Labelling and Legitimization: Justifying Political Violence in the Basque Country

This article focuses on the role of labelling in the discourse employed by the Left-Wing Nationalist movement in the Basque Country to legitimize the use of violence for political ends. The approach in this article goes beyond classic labelling theory. I demonstrate that radical Nationalists do not passively undergo their being labelled as deviants (fanatics, terrorists) by society, but develop counter-labels instead to define their opponents and re-label themselves.     

No more bullets for ETA: the loss of internal support as a key factor in the end of the Basque group’s campaign

The Basque separatist organisation ETA laid down its arms in 2011 after 40 years of an armed campaign for independence. It was not a consequence of political negotiations. The Basque group did not achieve its goals. Yet, it unilaterally decided to end its armed activity forever. This article analyses why and how ETA ended its armed campaign. It clarifies the events from the collapse of the last peace process in June 2007 to the announcement of the definitive end of ETA’s campaign in October 2011. It identifies the causal factors that led the Basque group towards its end. This article contends that the end of ETA’s campaign is a case of transformation triggered by its constituency’s withdrawal of support for the armed struggle. The leadership and social base of the political movement to which ETA belongs concluded that political violence was not effective anymore and, furthermore, was damaging for the Basque pro-independence movement. After an internal struggle, in which the faction advocating for exclusively political means prevailed, ETA was driven towards a unilateral abandonment of armed struggle.     

What Makes Terrorism Salient? Terrorist Strategies,Political Competition,and Public Opinion

This article analyzes the determinants of terrorism saliency in public opinion. It is usually assumed that after a terrorist attack, terrorism becomes automatically salient. However, this assumption is only true in those countries where terrorist attacks are exceptional events. In democracies that have suffered domestic terrorism for decades, the evolution of terrorism saliency does not only depend on the frequency or intensity of terrorist attacks. In this article it is claimed that the tactics carried out by terrorist groups (the type of victim, especially) and the dynamics of political competition (especially the ideology of the incumbent) are also factors that explain the evolution of terrorism saliency. The article also analyzes how these two factors interact with citizens’ predispositions to explain variation in their reactions to terrorist threat. The empirical test relies on a novel database from monthly public opinion surveys in Spain from 1993 to 2012.     

Restorative justice in the aftermath of politically-motivated violence: the Basque experience

ABSTRACT

An emerging body of literature discusses how restorative justice can contribute to the response to terrorism. This paper expresses concerns about the uncritical acceptance of many orthodox assumptions about terrorism inherent in the search for a “restorative response” to terrorism. When restorative justice embraces the label “terrorism” in what appears to be a politically neutral sense, rather than opening up a critical discussion of realities of political violence and the factors that had propelled it, it may form part of the efforts designed to inculcate “truths” that help control political dissent. With its key aspiration being to restore a presumed healthy order disrupted by terrorist offences, restorative justice may be enlisted to help entrench social relations that led to the violence in the first place. The paper illustrates this danger by examining attempts to use restorative justice techniques by Spanish authorities in the aftermath of ETA or Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (“Basque Homeland and Freedom”) violence. It is argued that rather than searching for a “restorative response” to terrorism, a more adequate framework for restorative justice in the aftermath of politically motivated violence may be found within broader projects of reparation for historical injustices, remembering and political reconciliation.     

Victims of ETA’s terrorism as an interest group: Evolution,influence, and impact on the political agenda of Spain

This article responds to the following research questions: How and why have victims of ETA’s terrorism in Spain become an interest group with significant influence on the political and legislative agenda of the country. The evolution of the associative movement of victims of terrorism is assessed in order to explain the process by which their influence and impact on the political agenda has gradually grown throughout the years. It analyzes the transition from the isolation suffered by victims of terrorism in the early days of ETA’s campaign to the prominent social and political role played at later stages. The factors that motivate and explain their active role as interest groups are looked into, demonstrating different claims and interests with varying degrees of coherence and leverage. The relevancy of victims of terrorism within the anti-terrorist policies of various Spanish governments will be established, as well as the achievements and limitations of such a significant interest group.     

Restorative justice in the Basque peace process: some experiments and their lessons

This paper contributes to the literature that analyses application of restorative justice in transitional societies. It examines recent attempts to employ restorative justice in the Basque peace process following ETA’s ceasefire. Using the Basque experience, it discusses some of the hidden dangers and tensions which arise when attempts are made to utilize ‘traditional’ restorative justice approaches and assumptions underlying them in transitional settings. One of the initiatives under discussion used a well-established restorative justice method of mediation between individual victims and offenders and attempted to transplant it without alteration from the context of ‘ordinary’ crime to the context of ‘political’ crime. It is argued that the scale and complexity of the conflict that looms behind individual offences in question renders certain assumptions and practices of ‘traditional’ restorative justice questionable both ethically and politically. Several other initiatives that have emerged recently in the Basque peace process are discussed which do not take the ‘classic’ form of restorative justice, yet values underpinning them fit well with the restorative justice philosophy. They might suggest a more promising direction for the development of restorative justice in the aftermath of mass violence.     

Examining Deterrence and Backlash Effects in Counter-Terrorism: The Case of ETA

Scholars are increasingly drawing on models and theories from the field of Criminology to offer new insights on terrorist violence. A particularly useful framework by LaFree, Dugan, and Korte works from the assumption that illegal behaviour can be affected by the threat and/or imposition of punishment. It sees the results of the government's intervention in terms of deterrence (state's repressive action leads to a reduction in terrorism violence), and backlash (state's repressive action leads to defiance and retaliation, and to an upsurge of terrorism violence). This article applies this model to a case study of the government's responses to Euzkadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA). It uses a variation of survival analysis technique—Series Hazard—to assess the impact of six major initiatives on the risk of new ETA attacks in the period from 1977 to 2010. Mostly, the results provide support for both backlash interpretations, although important questions regarding interpretation are raised.     

Killing and Voting in the Basque Country: An Exploration of the Electoral Link Between ETA and its Political Branch

We deal in this article with the relationship between ETA attacks and electoral support for Batasuna, its political wing. We show that the relationship is twofold, since the geographical distribution of electoral support for the terrorists affects the location of ETA attacks, but violence also influences electoral support for the terrorist cause. On the one hand, when ETA chooses a location for its attacks, it takes into account the electoral strength of Batasuna. Our results show that the higher the vote for Batasuna in a municipality, the more likely members of the security forces will be killed there. With regard to the targeting of civilians, the relationship is curvilinear. ETA kills civilians in municipalities that are polarized, where support for Batasuna falls short of being hegemonic. On the other hand, our results also show that ETA attacks have an effect on the size of its support community. When ETA kills members of the security forces, voters punish the Batasuna party electorally. In the case of civilians, it depends on the specifics of the various campaigns. We find that when ETA kills informers and drug-dealers, the vote for Batasuna increases. ETA's killing of non-nationalist politicians, however, decreases Batasuna's vote share.     

Exit From Terrorism: A Qualitative Empirical Study on Disengagement and Deradicalization Among Members of ETA

Terrorists disengage from the groups or organizations to which they belong as a result of structural, organizational, or personal factors. These types of factors seem to operate with relative mutual independence. All this can be analytically induced from research conducted at an individual level of analysis, based on 35 long interviews with former members of ETA who voluntarily decided to conclude their militancy at some point between 1970 and 2000. Until the mid-1980s, the individual decision to leave ETA tended to be linked to a subjective perception of ongoing political and social changes. From then on, disagreement with the internal functioning of the ethno-nationalist terrorist organization or the tactics adopted by its leaders became more salient motivations for those militants who decided to walk away. All along, however, there were ETA members who left terrorism behind for reasons of a rather personal nature. As expected, in this qualitative empirical study, disengagement was found to be a process seldom concomitant to that of deradicalization.