对下调法定最低刑责年龄的省思

此次刑法修正案(十一)对最低刑事责任年龄进行下调,可以在很大程度上避免一部分已满12周岁未满14周岁的未成年人倚仗法律保护肆意实施危害行为的"钻法律之空子"的情况发生,能够有效提升法律的威慑力,使公众免受"12岁恶魔"的伤害。在作为调整对象的低龄未成年人一侧,最低刑责年龄的下调意味着他们必须为自己的不法行为承担责任、付出代价。戴上这只法律"金箍"的未成年人将不得不在法律的框架内保持自身行为的检点合法。当然,虽然法律对最低刑事责任年龄进行了下调,但犯罪未成年人仍然需要在"教育为主、惩罚为辅"的矫治环境中得到救赎,既不能"一放了之",也不能"一关了之"[1]。在"疏"与"堵"并行的同时加强相关法律制度的衔接,使低龄未成年人可以在一个相对完善的制度设计中树立起对法律以及他人权益的敬畏之心。     

Conservation in Context: Toward a Systems Framing of Decentralized Governance and Public Participation in Wildlife Management

Governance scholars have long championed the adaptive utility of decentralized management institutions, in part due to their ability to bring diverse stakeholders into decision‐making processes. However, research into the link between decentralization and participation often looks at policy design but bypasses important system feedbacks that shape sustained participation over time. To paint a more robust picture detailing how decentralization and participation are related, this paper uses a complex systems framework to explore interacting structural, operational, and cultural components of decentralized wildlife governance institutions in the United States and Botswana. Through this comparative analysis, I argue that the landscape of public participation in decentralized governance institutions appears to be significantly impacted by three factors: 1) how decentralization processes occurred, 2) where in the process of decision making participation is situated, and 3) perceptions of power distribution between groups with competing interests.     

The Space Between: Demonization of Opponents and Policy Divergence

Prior research on policy conflicts indicates a tendency among policy actors to misperceive the influence of actors engaged in policy debates based on the degree of distance between their relative policy positions. This research develops a measure for assessing the degree and direction of the misperception effect. This measure is then utilized as a dependent variable to assess the relationship between theoretically relevant factors and the degree to which actors will exaggerate the influence of their opponents and allies. The research uses original survey data of policy actors engaged in the debate over hydraulic fracturing in New York. The results indicate misperceptions of relative influence are prevalent and most associated with the experience of a policy loss and holding relatively extreme policy beliefs. The findings provide new insight into factors that influence the demonization of political opponents. These insights are timely in the context of polarized debates over environmental and energy policy in the United States.     

商榷“婚姻法解释（三）”第十一条规定之不适当——基于“对夫妻共有产权另一方权益保护”视角

本文通过引用《宪法》的规定,列举和分析此条对夫妻共有房产权另一方权益的侵害及其程度,以及由此导致的司法资源浪费、社会不安定因素的增加等方面的不适当之处,以《宪法》至高无上的法律效力、特别法优先于一般法、侵权行为是无效法律行为等法制的原理和原则,从维护司法公正、权威,保护妇女合法权益,维护全社会共同保障妇女权益的大好局势和社会安定团结等方面,提出对“婚姻法解释（三）”第十一条改变或撤销建议。     

Does terrorism create terror?

The conceptual and etymological meaning of the terms ‘terror’ and ‘terrorism’ is so closely connected that it seems difficult to distinguish the one from the other. However, by comparing the idea that terrorism inevitably creates terror with the results of recent empirical studies of the psychological effects of terrorist attacks, four different points of view emerge corresponding to four distinct interpretations of the results. It is thus clearly necessary to redefine the terminology relating to terrorism, in order to conduct the discussion on a more rigorous basis.     

Issues in teaching terrorism as cultural artefact

From a humanities course on terrorism that focuses on how terrorist ideology and acts are transformed into cultural artefacts, several pedagogical–theoretical issues have emerged: the incongruity of viewing terrorist violence as art; 9/11 as an ahistorical event; the impossibility of defining terrorism; the infiltration (trivialisation?) of terrorism into popular culture; subgenres of terrorist works, each with its own paradigm; and the iconoclastic potential of many terrorist texts and films. These issues have implications for the curricular design of terrorism courses and for the role of instructors – in academia and in the larger community.     

Who is the enemy now? Islamophobia and antisemitism among Russian Orthodox nationalists before and after September 11

In this article Verkhovsky focuses on Russian nationalist groups who base their ideology on the Russian Orthodox tradition. These Russian Orthodox nationalists should be distinguished both from those nationalists for whom Orthodoxy is clearly overwhelmed by the ideological demands of ethno-nationalism, as well as from those who use Orthodoxy simply as a popular symbol of national identity. Orthodox nationalists, moreover, are fairly independent of the Moscow Patriarchate and its ideology. The ideology of Orthodox nationalism focuses both on its principal enemy, the Antichrist, and on those enemies subordinate to the Antichrist: Jews, Catholics, the West, the New World Order and so on. In the mid-1990s Islam had no obvious place among this set of hostile forces. The Moscow Patriarchate and moderately nationalist politicians, relying to some extent on Eurasianist ideas, saw the relationship between Orthodoxy and Islam in Russia as a harmonious one, and, on the whole, Orthodox nationalists did not disagree, although individuals occasionally claimed that the Jews, using the West, were setting Islam against Orthodox Russia. The situation began to change during the second Chechen war, when Orthodox nationalists began to issue warnings of an Islamic threat. This was related not only to the situation in former Yugoslavia and in Chechnya, but also to an increase in the immigration of Muslims to ethnically Russian regions of the country. For Orthodox nationalists, this Islamic threat was part of the larger threat coming from the Jews and the West. Islam, they claimed, was being used as a tool by the Antichrist not only because it was a flawed religion, but because it, being less godless than the West, would produce radical Islamism as a synthesis of western technology and eastern passion. In the intense debates that followed in the wake of the attacks of 11 September 2001 most Orthodox nationalists in Russia supported adopting a neutral position in the supposed ‘clash of civilizations’ between Islam and the West.