July 2005, St Anne’s College, Oxford.