How the City of London lost at Brexit: a historical perspective

The nature of the City of London as an offshore financial centre has long made London dependent on the British state providing protection from external political regulation, even as London’s foreign currency business separated its interests from British governments’ economic policy preoccupations. Since the 2008 crash and the onset of the eurozone crisis, London has faced threats to both its autonomy from external regulatory demands and to its offshore business interests at the same time as the long-standing external statecraft of British governments around EU membership has broken down. The Cameron governments’ efforts to protect the City within the European Union under political conditions that were transformed by the eurozone crisis exposed the limits of Britain’s position as a member of the European Union. When David Cameron then tried to resolve the problem of EU membership through a referendum he made it extremely difficult to defend the City’s broader commercial interests in the Single European Market because freedom of movement issues weighed significantly more in British domestic politics than financial services.     

Perhaps this time it's different: ideas and interests in shaping international responses to financial crises

The experience of the recent two decades of financial crises shows that donor countries and international financial institutions (IFIs) can respond to a crisis in a peripheral open economy by either of two crisis management strategies: either they can impose harsh conditionality to fix the domestic economy and prevent future moral hazard problems, or they can provide last-resort credit to restore market confidence. In some cases, the crisis management strategy changes as the crisis evolves. What are the factors that determine the choice of key donor countries and IFIs? This article traces the processes by which the USA and the International Monetary Fund designed the crisis management strategy in respect to the Asian crisis, and how Germany and the European Central Bank designed the response to the eurozone crisis, in order to understand how ideas regarding the causes and solutions of a financial crisis interact with the interests of key donor countries. The article argues that in both cases ideas and interests are mutually constituted, but in each case the mechanism that linked ideas and interests was different: whereas in the Asian case US interests led to policy innovation and experimentation and to a change in the crisis management strategy, in the European case ideas played a greater role in shaping German interests. The article explains this difference on the basis of the lessons learned by IFIs from the Asian crisis, which were then implemented in the eurozone case.     

The Eurozone as a Flawed Currency Area

The European single currency system has come under unprecedented strain during the past three years and there is little reason to assume that this will diminish, in any significant way, in the near future. This article briefly explores the background to the current eurozone crisis before outlining a number of potential solutions. Specifically, we discuss how the credit crunch induced recession of 2008 triggered the problems within the eurozone regarding sovereign debt, looking at the issues of spill‐over and free‐rider effects, together with the implementation of EMU fiscal rules. The analysis is then extended by outlining a series of potential remedies. This consists of a critical evaluation of solutions that the EU has already instigated (i.e. moral persuasion, financial relief measures and debt default), together with a series of alternative propositions (i.e. fiscal federalism and a European Clearing Union) and even the collapse of the euro.     

Paradoxes of Regionalism and Democracy: Brexit’s Lessons for the Commonwealth

Abstract

On 23 June 2016, 52% of Britons voted in a referendum to exit (Brexit) the European Union (EU) while 48% opted to remain. This is a watershed moment in world politics, given the implications for the future of the UK, the EU and the rest of the world. This paper uses the case of Brexit to analyse paradoxes of regionalism and democracy. The central question is, what does the case of Brexit suggests about the contradictions of democracy and regionalism in the 21st century? Importantly, what broad lessons may be gleaned from the case for regionalist projects among Commonwealth countries?     

Financial crises as catalysts for regional cooperation? Chances and obstacles for financial integration in ASEAN+3, MERCOSUR and the eurozone

This article compares and analyses the different answers from the Association of Southeast Asian Nations+3 (ASEAN+3), Mercado Común del Dur (MERCOSUR) and the eurozone on financial crises in their respective regions. All three regions were hit by economic turmoil between 1997 and 2012, but whereas ASEAN+3 and the eurozone answered with establishing regional liquidity arrangements (RLAs) in order to fight future crises, financial cooperation did not take off in MERCOSUR. Thus, the paper asks why some regions establish RLAs in cases of crisis and others do not. It argues that the variance of regional financial integration in different world regions is due to different interests of regional powers in their respective regions. The regional powers of ASEAN+3 and the eurozone are institutionally and/or economically highly embedded within their respective regions, but this is not the case for Brazil in MERCOSUR. China and Japan suffered from negative externalities of the Asian crisis, and, consequently, have had an interest to stabilize their neighbours’ economies after the crisis. In contrast, Brazil was able to follow a beggar-thy-neighbour strategy at the turn of the millennium, which externalized some of the costs of Brazil's own economic crisis towards Argentina. As a result, Brazil has had no interest in providing liquidity for its regional neighbours after the crisis. France and Germany are not only economically but also institutionally highly embedded in the eurozone because they share a common currency with their regional neighbours. Thus, the stability of the eurozone is a vital interest for Europe's regional powers, and they devote significant resources to stabilize the economies of the eurozone's periphery.     

The Commonwealth of Nations and the EU after the ‘Global’ Crisis: Rethinking Post-2015 ‘Global’ Development?

Abstract

The continuing ‘global’ crisis has accelerated divergences between regions, especially between the ‘rising’ global South, the European Union (EU) of the PIIGS (Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece and Spain) and Cyprus, which belongs to both the Commonwealth and the EU. This article studies the emerging ‘vertical’ divergences between the EU and the global South, especially around the so-called Economic Partnership Agreements, and the parallel ‘horizontal’ divergences among Anglophone, Francophone (the Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie) and Lusophone (the Comunidade dos Países de Língua Portuguesa) Commonwealths, with their inheritance of emulation and competition. It focuses on the possibilities of enhanced human/citizen security to propose an analysis that challenges established perspectives and points towards prospects for Commonwealth ‘schools’ of international relations/development.     

‘Whatever it takes’: Polanyian perspectives on the eurozone crisis and the gold standard

Abstract

The parallels between the monetary politics of the gold standard and that of the eurozone crisis are striking and have informed contemporary debate about the future of European integration. The eurozone crisis has been widely interpreted as the result of a mismatch between international monetary integration and a concomitant lack of fiscal integration, or more broadly as the result of a European Union which is economically integrated, yet politically fragmented. The prospect of a 1930s-style descent into division and nationalism has formed the backdrop against which moves towards extensive integration at the supranational level have been made. Polanyi diagnosed the political effects of monetary integration through his analysis of the gold standard system in The great transformation, making it important that we unpack his analysis and consider carefully how a Polanyian perspective might apply to the eurozone today. I argue that Polanyi encourages us to look beyond ‘monetary vs. fiscal’ and ‘economic vs. political’ characterizations of European integration, and instead to examine how such oppositions are formed in the first place and how they constrain political debate, particularly in terms of how ‘sound money’ is established as the highest policy concern. Through a re-reading of Polanyi's distinction between ‘all-purpose’ and ‘special-purpose’ money, I highlight how, despite the huge efforts undertaken to preserve the identity of the euro as an all-purpose currency, the eurozone crisis has rendered visible a series of latent conflicts between the different functions of money. This analysis moves us away from the ‘monetary vs. fiscal’ integration view of the eurozone crisis and towards a more open study of how the various possible purposes of money are being articulated and challenged, offering some limited hope for alternatives to the current eurozone policy agenda.     

Tracing leadership: the ECB’s ‘whatever it takes’ and Germany in the Ukraine crisis

Abstract

Political scientists face problems when assessing a leader’s impact: how can we know that a policy outcome or institutional change is caused by leadership? This article argues that in addition to relying on comparisons and counterfactuals, we need to trace the causal mechanisms by which leadership affects outcomes. Therefore, the article proposes a way to trace leadership and applies it to two cases of EU crisis management: the European Central Bank’s role in announcing Outright Monetary Transactions in the eurozone crisis, and Germany’s role in shaping the EU’s response to the Ukraine crisis. Systematic process-tracing shows that both actors provided leadership ‘by default’. However, while the ECB had to combine the provision of knowledge with unilateral action in order to overcome the eurozone crisis, Germany could use manifold bargaining-based strategies and thus became the EU’s de facto agenda setter and main representative in managing the Ukraine crisis.     

The Vocal Euro‐outsider: The UK in a Two‐speed Europe

The EU is divided between member states that have adopted the euro and those that have not. This article looks at the issue of differentiated integration with particular reference to eurozone integration and the euro‐outsiders. I explore the recent public debate in the UK on euro‐outsiderness, comparing this with debates in Denmark. The article highlights some striking differences between the UK and Denmark when it comes to the actual management of euro‐outsiderness in Brussels as well as some of the dilemmas facing euro‐outsiders such as the UK, Denmark, Sweden and Poland as the EU struggles to exit its crises. Finally, I discuss the future of two‐speed European integration and the UK's possible exit from the EU. The UK cannot escape the dilemma of favouring either influence or autonomy; whether the UK remains in or leaves the EU, it will need to allow the eurozone to proceed in order to prevent further eurozone crises.     

In the Eye of the Storm: The Italian Economy and the Eurozone Crisis

Abstract

The eurozone crisis had a more significant and longer-lasting impact on Italy than on virtually any other member state, with the effects still visible a decade after. The extent of the shock was surprising in view of progress Italy had apparently made in the 1990s in terms of enhancing its capacity to meet the demands of European Monetary Union. The explanation for this traumatic economic experience lies in Italy’s deep, long-term, structural tensions which were placed under severe pressure during the 1990s and which were cracked open by the 2011 sovereign debt crisis. These have had long-standing economic effects as well as political ramifications in terms of a significant change in the Italy–EU relationship.