Playing the regional card: why and how authoritarian gravity centres exploit regional organisations

The evidence of regional authoritarian clustering across different world regions goes together with the finding that after the end of the bipolar world regional patterns of interaction became more important. Especially in the 2000s a process of revitalisation of regional organisations and even the creation of new regional organisations took place. Interestingly, these newly founded organisations consist predominantly of authoritarian regimes. Due to the emergence and resilience of authoritarianism in the world, the question arises: To what extent do regional organisations (ROs) play a role in this phenomenon? We argue that authoritarian protagonists which we call authoritarian gravity centres (AGCs) constitute a force of attraction for countries in geopolitical proximity – and use ROs as a transmission belt and a learning room for disseminating autocratic elements. In a cross-regional comparison, based on extensive field work, we provide empirical analysis on two AGCs (Saudi Arabia and Venezuela) within their respective ROs Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (ALBA-TCP) and tackle the questions of why and how autocracies decide to move forward multilaterally within the RO.     

Understanding the foreign policy of autocratic actors: ideology or pragmatism? Russia and the Tymoshenko trial as a case study

While the literature on the autocratic regimes has been rapidly growing in the last years, there still exists a research gap in this field: which impact do autocratic regimes have on the regime transition in the neighbouring countries? The literature on autocracies has demonstrated that autocratic political leaders tend to support each other. This article argues that the external influence of an autocracy may be more complex. The article analyses the case of Russia's international standing in relation to the trial of Yulia Tymoshenko. Using detailed process tracing, it has been shown that in terms of the Russian position, pragmatic goals may undermine ideological goals. Thus, while the main objective of Russia is to ensure the stability of gas contracts, the unintended consequences of its actions undermine the consolidation of autocratic regime in Ukraine. The article builds on the literature on regime transition, autocracy, and international relations.     

封建俄国缙绅会议简析

在 16、17世纪社会各阶层发展形成的基础上 ,应沙皇专制统治要求 ,召开了缙绅会议。它形式上是软弱的 ,根本不是选举的代议机关。但它是在俄罗斯统一国家形成之后 ,中央集权国家发展这个环节当中 ,等级君主制政治结构的一种典型表现形式。在社会发展的历程中 ,缙绅会议出现了 ,然后又被淘汰     

刑事政策体系中的民间社会与官方(国家)——一种基于治理理论的场域界分考察

治理理论是当今世界上颇具代表性的新型国家——社会关系架构和公共事务管理模式,也是认识刑事政策体系中民间社会与官方(国家)在犯罪抗制场域界分时的重要分析工具。运用这一工具可以看出,民间社会与官方(国家)在刑事政策体系中存在着专治与共治领域的治理分工。其中,专治领域是国家保有的专属犯罪抗制场域,共治领域则是官方(国家)与民间社会合作抗制犯罪的开放空间。同时,在共治领域中,官方(国家)与民间社会应形成协同支持、国家主导的伙伴关系。     

Modelling Transitions To and From Democracy

This article describes the results of a broad reanalysis of factors shaping the prospects of countries making a transition to or from democracy using a new measure of regime type. While some of the results are consistent with prior quantitative and comparative research, others are not. For example, in line with other studies, the article finds that autocracies are more likely to make a transition to democracy when they offer broader protections for civil liberties, experience a change in political leadership, or suffer an economic downturn. At the same time, the analysis does not support the claim that transitions in neighbouring countries directly improve prospects for a transition to democracy, or that economic decline and presidential systems heighten the risk of democratic breakdown. Perhaps most intriguing, our model of transitions to democracy also identifies a new twist on old stories linking economic development to democratization. For countries under authoritarian rule that have attempted democracy before, the research here indicates that development does improve prospects for another attempt, as modernization theory suggests. For countries with no democratic experience, however, affluence conveys no direct democratizing benefit and appears, if anything, to help sustain authoritarian rule.     

Can non-democracies support international democracy? Turkey as a case study

Abstract

In recent years, there has been a rise of interest in the concept of autocracy promotion, with scholars questioning whether the efforts by authoritarian governments to influence political transitions beyond their borders are necessarily pro-authoritarian. An extension of this question is whether some authoritarian governments may at times find it in their interest to support democracy abroad. This article aims to answer this question by focusing on the case of Turkey. It argues that, despite its rapidly deteriorating democracy since the late 2000s, Turkey has undertaken democracy support policies with the explicit goal of democratic transition in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region during the Arab Spring and, while not bearing the intention of democratic transition, has employed democracy support instruments in the form of state-building in sub-Saharan Africa since 2005 to the present day. Based on original fieldwork, the article finds that non-democracies can turn out as democracy supporters, if and when opportunities for strategic gains from democratisation abroad arise. The article further suggests that even in those cases where strategic interests do not necessitate regime change, a non-democracy may still deploy democracy support instruments to pursue its narrow interests, without adhering to an agenda for democratic transition.     

Unpacking Autocracy: Political Regimes and IMF Program Participation

Why do some countries participate in IMF programs while others refuse to do so? We suggest an answer to the question by unpacking one side of the typical democracy–autocracy dichotomy. Specifically, we utilize the growing literature on the varieties of authoritarianism to develop an argument linking the different incentives and constraints that leaders in party-based, personalist, and military regimes face when considering whether to sign agreements with the IMF. Empirically, we demonstrate that distinguishing among autocracies uncovers important variations in the sensitivity of such regimes to the political costs incurred by IMF participation. Party-based autocracies, for instance, respond to both sovereignty costs and the benefits of program participation during severe economic crises. Personalist regimes, however, are not sensitive to the sovereignty costs incurred with IMF participation and thus only participate when doing so provides needed revenue during economic crises. The unique features of military juntas, by contrast, suggests that such regimes are not sensitive to either of these political costs and thus do not respond to economic crises in the same way as their autocratic counterparts.     

The threat of autocracy diffusion in consolidated democracies? The case of China,Singapore and Australia

The majority of today’s authoritarian regimes have little hope of promoting autocracy beyond their own borders, let alone to consolidated democratic countries. However, China and Singapore are two prominent examples of non-democratic countries whose soft power arsenals have given them some global appeal beyond that enjoyed by most authoritarian regimes. But to what extent has China’s and Singapore’s power of example influenced consolidated democracies in terms that the latter wanting to replicate some political practices or even norms in these non-democratic regimes? In this article, we engage recent works to examine this question in relation to how Australians perceive the political example offered by China and Singapore. Focusing our analysis on several prominent polls conducted recently by the Lowy Institute for International Policy, we suggest that at present there is little evidence of a causal impact of the rise of authoritarian powerhouses such as China and Singapore on how Australians view democracy at home. Through these case studies, this article sheds some light on the theoretical as well as practical questions about the inherent impediments of authoritarian diffusion in consolidated democracies.     

Regime type and good governance in low and high income states: what is the empirical link?

This analysis looks at the link between regime type and good governance across four different levels of development – low income countries, medium-low income countries, medium-high income countries, and high income countries. Through pooled time series analysis of more than 170 countries with yearly or bi-yearly data from 1996 to 2009, I find that democracies are better governed than non-democracies. This relationship is robust across all regime types. Even at a low level of development, countries that elect their representatives in free and fair elections have a better regulatory framework and are more efficient and transparent. The practical implications of this finding are that a democratically governed state will most likely have a superior social and economic track record than a non-democracy.     

A third wave of autocratization is here: what is new about it?

Less than 30 years after Fukuyama and others declared liberal democracy’s eternal dominance, a third wave of autocratization is manifest. Gradual declines of democratic regime attributes characterize contemporary autocratization. Yet, we lack the appropriate conceptual and empirical tools to diagnose and compare such elusive processes. Addressing that gap, this article provides the first comprehensive empirical overview of all autocratization episodes from 1900 to today based on data from the Varieties of Democracy Project (V-Dem). We demonstrate that a third wave of autocratization is indeed unfolding. It mainly affects democracies with gradual setbacks under a legal façade. While this is a cause for concern, the historical perspective presented in this article shows that panic is not warranted: the current declines are relatively mild and the global share of democratic countries remains close to its all-time high. As it was premature to announce the “end of history” in 1992, it is premature to proclaim the “end of democracy” now.